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OF THE

ORIGIN AND PROGRESS

OF

LANGUAGE.

Graiis ingenium, Graiis dedit ore rotundo
Musa loqui.——— HORAT.

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OF THE

ORIGIN AND PROGRESS

OF

LANGUAGE.

VOL. V. BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

Of the Roman hiſtory, and the excellence of the ſubject of it above that of the ſubject of any other hiſtory, even of that of Herodotus.—The two compared together.—The progreſs of the Roman State from the ſmalleſt beginnings.—Difference in that reſpect betwixt Rome and the king-

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is not good, the matter *of them is excellent.*

I PROCEED now, according to the method propoſed in the end of the laſt volume, to ſpeak of the hiſtory of Rome, and of ſeveral authors Greek and Latin, who have written that hiſtory, the ſubject of which I think is ſtill more excellent than that of Herodotus' hiſtory. The ſubject indeed of Herodotus is ſo far more various that it takes in the hiſtory of many nations, all that were known in his time, and down to the age immediately before that in which he lived, and it concludes with a war, which, for the works preparatory to it, the number of men employed in it, and the importance of the ſucceſs of it, is the greateſt event in the hiſtory of man. But the hiſtory of none of thoſe many nations is ſo well known, or ſo intereſting as the hiſtory of Rome, which produced the greateſt empire that ever was on earth. And as to the great event which is the cataſtrophe of Herodotus's hiſtory, it was but a ſingle war decided by

three ſea-fights, and one battle at land, (for the defence of Thermopylae by the 300 Spartans cannot be called a battle); whereas in the Roman hiſtory we have numbers of great wars and famous battles not eaſy to be counted; and there is no hiſtory ſo diſtinguiſhed, and adorned with illuſtrious characters, that ſhine like lights in the dark, and throw a ſplendor upon it, which illuminates this hiſtory more than any other.

But what makes the Roman ſtory a more inſtructive and entertaining ſubject of hiſtory than that of any other people, is, that we can trace this mighty empire back to as low a beginning as that of any ſtate we read of. It was originally a ſmall colony from no great city, namely, *Alba Longa*; and its territory at firſt was not of the extent of many a private eſtate in Great Britain. Of this territory each citizen had for his ſhare *two jugera*, that is, about an acre and a half. Their firſt wars, as Valerius Maximus tells us *, were within ſeven

* De Animi Moderatione, lib. 4. cap. 1. ſect. 10.

miles of their city. And the force with which they waged thoſe wars was no more than 3000 foot, and about 300 horſe *; a much leſs force than many Scotch barons could have brought to the field, one of whom, the Earl of Douglas, uſed to travel thro' the country in time of peace with a retinue of 2000 horſe. Now the empires of Aſia, of which Herodotus ſpeaks, namely, the empire of the Aſſyrians, the Medes, and the Perſians, we cannot trace from ſuch ſmall beginnings, tho', no doubt, there was a time when there were as ſmall ſtates in Aſia as the Roman; but we have no records of Aſia, till arts and civility were far advanced in that part of the world, nor conſequently till there were wars and conqueſts, by which great kingdoms are formed. And, accordingly, all we know of Aſia, in very antient times, is, that a great king of Aſſyria conquered a great part of it; then the Medes conquered the Aſſyrians; and, laſtly, the Perſians the Medes. Whereas we know, that the Romans, from the ſmall beginnings I have

* Dionyſ. Halicarnaſ. lib. 2. cap. 16.

mentioned, roſe to be a great ſtate in the midſt of many warlike nations, more powerful than they, with whom they had to contend for ſome hundreds of years, not for glory and dominion only, but for life and liberty, and the means of ſubſiſtence. During that time, they experienced, as was neceſſary, great viciſſitudes of fortune; once their army was totally defeated, and their city taken, all except the rock upon which they had a citadel, that they called the Capitol. And, when they came to contend with the Carthaginians for glory and dominion, they loſt three great battles; and, in the laſt of them, had 70,000 of their citizens killed upon the ſpot, and 10,000 taken priſoners *.

But what inſtructs us more than all theſe various events, is, that we learn from this hiſtory by what laws, by what inſtitutions, and by what manners, the Romans became the greateſt people that ever exiſted in the great arts of government and arms. Without this knowledge, we might

* Polybius.

believe, as we find ſome of the Greeks did *, that thoſe barbarians, as they called the Romans, were by the mere caprice of fortune raiſed to the empire of the world. But their hiſtory, if diligently ſtudied, muſt convince every intelligent reader, that, by their wiſdom and their virtues, they merited that empire; and particularly, by that greateſt of all virtues, piety, in which, as Cicero has obſerved, they excelled all the world: 'For,' ſays he, 'the Spaniards exceed us in numbers, the Gauls in the glory of war, and the Greeks in arts: But we ſurpaſs all nations in that *prime wiſdom*, by which we have learned, that all things are governed and directed by the immortal Gods †.'

Nor is the fall of this empire leſs edifying than the riſe of it. Neither ſhould we have underſtood ſo well by what arts it roſe, if we had not likewiſe known by what change of manners, and what vices

* Plutarchus, *De fortuna Populi Romani.*

† *Oratio de Haruſpicum Reſponſis*: 'Sed pietate ac religione, atque hac una ſapientia, quod Deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perſpeximus, omnes gentes nationeſque ſuperavimus.'

it fell. But, even in their fall, we muſt admire this great people; for the vices of the Romans, as well as their virtues, ſeem to be ſomething above humanity *.

From all theſe conſiderations, I think we may conclude, that the world has never furniſhed ſuch a ſubject for hiſtory as the Roman ſtate. And, what may convince the reader, more perhaps than any thing I have ſaid, of the excellency of this ſubject of hiſtory, let him compare the Roman hiſtory with the hiſtory of ſome modern nations in Europe for theſe laſt 50 or 60 years, which is ſuch, that I am perſuaded no man of genius or learning will deign to write it: And then we may apply to it what Milton ſays of the want of records in the barbarous ages: 'Perhaps,' ſays he, 'diſeſteem and contempt of the public affairs then preſent, as not worth recording, might partly be in cauſe. Certainly, 'ofttimes, we ſee, that wiſe men, and of 'beſt abilities, have forborn to write the 'acts of their own days, while they beheld, with a juſt loathing and diſdain,

* See what I have ſaid of the Romans in the laſt chapter of vol. 3. of this work.

'not only how unworthy, how perverſe, 'how corrupt, but often how ignoble, how 'petty, how below all hiſtory, the perſons 'and their actions were, who, either by 'fortune, or ſome rude election, had at-'tained, as a ſore judgment and ignominy 'upon the land, to have chief ſway in 'managing the commonwealth *.'

I come now to ſpeak of the hiſtorians Greek and Latin, who have treated this ſo excellent ſubject. And I will begin with the Roman hiſtorian Livy, whoſe plan was more extenſive than that of any other I ſhall mention; for he intended, and did actually write the whole hiſtory of Rome for the ſpace of above 700 years, from the foundation of the city down to the age of Auguſtus, in which he lived. In his preface, which is a piece of admirable compoſition, he praiſes, I think moſt juſtly, the people whoſe hiſtory he is to write: '*Cae-'terum aut me amor negotii ſuſcepti fallit,*

* Milton's *Preface to his Hiſtory of England*, the whole of which I would adviſe every reader to peruſe, who has any taſte for the elegance of antient compoſition, and deſires to know how far it may be imitated in Engliſh.

'*aut nulla uſquam reſpublica nec major, nec*
'*ſanctior, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit:*
'*Nec in quam civitatem tam ſera avaritia*
'*luxuriaque immigraverint: Nec ubi tan-*
'*tus ac tam diu paupertati ac parſimoniae*
'*honos fuerit. Adeo, quanto rerum minus,*
'*tanto minus cupiditatis erat.*' And he knew perfectly well the fruit that was to be reaped from reading the hiſtory of the fall, as well as the riſe of ſuch a people; for, in the ſame preface, there is the following paſſage: '*Ad illa mihi pro ſe quiſ-*
'*que acriter intendat animum, quae vita,*
'*qui mores fuerint: Per quos viros, quibuſ-*
'*que artibus, domi militiaeque, et partum et*
'*auctum imperium ſit. Labente deinde pau-*
'*latim diſciplina, velut deſidentes primo*
'*mores ſequatur animo; deinde ut magis*
'*magiſque lapſi ſint; tum ire coeperint prae-*
'*cipites: Donec ad haec tempora, quibus*
'*nec vitia noſtra, nec remedia pati poſſumus,*
'*perventum eſt. Hoc illud eſt praecipue*
'*in cognitione rerum ſalubre et frugiferum,*
'*omnis te exempli documenta in illuſtri po-*
'*ſita monumento intueri: Inde tibi tuaeque*
'*reipublicae, quod imitere, capias: Inde foe-*
'*dum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites.*'

Here we have the moral of his hiſtory, the chief thing to be conſidered in every work, very well ſet forth.

The character of this hiſtorian, I think, is moſt amiable; for, in the courſe of this hiſtory, he has ſhown himſelf religious, a lover of virtue, and who had ſenſe and philoſophy enough to prefer the firſt ages of Rome, and the antient parſimony and ſimplicity of manners, to all the wealth and luxury, the pomp and grandeur of Rome in the days of Auguſtus, (who boaſted, that of a brick he had made it a marble city *) and to their wide extended empire at that time. The rule of writing hiſtory, no doubt, is, that an hiſtorian ſhould not appear in his own work any more than an epic or a tragic poet. It is the buſineſs of an orator to exhibit himſelf as a good man, and friendly to thoſe to whom he ſpeaks; for the character of the orator, as Ariſtotle has told us, is one topic of perſuaſion †: Whereas the reader has nothing to do with the character of the hiſtorian.

* Suetonius, *in Vita Auguſti.*

† Ariſtot. *Rhetoric.*

Nevertheleſs, if an hiſtorian can naturally, and without affectation, introduce obſervations upon men and manners, and compare the times of which he is writing with better or worſe times, and thereby ſhow his own ſentiments and opinions to be ſuch as a good man ought to have, I think he is not only pardonable, but commendable. Now, this Livy has done, more, I think, than any other hiſtorian I know.

And firſt, as to his ſentiments upon religion, he has given us a very fine reflection comparing the manners of the Romans in antient times with thoſe of the ſame people in his time; and he has introduced it very properly upon occaſion of the tribunes endeavouring to perſuade the people, that they were not bound by their military oath to follow the conſul Quinctius Cincinnatus to the field, becauſe he was a private man, when they took that oath. This argument from their own magiſtrates, and tending too to perſuade them to follow their own inclinations, by not doing what they were very averſe to do, one ſhould have thought, could not have failed of ſucceſs. But ſuch was the reverence at

that time for the religion of an oath, that they had no regard to this cavil of the tribunes, as Livy very properly calls it: Upon which he ſays, '*Nondum haec, quae nunc* '*tenet ſeculum, negligentia Deûm vene-* '*rat: Nec interpretando ſibi quiſque juſju-* '*randum et leges aptas faciebat, ſed ſuos* '*potius mores ad ea accommodabat* *.'

In another paſſage † he gives us an example of their reverence for their military oath, and of the ſeverity of the diſcipline of their armies, ſuch as I believe is not to be found in the hiſtory of any other nation. In the 283 year of Rome there happened a moſt violent contention betwixt the patricians and plebeians, upon the ſubject of the election of the tribunes of the people. Before that time, they had, from their firſt inſtitution, been always elected in the *comitia centuriata*, the ſame in which the conſuls were elected; and where the patricians, by their property and their influence with their clients and dependents, had a great weight; ſo that they had commonly one or more of the tribunes in their inte-

* Lib. 3. cap. 20.

† Lib. 2. cap. 59.

reſt. To prevent this, the plebeians inſiſted, that a law ſhould paſs, ordering the election of tribunes to be by the *comitia tributa*, where every free citizen had an equal vote, without regard to his fortune. This law the patricians oppoſed moſt vehemently. And, at the head of the oppoſition, they ſet Appius Claudius, whom they procured to be named conſul. Accordingly, he oppoſed the paſſing of this law with ſo much vehemence, that, if it had not been for the wiſdom of the ſenate, and the moderation of his colleague, things would have come to extremity; and there would have been violence and bloodſhed even in the *comitia*. But the ſpirit of the people was raiſed to ſuch a height, that the patricians were obliged to yield, and the law was paſſed; and indeed there ſeemed to be ſome reaſon that the people ſhould have the election of their own magiſtrates. After this, Appius Claudius, the conſul, was ſent at the head of an army into the country of the Volſci, who were then at war with the Romans. There, being a man of a moſt violent and imperious diſpoſition, full of the hereditary hatred his houſe bore to the plebeians, and in-

ſhamed beſides by the animoſity which the people and their tribunes had ſhown againſt him in the buſineſs of the law, he exerciſed military diſcipline with the greateſt ſeverity, and in ſuch a manner as to ſhow plainly that he was more guided by paſſion and hatred to the plebeians, than by that prudence which became a general. The conſequence of this was, that, in a battle which he had with the Volſci, the Romans yielded the victory, and ſhamefully fled to their camp, and made no reſiſtance till the Volſci attacked their intrenchments, which they defended, not chuſing to ſubmit to the ſhame and loſs of having their camp and their whole baggage taken. The next day Appius was perſuaded by his lieutenants and the tribunes of legions to leave the enemy's country, and to retire to the Roman territories. As they were retiring, the Volſci attacked them: And the Romans, inſtead of defending themſelves, ran away ſhamefully, and threw down their arms. The conſul, after having in vain tried to make his troops ſtand, when he had got out of the enemy's country called them together, and, aſking what was

become of their arms and ſtandards, all the ſtandard-bearers he whipt and cut off their heads; and the reſt of the army he decimated. To which puniſhment they quietly ſubmitted *. That with ſuch military diſcipline the Romans ſhould conquer the world, is not to be wondered.

What he ſays in his preface ſhows that he had the opinion I have mentioned of the ſtate of Rome in his own time, ſplendid and magnificent as it then appeared to be, compared with its antient ſtate. It is where he ſpeaks of one fruit he ſhould reap from his labours in the great work he had undertaken: '*Ego, contra hoc quoque labo-*
'*ris praemium petam, ut me a conſpectu*
'*malorum, quae noſtra tot per annos vidit*
'*aetas, tantiſper, certe dum priſca illa tota*
'*mente repeto, avertam, omnis expers curae,*
'*quae ſcribentis animum, etſi non flectere a*
'*vero, ſolicitum tamen efficere poſſit.*' And it is certainly one fruit, which every man of genius and learning, who ſtudies antient hiſtory, reaps, that he turns his eyes from

* Livy, lib. 2. cap. 59.

the miſery and futility of modern times, to better ages and nations where he can live and converſe with the heroes and ſages of antient times. For my own part, I think I can ſay of myſelf, while reading the Roman hiſtory, what Livy ſays of himſelf while writing it, that *my mind ſome way becomes antient* *; beſides enjoying the pleaſure above mentioned, I flatter myſelf, that, by reading the actions and ſtudying the characters of thoſe great and good men, I become a better man myſelf, and feel a diſpoſition to imitate them as much as my inferior abilities and lower rank in life will permit †.

* Lib. 43. cap. 13.

† I heard the late Lord Chatham ſay in the Houſe of Commons, that the moſt inſtructive book he ever read was Plutarch's Lives: And I am perſuaded, that it was by ſtudying and admiring thoſe Lives that he became the greateſt man of his age, and was enabled by his councils to raiſe the glory of the Britiſh arms to ſuch a height, and to make of one of the ſmalleſt kingdoms in Europe a great empire, as great as the Roman even in extent of land-territory; for it comprehended, beſides Britain and Ireland, ſeveral Weſt India iſlands, a great part of the Continent of North America, and,

I could dwell with pleaſure much longer upon the virtues of this *princeps terrarum populus*, as they are very properly called by their hiſtorian, who excelled all the people that ever exiſted in arms and government, and I may add in laws; for they were the only nation of antiquity, which

greater than all the countries I have named, (as great as one half of Europe), our poſſeſſions in India, to which the arms of the Romans never reached. And, when to ſuch an extent of land-territory we add our dominion by ſea, which extended from pole to pole, it may be ſaid to have been an empire very much greater. What the ſtate of the nation is now, after it came to be governed by other men and other councils, it would be invidious and unpleaſant to mention, as well as foreign to the purpoſe of this work. I will only add, that I hope his ſon, Mr Pitt, who has inherited his virtue, genius, and eloquence, will retrieve our affairs as much as is poſſible, conſidering our loſs of territory, of military glory, and reputation in Europe, and the almoſt bankrupt ſtate of our finances, which he has already reeſtabliſhed beyond what could have been believed in ſo ſhort a time. I will ſay no more on this ſubject, except to give an advice to thoſe who oppoſe him, in a line of Virgil;

'Hunc ſaltem everſo juvenem ſuccurrere ſæclo
'Ne prohibete.'

compiled a ſyſtem of the laws of private property. This they did upon the principles of Greek philoſophy, after that philoſophy was introduced among them; and upon theſe principles have made a code of laws, ſo juſtly admired by all the nations of Europe who ſtudy it, and which it is the boaſt of Scotland to have for their *common law*. But reflections of this kind would carry me too far from my purpoſe; and I return to Livy.

There is another paſſage concerning religion which I will mention. It is, where he relates the prodigies that preceded the laſt Macedonian war, for which he thought it was not improper in the age in which he lived to make the following apology: 'I am 'not ignorant,' ſays he, 'that all this will be 'thought vain and trifling in an age when 'ſuch events are quite neglected. It is from 'the ſame ſpirit which makes men to believe 'that the gods take no care of human af-'fairs, that theſe prodigies are not public-'ly noticed and recorded. For my own 'part,' continues he, 'I do not know how 'it happens, but while I write of antient

'times my mind ſome way becomes an-
'tient. And beſides I make it a matter
'of conſcience not to refuſe a place in my
'hiſtory to thoſe prodigies which our an-
'ceſtors, the wiſeſt of men, entered into
'the public records, and expiated with
'much trouble and expence *.'

I have elſewhere obſerved †, that it is the duty of every hiſtorian to inculcate that prime virtue of piety, without which no other virtue can be perfect, nor can there be any real happineſs among men. And I have ſhown, that not only the hiſtorians, but the great poets, epic and tragic, among the antients, have made it the moral of their pieces, that the Gods govern the affairs of men, and direct the events of human life. When I compare, in this reſpect, ſuch religious hiſtorians as Herodotus and Livy with ſome of our later hiſtorians, I am diſpoſed to believe (and I am afraid I am not much miſtaken) that theſe

* Lib. 43. cap. 13.

† Vol. 4. p. 441.

do not believe that there is a God, or that his providence ſuperintends and directs the affairs of men, as well as the operations of nature. Such authors, who have formed this unfortunate opinion, I would adviſe, if they will write, to apply themſelves to ſome work of leſs gravity or dignity than hiſtory. They may write copies of verſes, political pamphlets, magazines, and reviews; or, if they will attempt to riſe to any work of genius, may write *comedy*, which, as it is only a repreſentation of common life, and of the *ridiculous* of that life, which is commonly the caſe of our modern comedy, has nothing at all to do with religion, and is only fitted

——— riſu diducere rictum
Auditoris; ——— *.

* Horat. ſat. 10. lib. 1. v. 7.——In the comedies of Terence, which are imitations of thoſe of Menander and other writers of the later Greek comedy, there is not any one paſſage, as far as I remember, that can move a laugh. They are all natural and inſtructive imitations of common life, without any mixture of the ridiculous. See what I have ſaid upon the ſubject of modern comedy, vol. 3. of this work, p. 346. The

but, to give up altogether the attempt to write any poetry of a higher kind, or even proſe, ſuch as hiſtory or philoſophy.

In confirmation of what I have ſaid of his preferring the antient ſtate of Rome to its then ſtate under Auguſtus *, I will quote here a paſſage which ſhows what he thought in general of the ſtate of the country of Italy in thoſe antient times, compared with what it was in his time. The paſſage is in his ſixth book, cap. 12, and I think it the more remarkable that it confirms the truth of what Pliny, the elder, has obſerved of the deſolation of Italy in his time. He ſays, that in antient Latium,

fable, which is the chief part of every dramatic work, is very much laboured in theſe comedies. And it is reported of Menander, who wrote above a hundred of them, that he uſed to ſay, that, after he had invented and arranged the fable, the ſentiments and verſification coſt him very little trouble. How defective our comedies as well as our tragedies are, in the fable, every man, who has the idea of a *piece* or *whole*, and who has ſtudied the philoſophy of poetry in Ariſtotle, muſt know.

* P. 13.

a country of only 50 Roman miles in length, and of no great breadth, there were no less than 55 nations, of which in his time there was not a veſtige *. Livy in this paſſage tells us, that none of the antient authors, whom he had conſulted, could account how the Volſci and Equi were able to recruit their armies ſo ſoon, after being ſo often defeated by the Romans, tho' they were all agreed as to the fact. He gives three different accounts of it; the laſt of which, and, I take, the true account, is a fact, that he muſt have known: 'Innumerabilem multitudinem liberorum capitum in iis fuiſſe locis, quae nunc, vix 'ſeminario exiguo militis relicto, ſervitia 'Romana ab ſolitudine vindicant.' So that the fruit of all the great conqueſts of the Romans, and of all their wealth and power, was the deſolation of their country, which in later times was ſo entirely depopulated, that Conſtantine, in order to repeople it, ſettled in it 300,000 Sarmatians †.

* Nat. Hiſt. lib. 3. cap. 9.

† Vol. 4. of Ant. Metaphyſics, lib. 2. chap. 5. p. 155.

And here let me obſerve, that nothing can ſhow more the noble free ſpirit of our author than thoſe things which he has ſaid of the ſtate of Rome and of Italy under Auguſtus Caeſar, eſpecially when we compare it with what the poets and flatterers of that Emperor, ſuch as Virgil and Horace, have ſaid of the proſperity which the Romans enjoyed under him, who, if we believe them, reſtored the golden age in Italy, and was acknowledged to be the greateſt man they ever had, or ever were to have,

Nil oriturum alias, nil ortum tale, fatentes *.

The character of this hiſtorian is ſo amiable, that I am unwilling to find any fault with his hiſtory. But, as my buſineſs is not with the man, but with his writings, I muſt be excuſed to obſerve ſome things in theſe, that I think faulty, both with reſpect to the matter and the ſtile.

As to the matter, I muſt do him the juſtice to ſay, that I do not believe that he

* Horat. lib. 2. epiſt. 1. v. 17.

willingly falſified, or omitted to relate any one fact thro' favour or enmity to any man or party of men. And, when he came down to later times, and related the civil war betwixt Caeſar and Pompey, (a part of his works that is now loſt), tho', living under the reign of Auguſtus, he might be ſuſpected of partiality to Caeſar and his party, yet, it is ſaid, that his hiſtory had ſo much the appearance of a bias to the other ſide, that Auguſtus ſaid he was a Pompeian. But, what chiefly I find fault with, with reſpect to his matter, is, that it is defective, and that he has given us not ſo much the hiſtory, as the abridgement of the hiſtory of the firſt ages of Rome, and particularly of the reigns of the kings. This obſervation muſt ſtrike every one who compares Livy's hiſtory of that period with the Halicarnaſſian's hiſtory of the ſame period, particularly as to the reign of Romulus, which the Halicarnaſſian has made the ſubject of a whole book; whereas Livy has deſpatched it in a few pages, paſſing over ſome moſt important tranſactions of his reign very ſlightly, particularly his war with the *Veijentes*, or inhabitants of *Veii*,

the greateſt war in which he was engaged; and which was not decided without three great pitched battles, the firſt of which was fought the whole day without a victory upon either ſide. This war the Halicarnaſſian has related at conſiderable length *. But Livy has diſpatched it in one ſhort chapter †, and ſpeaks only of one battle, and which was nothing extraordinary according to his account of it. It is only ſtories, which he can adorn with deſcriptions or ſpeeches, that he chuſes to dwell upon in this part of his hiſtory; and, to make them a better ſubject for rhetoric and deſcription, he has added circumſtances to ſome of them, which, I am perſuaded, had no foundation in truth. Thus, for example, in the account he has given of the war of the Sabines againſt Romulus, he has made the women, in the very heat of the conflict, interpoſe betwixt the two armies, and, with tears and ſupplications, and a very fine ſpeech, which he puts in-

* Lib. 2. cap. 54. et ſeq.

† Lib. 1. cap. 15.

to their mouths, addreſſed to their fathers and huſbands, put an end to the battle, and make an immediate peace and union betwixt the two nations. The narrative is ſo rhetorical, and even poetical, that, if it were true, it is not like truth: 'Tum 'Sabinae mulieres, quarum ex injuria bel- 'lum ortum erat, crinibus paſſis, ſciſſaque 'veſte, victo malis muliebri pavore, auſae 'ſe inter tela volantia inferre, ex tranſ- 'verſo impetu facto, dirimere infeſtas a- 'cies, dirimere iras: hinc patres, hinc vi- 'ros orantes, *Ne ſe ſanguine nefando ſoceri* 'generique reſpergerent: ne parricidio ma- 'cularent partus ſuos, nepotum illi, liberûm 'hi progeniem. Si affinitatis inter vos, ſi 'connubii piget, in nos vertite iras: nos 'cauſa belli, nos vulnerum ac caedium viris 'ac parentibus ſumus. Melius peribimus, 'quam ſine alteris veſtrûm viduae aut or- 'bae vivemus.' Then he relates how, in conſequence of this interpoſition of the women, the peace betwixt the two nations was concluded *.

* Lib. 1. cap. 13.

On the other hand, the Halicarnaſſian has told us a very plain and probable ſtory, without any tragical peripeteia, ſuch as that of Livy, relating how the thing took its riſe from the council of one woman, whom he names, calling her *Cherſileia*, who, he ſays, was a Sabine of no obſcure family. She, having propoſed the thing to Romulus and the ſenate, and having met with their approbation, went in proceſſion to the camp of the Sabines, with other Sabine women and their children; and, as both parties by that time were weary of the war, having ſuffered nearly equal loſſes, they perſuaded the Sabines, as they had done the Romans, to make peace †. And, as he relates this ſtory without mentioning any difference of opinion among his authors, I think there is not the leaſt reaſon to doubt the truth of it.

There is another ſtory during this period of the reign of the kings, which he has told at great length, but has omitted ſome material circumſtances, which the

† Lib. 2. cap. 45.

Halicarnaſſian has related. The ſtory I mean is the fight of the Horatii and Curiatii. In the beginning of this ſtory Livy has not mentioned a thing, which I have no doubt happened, and which ought not to have been omitted, as it ſhows how well the family government and diſcipline eſtabliſhed by Romulus, which I think was one of the beſt of his many excellent inſtitutions, was then kept up. The Horatii, before they would undertake the combat, deſired leave to conſult their father. And it was not *till* they got his conſent and approbation that they would fight with their couſins-german, who in the language of the country were called their *brothers*, and with whom they had always lived as brothers. And he has omitted another circumſtance very moving, that, before they engaged, they embraced and ſhed many tears. And as to what happened after the combat, when Horatius killed his ſiſter, he has told the ſtory very much to the diſadvantage of Horatius, and made it, I think, not probable; for he makes him kill his ſiſter only for lamenting the man who was her couſin-german, and was to have been

her ſpouſe: Whereas the Halicarnaſſian ſays that ſhe not only lamented him, but reproached her brother with the moſt opprobrious language; and in general it may be obſerved, that the narrative of the Halicarnaſſian, by being ſo much more circumſtantial than that of Livy, is not only more connected, and more entertaining, but is really more probable. Nor can I believe, that, tho' the *ſpeeches* be no doubt all of his compoſition, as well as thoſe of Livy, he has feigned *facts*, or related any material circumſtance that he did not find in ſome one author or another.

But, tho' Livy may have added circumſtances to his ſtories by way of embelliſhment, or omitted others that he ought to have mentioned, I do not believe that he has feigned any one ſtory altogether, or even that he deſerves the cenſure of Caligula of being negligent in his hiſtory *; but, on the contrary, I ſee him in many paſſages ſtating the different relations of the ſame fact, and ſtudious to diſcover which of them is moſt probable, as in

* Suetonii *Caligula*, cap. 34.

book 8 chap. 26. And in the end of that book he confeſſes very freely the uncertainty of hiſtory as to ſome points, and that there was no contemporary hiſtorian of thoſe times, by whoſe authority theſe controverted points might be determined. In this reſpect, we may compare him with our Scotch hiſtorian, Hector Boece, who, like him, has adorned his hiſtory with many ſpeeches, tho', as the reader will eaſily believe, not near ſo good, but, as to the facts, is little better than a mere fabuliſt, of which the intelligent reader will deſire no other proof than this, that, tho' he tells us he took his hiſtory from three antient authors, viz. Campus Bellus, Verimundus, and Cornelius Hibernicus, whom no body but himſelf ever ſaw or heard of, yet theſe authors perfectly agree in their accounts of facts which are ſaid to have happened in a remote and barbarous country, more than three hundred years before Chriſt. And he gives you a full and circumſtantial hiſtory of the country from the earlieſt times, without intimating the leaſt doubt of any fact

that he relates. And ſo much for the *matter* of Livy's hiſtory.

As to his *ſtile*, I think it would be unjuſt to charge upon him in particular that general fault, which I have obſerved in the Latin compoſition*, rhetorical as well as hiſtorical, of concluding ſo frequently the periods or ſentences, or members of ſentences, with a verb, but which I do not obſerve is more frequent in Livy than in other Latin writers. And it would be ſtill more unjuſt to charge him with the defects of the language in which he writes, ſuch as the want of a preſent participle paſſive, or a paſt participle active, which makes the compoſition in Latin much more disjointed, incoherent, and often obſcure, than in Greek. Neither ſhould we charge to his account that greater defect ſtill of the Latin, and indeed the greateſt defect almoſt that any language can have, the want of an Article; the conſequence of which is, that, when two words are joined together in a propoſition, we cannot tell

* Vol. 4. p. 227. et ſeq.

which is the ſubject, and which the predicate. Of this I have elſewhere obſerved one example in Livy, in the caſe of the two names *hiſter* and *ludio* for *a ſtage-player**. There perhaps the ambiguity was unavoidable. But he has uſed expreſſions ſuch as I do not find in any other Latin author, which, for want of the article, are not intelligible to any man who does not underſtand Greek. Now, I think it is a fault in an author to write ſo in any language that he cannot be underſtood without the knowledge of another. Of this I will give two or three inſtances out of many that might be given.

The firſt I ſhall give is from the end of the third book, where, ſpeaking of the judgment that the people of Rome gave in their own favour, in a queſtion concerning the property of ſome lands betwixt two neighbouring nations, he ſays, the judgment was in the main right, as the land was truly theirs, if it had been given by other judges. Then he adds, '*Nunc haud ſane*

* Vol. 4. p. 92.

'*quicquam bono cauſae levatur dedecus* '*judicii.*' Where, if the Latins had an article to prefix to *bono*, and could have ſaid, as the Greeks would have ſaid, τῳ ἀγαθῳ or τῳ δικαιῳ της δικης, there would have been no obſcurity in the paſſage; whereas, I ſay, that, as it ſtands in Livy, there is a very great obſcurity in it, ſo that it is not intelligible to the mere Latin ſcholar. And the obſcurity is greater in this caſe, that a neuter adjective is made to govern a ſubſtantive in the genetive, which is common in Greek, but very unuſual in Latin. Another inſtance of the ſame kind is, where, giving a character of Tarquinius Superbus, he ſays, 'Nec ut injuſtus 'in pace rex, ita dux belli pravus fuit; 'quin ea arte aequaſſet ſuperiores reges, '*ni degeneratum in aliis, huic quoque de-* '*cori offeciſſet* *.' Where the reader, in order to underſtand the paſſage, muſt know that the Greeks are in uſe, by joining the article to a participle in the neuter gender, as well as to an adjective, as in the

* Lib. 1. cap. 53.

preceding caſe, to make a ſubſtantive of it. In theſe two examples, the article is wanting only to a ſingle word: But I will give an example where it is wanting to a whole member of a ſentence. It is in the ſpeech of the Campanian ambaſſadors to the ſenate of Rome, where they ſay, '*Fuit quidem apud vos ſemper ſatis juſta cauſa amicitiae, velle eum vobis amicum eſſe, qui vos appeteret*'*. Where the article is wanting, not to a ſingle word or thing, but to the whole laſt part of the ſentence. And it muſt be underſtood to be prefixed to the infinitive *velle*, according to the elegant uſe of it in Greek, by which of the infinitive they make a noun, with the addition of expreſſing time, and governing a noun in the accuſative, or whatever other caſe is the regimen of the verb. Now this, I ſay, is ſtill more unintelligible than the former examples to the mere Latin ſcholar, who will underſtand *velle* to be nothing more than an infinitive; and will try in vain to conſtrue it with ſome other word in the ſentence. And here we may

* Lib. 7. cap. 30.

obſerve one great uſe of the article in Greek, beſides that principal one already obſerved of diſtinguiſhing the *ſubject* in a propoſition from the *predicate*. And this is the making a whole ſentence, or member of a ſentence, one thing or one word, as it may be called, which may be made the ſubject of a propoſition; as in this caſe the τὸ *velle eum vobis amicum eſſe, qui vos appeteret*, is affirmed to have been *among the Romans a ſufficient cauſe of friendſhip*. This muſt give a wonderful perſpicuity to the diſcourſe, as it often happens not only in reaſoning but in narrative, that ſeveral ideas are conſidered but as one, and make either the ſubject or predicate of a propoſition. I will give another inſtance of the ſame kind from book 7. cap. 8. where the Roman dictator had delayed fighting on account of the entrails of the victim not being favourable: '*Diu non perlitatum tenuerat dictatorem, ne ante meridiem ſignum dare poſſet.*' Where the Greek article τὸ would have made the ſenſe perfectly clear, but which without it is not intelligible to a man who is not a Greek ſcholar; and therefore ſuch a form of ex-

preſſion ought to have been avoided by a Roman author *.

* Horace is an author who has uſed many Greek idioms, but in ſuch a manner as to produce no obſcurity. I will mention one that I think very elegant. It is in the ſtory of Europa, where he makes Venus ſay to her,

Uxor invicti Jovis eſſe, neſcis. (Od. 27. lib. 3. v. 73.)

Here he adopts that elegant Attic conciſeneſs of ſparing the repetition of the pronoun, where the perſon of the governing verb in the ſentence is not changed. According to the common Latin idiom it ſhould have been, *Neſcis te eſſe uxorem invicti Jovis.*

But I ſay the other phraſe is much more elegant, and equally clear and unambiguous. And there is nothing in the Latin language any more than in the Greek that hinders it from being uſed, tho' it be not at all of common uſe among the Latin writers. This common Greek idiom, however, Doctor Clarke does not appear to have known, otherwiſe he would have found as little difficulty as Euſtathius has done in that paſſage of the firſt Iliad, where Achilles ſays to Agamemnon,

——————ουδε τ' οϊω
Ενθαδ' ατιμος εων, αφενος και πλουτον αφυξειν.

Iliad I. v. 170.

Here we may obſerve an example of both conſtructions: viz. of the Greek, when, the perſon of the

Neither would I impute to Livy the want of thoſe connecting particles, ſuch as μεν, δε, μην, δη, 'ουν, τοι and τοιγαρουν, which, beſides giving a flow to the Greek compoſition, ſuch as is not to be found in Latin, connect the ſenſe and give an emphaſis to it, which it wants in Latin; and muſt have had ſtill greater effect in ſpeaking than in writing, and, I am perſuaded, contributed not a little to give that *rotunditas oris*, which Horace com-

verb not being changed, the following noun or participle agrees with it in caſe, as εγω ουκ οιω ενθαδ' ατιμος εων; and alſo of the common Latin conſtruction, where the perſon of the verb is changed, as ουκ οιω σε αφενος και πλουτον αφυξειν. This paſſage therefore appears to me as clear as it did to Euſtathius. The Doctor, however, it ſeems, thought it very difficult; and has given us a long note upon it, which is, no doubt, thought to be very learned and ingenious by thoſe who admire the Doctor's Greek learning, and think that he has made great diſcoveries in that language, particularly with reſpect to the tenſes, of which he has given us a ſyſtem quite different from that of all other grammarians antient or modern; and has found out one tenſe in Greek, ſuch as is to be found in no other language, by which a paſt action is denoted to be quickly performed. See vol. 2. of this work, p. 153. and 156.

mends in the Greek ſpeech *. And indeed, tho', without the uſe of ſuch particles, the words may be connected together, the ſentences never can be connected ſo much as they ought to be. And of this defect, both in the Latin and the modern languages, every man who has read much Greek, and ſtudied the beauties of compoſition in that language, muſt be ſenſible †.

The only way of remedying this defect, is by compoſing in periods, or ſentences of ſome length, which will make the compoſition appear leſs broken and disjointed. But Livy, inſtead of applying this remedy, has aggravated the defect of his language, by cutting his ſtile into ſhort, abrupt, unconnected ſentences, and affecting a brevity, and with it a point and a turn, which very often produces a great obſcurity. Both theſe faults of ſtile the Romans acquired in their ſchools of declamation, which

* *De Arte Poetica*, v. 323.

† See what I have ſaid on this ſubject, vol. 4. p. 63. and following, alſo p. 95.

were ſo much in faſhion among them in later times, that every man who was bred to ſpeak or write frequented them, and there formed his taſte of ſtile and compoſition. That Livy was taught in one of theſe ſchools, I think, is evident from the the whole colour of his ſtile, and from ſome particular paſſages that I have already quoted. And I will here quote ſome more to ſhow that he learned there both the ſhort cut of ſtile, which he affects ſo much, and alſo that obſcurity which thoſe declaimers ſtudied: For they thought that their ſmart, pointed ſentences, the *vibrantes ſententiolae*, as Petronius calls them, were the better for their meaning not being obvious, which they imagined was more ſtriking, if it took time and thought to find it out. And Seneca mentions one of them, who recommended it to his ſcholars, to cloud or darken their conceits as much as they could, (σκοτιζε was the word he uſed): And he commended one of them very much for being ſo obſcure, *ut ne vel ipſe intelligam.*

I will firſt give ſome examples from this author of a ſtile ſo cut into ſhort ſentences, as not to deſerve the name of compoſition. After the ſpeech above mentioned, which he puts into the mouth of the Sabine women, he deſcribes the effect of it in this manner: 'Movet res tum multitudinem, 'tum duces. Silentium et repentina fit 'quies; inde ad foedus faciendum duces 'prodeunt: nec pacem modo, ſed et civi-'tatem unam ex duabus faciunt: regnum 'conſociant; imperium omne conferunt 'Romam *.' The relation of ſo great an event, one of the greateſt in the Roman ſtory, ought not, I think, to have been cut and broken, and minced down in this manner; but ſhould have been narrated, if not in a full well turned period, at leaſt not in an unconnected disjointed ſtile, very different from the manner in which the Halicarnaſſian relates it †.

And not only in his narrative does he uſe this ſhort, abrupt ſtile, but even in his

* Lib. 1. cap. 13.

† Lib. 2. cap. 46.

ſpeeches, where it is ſtill more improper; for nobody ſpeaking in that way in a public aſſembly could be heard with any patience, or attended to. However Livy has uſed it in his ſpeeches; and, (what is ſingular in his ſtile, and diſtinguiſhes it even from that of Tacitus, or any other author I know), more in them than in his narrative. After the expulſion of the kings, he makes the violent republicans ſpeak againſt one of the conſuls, who had the misfortune to be called Tarquinius, in this manner: 'Nimium Tarquinios regno aſ-'ſueſſe. Initium a Priſco factum.' Then, a little after: 'Pulſo Superbo, penes Col-'latinum imperium eſſe. Neſcire Tarquini-'os privatos vivere: Non placere nomen; 'periculoſum eſſe libertati *.' Then, in a ſpeech which his colleague Brutus makes in an aſſembly of the people, he perſuades him to go into voluntary exile, in the following pretty little ſentences: 'Regium 'genus, regium nomen, non ſolum in ci-'vitate, ſed etiam in imperio eſſe. Id of

'fieere, id obſtare libertati. Hunc, tu, 'tua voluntate, L. Tarquini, remove me-'tum. Meminerimus, fatemur, ejeciſti re-'ges. Abſolve beneficium tuum. Aufer 'hinc regium nomen *.'

* Lib. 2. cap. 2. In this ſpeech we have the ſtile of Portius Latro and the other declaimers of his age very exactly imitated; for they frequently addreſſed thoſe to whom they ſpoke in ſuch ſentences as, '*Ab-'ſolve beneficium tuum. Aufer hinc regium nomen.*' And there is another ſpeech, which he puts into the mouth of the father of Horatius in defence of his ſon for the murder of his ſiſter, (lib. 1. cap. 26.) which, if poſſible, is ſtill more like to the ſtile of Portius Latro. In this ſpeech the father turns from the people, to whom he was ſpeaking, and addreſſes himſelf to the Lictor: '*I lictor, colliga manus, quae paulo ante armatae imperium 'populo Romano pepererunt. I, caput obnube liberatoris 'urbis hujus: arbore infelici ſuſpende: verbera, vel intra 'pomoerium, modo inter illa pila et ſpolia hoſtium; vel extra 'pomoerium, modo intra ſepulchra Curiatiorum. Quo e-'nim ducere hunc juvenem poteſtis, ubi non ſua decora eum 'a tanta foeditate ſupplicii vindicent?*' And indeed, whoever reads the *Suaſoriae ac Controverſiae* of Seneca with any attention, muſt be convinced that the two ſtiles reſemble one another as much, I think, as any ſtiles can do. See what I have written upon the ſubject of the ſchools of declamation, cap. 13. of vol. 3. of this work, p. 50. et ſeq.

Many examples may be given from this author of ſpeeches of like compoſition, ſuch as the ſpeech of Mucius Scaevola to Porſena the Etruſcan King, *in lib* 2. *cap.* 12. the ſpeeches of the people againſt the Patricians upon occaſion of the ſudden death of a Tribune, who was ſuſpected to be murdered by the Patricians, *ibid. cap.* 55. And there is a ſpeech againſt the Decemviri, *lib.* 3. *cap.* 52. conſiſting almoſt intirely of ſhort, pungent interrogations, after the manner of the ſchool of declamation, no leſs than eight of them in a ſtring. It may be obſerved, that theſe are only ſhort ſpeeches, introduced occaſionally, and made part of the narrative, and which ought to be conſidered rather as reflections on what was paſſing than as ſpeeches: But in his moſt formal harangues there is more or leſs of the ſame colour of ſtile, nor can I find any thing in them like the compoſition of Demoſthenes, upon which, and the orations of the Halicarnaſſian in his hiſtory, who has imitated Demoſthenes ſo well, I have formed my taſte of a rhetorical ſtile. At the ſame time I muſt do Livy the juſtice to acknow-

ledge, that there is a great deal of matter and good argument in his ſpeeches; for which reaſon I think they ſhould be carefully ſtudied by thoſe who would form themſelves to be ſpeakers upon public buſineſs.

Livy ſeems to be ſo fond of this neat, trim ſtile, as ſome people think it, that, for the ſake of it, he ſometimes gives up the gravity and dignity of the hiſtorical ſtile, and falls into the ſtile of familiar ſmart converſation. As where he deſcribes Collatinus, the huſband of Lucretia, drinking with the ſons of Tarquin, when the converſation turned upon their wives, each commending his own. To decide the preference, Collatinus propoſed that they ſhould get upon horſeback, (for they were then in the camp before Ardea), and go to Rome to ſee what his wife Lucretia was then doing. Livy adds: 'Incaluerant vi-'no. Age ſane omnes. Citatis equis ad-'volant Romam *.' This is certainly more

* Lib. 1. cap. 57.

the ſtile of comedy than hiſtory: And many ſimilar paſſages might be quoted from Terence.

That this ſhort cut of ſtile came from the ſchools of declamation, is evident from the ſamples of the declamations preſerved to us by Seneca, where there is nothing like compoſition in periods, but the whole conſiſts of ſhort unconnected ſentences. It was theſe ſchools that gave riſe to this ſtile of writing among the Romans, quite unknown to the Greeks, among whom there were no ſuch ſchools; for, tho' they had ſchools of rhetoric, ſuch as that of Iſocrates, it does not appear that in thoſe ſchools they declaimed upon fictitious ſubjects, but were only taught the precepts of the art; or, if they practiſed it, it was upon ſome real ſubjects, which might be agitated at the time. Salluſt was the firſt author who wrote in this ſtile. After him came our author, who added to the ſhort ſentences of Salluſt the ſmart turns, and what may be called quaint conceits, as well as the obſcurity of the declaimers of his age, neither of which is to be found in

Salluſt. Then came Tacitus, who lived at a time when the Romans began to give over the ſtudy of the Greek authors, and to form themſelves upon models of their own. He imitated Salluſt and Livy; but has made his ſtile much worſe than that of either of them, and, in my opinion, completed the corruption of the taſte of Roman writing; for he has added to the abrupt, diſjointed ſtile of Salluſt, and to the ſmart, ſhort ſentences of Livy, an affectation of ſaying every the moſt common thing in a way uncommon and ſurpriſing, and thereby has made a riddle, where is nothing at bottom, but plain and ordinary ſenſe. And, from this oracular obſcurity of expreſſion, he has acquired among ſome people the reputation of oracular wiſdom. And thus it appears, that Tacitus has verified Horace's obſervation, *decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile.* And indeed there is nothing more natural than to make a bad pattern worſe in the imitation, as it is much eaſier to imitate what is bad in any pattern than what is good.

This is the progreſs of the corruption of ſtile among the Romans: And the queſtion

is, whether we moderns are to imitate ſuch authors as the three I have mentioned, or the great authors of antiquity, ſuch as Demoſthenes, Herodotus, Thucydides, and the Halicarnaſſian, who never formed their taſte of writing or ſpeaking in a ſchool of declamation; for it is of abſolute neceſſity, that we ſhould learn from ſome of the antients to ſpeak or write, as well as to paint or make ſtatues. Now, if we ſtudy and admire ſuch Latin authors as the three writers I have mentioned, it is impoſſible we can have a good taſte in writing, as impoſſible as, to uſe a ſimile of Petronius, that a man who lives in a kitchen, (he might have ſaid in a houſe of office), ſhould ſmell ſweet. And our taſte will be ſo much formed to their taſte and manners, as not to be able to ſpeak or write in any other, nor indeed, as I have obſerved elſewhere *, to underſtand very well what is written or ſpoken in a better ſtile. It was ſome years ago the faſhion in Britain to imitate Tacitus, and the French writers, ſuch as Monteſquieu, that is, Tacitus at ſecond hand. And it was imagined that the ſenſe was more condenſed, and

* Vol. 4. p. 239. 240.

more forcibly conveyed in that way, than when diffuſed into periods and long ſentences: Whereas I hold the contrary to be the truth; and that, as an argument cannot be apprehended, unleſs the propoſitions of which it conſiſts be all under the view of the mind at once, it is better that they ſhould be all comprehended in one period, than that they ſhould be minced down and frittered into ſhort, unconnected ſentences. This, I hope, will ſoon be the general opinion, and the taſte of the nation reformed both by the ſtudy of the beſt antient authors, and by the example of our Miniſter, who ſpeaks in periods with ſuch univerſal applauſe, and who was trained, as I have heard, to ſpeak in that way by his Father, much in the ſame manner as I have ſaid the Duke of Wharton was by *his* Father *; for it is only by example and imitation that the taſte or ear can be formed to that kind of compoſition.

From the ſame fountain Livy has derived the obſcurity of his ſtile. And indeed

* Vol. 4. p. 244.

it is neceſſary, if I write or ſpeak in ſhort ſentences, and affect to give a point and a ſmart turn to the thought, that I ſhould ſtudy to be very brief; the conſequence of which is, that I muſt be often obſcure. It is therefore not without reaſon that Petronius has accuſed the declaimers of having ruined eloquence, and every kind of writing. I will only give one or two inſtances of the obſcurity of Livy out of very many that might be given; for, to ſay the truth, I think that there is an obſcurity, greater or leſs, that runs through his whole hiſtory. The firſt I ſhall mention is, where he makes Mettus the general of the Albans, in a conference which he deſired with Tullus the Roman king, before the armies ſhould engage, ſpeak to him in this manner: 'Injurias, et non redditas res 'ex foedere, quae repetitae ſint, et ego re-'gem noſtrum Cluilium, cauſam hujuſce 'eſſe belli, audîſſe videor: nec te dubito, 'Tulle, eadem prae te ferre *.' Where neither the conſtruction nor the ſenſe can be made out without ſupplying an ellipſis,

* Lib. 1. cap. 23.

altogether uncommon and without example, as far as I know. The words wanted to make the ſentence intelligible, are *prae ſe ferre*, after the words, *regem noſtrum Cluilium*; and with this addition the meaning is, That 'I think I have heard that 'our King Cluilius pretends that the cauſe 'of the war is injuries for which indem-'nification is refuſed. And I doubt not, 'Tullus, but that you pretend the ſame.' Where, if the concluding clauſe *prae te ferre* could have applied to the preceding part of the ſentence, the ellipſis might have been endured; but, as it cannot, but muſt be changed into *prae ſe ferre*, it is a perfect riddle, which I believe I ſhould never have been able to have ſolved without the aſſiſtance of an ingenious friend of mine, Mr John Hunter Profeſſor of Humanity in the univerſity of St Andrews, whom I had occaſion to mention before in the courſe of this work, and I think it is a much more natural interpretation of the paſſage, than to ſupply, as Crevier does, the words, *quum dixit*; which is an ellipſis without example.

To the ſame friend I owe the expounding of another riddle of Livy, where ſpeaking of the creation of the firſt dictator, he ſays, 'In hac tantarum expectatione rerum ſolicita civitate, dictatoris primum creandi mentio orta. Sed nec *quo anno*, *nec quibus conſulibus*, quia ex factione Tarquinia eſſent, (id quoque enim traditur), parum creditum ſit, nec quis primum dictator creatus ſit, ſatis conſtat *.' Where, by uſing the common expreſſion of *quo anno et quibus conſulibus*, one ſhould have thought that he only meant to ſtate the doubt, *in what year, and under what conſuls, the firſt dictator was created.* But then what is to be made of the reſt of the ſentence? This is a difficulty which upon due conſideration makes us apply the expreſſion *parum creditum ſit* to the *quibus conſulibus*. And then the ſenſe is abundantly clear. But it certainly might have been expreſſed ſo as to leave no room for any difficulty, by removing the ambiguity in the expreſſion *quibus conſulibus* joined to

* Lib. 2. cap. 18.

quo anno. Of this paſſage Crevier takes no notice, except to obſerve, that there is a difference among authors as to the year in which the firſt dictator was created; from this I conclude, that either he did not ſee the difficulty of the paſſage, or could not ſolve it.

There is another paſſage, of which, with no aſſiſtance I have got, I am able to make ſenſe. It is where ſpeaking of the two daughters of Servius Tullius married to the two ſons of Tarquin the laſt king, the one a Virago, of a fierce turbulent ſpirit, but married to a man of a mild and gentle diſpoſition; the other of a peaceable gentle temper, but married to a man of a moſt fierce and violent ſpirit. Of the firſt mentioned lady, he ſays, 'Spernere ſororem, 'quod, nacta virum, muliebri ceſſaret au-'dacia *.' The maſter of the declaiming ſchool above mentioned, if he had given out this ſtory by way of text to Livy,

* Lib. 1. cap. 46. Crevier corrects the text, and reads *muliebri audacia*, leaving out the word *ceſſaret*; but makes no ſenſe of it unleſs we could ſuppoſe, that *audacia* was the characteriſtic of the female ſex.

might have praiſed him as he did one of his ſcholars, by ſaying *ne vel ipſe intelligo.*

There is another paſſage ſo remarkably obſcure that the meaning of it can only be divined, not made out from the words. It is where he deſcribes the ſtratagem which Hannibal uſed to paſs the Rhone in oppoſition to an army of Gauls, who were upon the other ſide. It is to be found in his 21. book, cap. 27. It is too long to be here inſerted. And I ſhall only add, that the obſcurity of it may ariſe not ſo much from the intricacy and perplexity of the ſtile, as from his intire ignorance of military affairs, which he could not learn in the ſchool of declamation, and which, it does not appear, he had ever any other opportunity of learning: It is therefore not to be wondered at, that we ſhould think his accounts of battles ſo obſcure, when we read thoſe given us by Polybius and Julius Caeſar, with whom compared, we may ſay, (to uſe a phraſe of Shakeſpear), that Livy *knew no more of the diviſion of a battle than a ſpinſter.*

This cenſure may appear to many preſumptuous, and much too ſevere upon an author of ſuch reputation as Livy. I will therefore quote ſome paſſages from him in ſupport of it: And I will begin with his deſcription of the Roman legion and the diviſion of their battle *, which he has prefixed to his account of the great and deciſive battle with the Latins, and which is plainly intended for the inſtruction of thoſe who were not military men, or at leaſt were ignorant of the Roman manner of fighting. But let any man compare it with the account given us by Polybius of the Roman diſcipline and diviſion of the legion, and he will ſoon be convinced that it does not at all anſwer that purpoſe. For it is much too ſhort, and in many places obſcure, particularly in his account of the *Triarii*, which I think is not intelligible, notwithſtanding all the pains that Lipſius, in his work *De Militia Romana*, has taken to botch and mend it. And there is one order of men in the Roman army, whom

* Lib. 8. cap. 8.

he calls *accenſi*, but of whom he tells us nothing, except that they were the weakeſt part of the army, and therefore thrown into the laſt line. But he ſhould have told us a great deal more concerning them, as it was by bringing them up into the firſt line, that Manlius gained the battle he afterwards deſcribes; for by this movement he made the Latins believe that it was his Triarii, whom he had brought up, which made them advance their Triarii, while Manlius kept his in reſerve, and by that means won the battle *. On the other hand, the deſcription given us by Polybius of the legion is full, accurate, and clear †;

* Lib. 8. cap. 10.

† It is contained in one of the excerpts from the *ſixth* book of his hiſtory, p. 466. of Caſaubon's edition. But the excerpt is not full; for we have in it only an account of the number of the legion, the diviſions and and ſubdiviſions of it, the officers ſuperior and inferior, and their manner of marching and encamping. But he ſays that he was to inform us alſo of their παρατάξις, or, *order of battle*, (ibid. p. 472. lit. E.) This however is wanting; but it is pretty well ſupplied, by what Livy has ſaid upon the ſubject in his deſcription of the

in ſhort, it is ſuch, that without it, and what he has told us in other places of the Roman manner of fighting, I, for my part, ſhould have known very little of that art of war, in which they excelled all the world.

The next paſſage I ſhall quote, is from his deſcription of the great battle of Zama, which decided the fate of Rome and Carthage, and put an end to the ſecond Punic war. The account of this battle he has copied from Polybius, as indeed of all the battles in this Punic war. But in his deſcription of this battle he has either miſunderſtood Polybius, or expreſſed his meaning very ill in one moſt material particular, upon which the fate of the battle appears to me to have depended. Polybius tells us, that Scipio ranged the *haſtati* and *principes* in two lines, but not according to the ordinary manner of the Romans. For he did not place the *manipuli* of the ſecond

legion, and which is by much the beſt part of that deſcription. And Polybius himſelf, in his account above mentioned of the battle of Zama, has explained very well the ordinary form of their battle, by telling us the changes which Scipio made in it upon that occaſion.

line oppoſite to the intervals of the firſt, but directly behind the manipuli of the firſt line, ſo as to give a clear paſſage to the elephants. This is moſt clearly expreſſed by Polybius; but obſerve how it is rendered by Livy. 'Non confertas autem 'cohortes ante ſua quamque ſigna inſtru-'ebat, ſed manipulos aliquantum inter ſe 'diſtantes, ut eſſet ſpatium quo elephantes 'hoſtium accepti, nihil ordines turbarent*.' Here there appears to be no error in the text; but what the ſenſe of it is I am altogether at a loſs to find out. And I think I may venture to affirm, that the military men even of his own time would hardly have gueſſed what he meant. One error in the paſſage is obvious, that he ſpeaks of cohorts as a diviſion of the legion then in uſe among the Romans; whereas it is certain, from Polybius's account of the legion, and even from his own, which I have quoted, that no ſuch diviſion was then known. All we know of that matter is, that the legion was ſo divided in the time of Julius Caeſar, but how long before we know not.

* Lib. 30. cap. 33.

What makes me imagine that Livy has miſtaken altogether the meaning of Polybius, rather than expreſſed it ill, is, that in his deſcription of another famous battle, which he has alſo copied from Polybius, he has plainly miſtranſlated him; and the error is ſo capital, that it makes nonſenſe of the whole account of the battle. The battle I mean is the famous one of *Cynoſcephalai*, betwixt Flaminius the Roman conſul and Philip King of Macedon, in the firſt Macedonian war. The error is where Livy tells us, that, when the right wing of the Macedonian army, where Philip commanded in perſon, got up to the top of the hill, Philip gave this order to his men: 'Caetratos et Macedonium phalangen, haſtis poſitis, quarum longitudo impedimento erat, gladiis rem gerere jubet*.' Now, from Polybius's deſcription of the phalanx ſubjoined to his account of this battle †, which deſcription Livy certainly ought to have ſtudied and underſtood be-

* Lib. 33. cap. 8.

† Lib. 17. cap. 762. *edit. Caſauboni.*

fore he gave an account of this Roman battle with that phalanx, it evidently appears that theſe ſpears, which Livy makes the Macedonians throw away as uſeleſs on account of their length, were no other than the *ſariſſae*, the chief weapon of the phalanx, and which made it irreſiſtible, where the ground was level and even, and it was oppoſed only in front. This weapon was 14 cubits long; and every man of the 16 in depth, of which the phalanx conſiſted, had one of them, which was laid over the ſhoulders of the men before him: And the weapon was ſo ponderous that it was wielded with both hands. A ſingle ſpear of this kind muſt have had a great force againſt any man armed with lighter and ſhorter weapons; but, by the cloſeneſs of the men in the phalanx, and the looſer order of the Romans, one of whom was by that means oppoſed to two Macedonians, the number of ſariſſae that each Roman had to encounter, was, according to Polybius' calculation, no leſs than 10. So that he had this wood of ſpears to cut down or get thro' before he could reach the body of a Macedonian with his ſword, which, as it is well known,

was the chief weapon of the Roman ſoldier. What the reſt of the armour of the Macedonian phalanx was, Polybius has not told us; but Plutarch has ſupplied that defect in his life of Paulus Æmilius, where, deſcribing his battle with Perſeus, he tells us, that as ſoon as the Romans came to cloſe with the Macedonians, by the means which he mentions, there was no match: For the Macedonians had nothing that could avail them in a cloſe encounter except little ſwords, which he calls εγχειριδια, and light targets, which he expreſſes by the diminutive πελταρια; whereas the Romans had ſtrong heavy ſwords, againſt which the Macedonian light target was no defence; and, in place of that target, they had great ſhields that covered their whole body. But the Macedonians, he ſays, while the order of the phalanx was preſerved, and they at liberty to uſe their *ſariſſae*, made ſuch an impreſſion with them, that neither the heavy ſhields of the Romans nor their coats of mail could reſiſt them, but they pierced thro' all into their bodies: And the Macedonians, he ſays, threw them over their heads

upon the points of their *ſariſſae*. This deſcription of the battle with Perſeus by Plutarch is the more to be truſted, that it is evident he took it from Polybius, whom he quotes in one part of it. And it is the more valuable, that the book of Polybius, in which it was contained, is now entirely loſt: And it makes amends to us for the very ſhort account Plutarch has given us, in the life of Flaminius, of the battle of *Cynoſcephalai*.

From this account of the armour of the Macedonians, and the ſtrength of their phalanx, it is evident that the order, which Livy makes Philip give to his men, was no other than that they ſhould diſarm themſelves. Let us now conſider the words of Polybius to which Livy has given ſo extraordinary a meaning. He tells us that Philip gave order to the right wing of his phalanx, where he commanded himſelf, to double their files. Then he adds: γενομενου δε τουτου, και των πολεμιων 'εν χερσιν 'οντων, τοις φαλαγγιτοις 'εδοθη παραγγελμα καταβαλουσι τας σαρισσας, επαγειν: Where you will obſerve that Livy has tranſlated καταβαλουσι τας σαρισσας *poſitis haſtis*, that is,

laying aſide, or *throwing away their ſpears*; as if Polybius had ſaid, ῥιψασι τας σαρισσας, (the expreſſion which he uſes when he deſcribes the rout of the phalanx in this battle): And he adds, what Polybius certainly never thought of, that the *ſariſſae* were uſeleſs on account of their length; and another thing alſo, that was very far from the mind of Polybius, viz. that Philip ordered them *gladiis rem gerere*, that is, to fight with daggers and light targets againſt the heavy ſtrong ſwords of the Romans and their great ſhields.

But it may be aſked, what then was the meaning of the order given by Philip, Καταβαλλειν τας σαρισσας. This Plutarch will explain to us in the account above mentioned, of the battle with Perſeus, taken, as I have ſaid, from the ſame author. It is where, ſpeaking of Æmilius the Roman general, he ſays, Επει δε και των αλλων Μακεδονων τας τε πελτας εκ μεσου περιεσπασαντων, και ταις σαρισσαις αφ' ενος συνθεματος κλιθεισαις ὑποσταντων τους θυρεοφορους ειδε, την τε ῥωμην του συνασπισμου και την τραχυτητα της προβολης, εκπληξις αυτον ισχυν και δεος, ως ουδεν ιδοιτο

πωποτε θεαμα φοβερωτερον*. Here you will obſerve that he has explained moſt clearly what Polybius means by the word καταβαλλειν, by uſing another word in place of it, viz. κλινειν; and the fact undoubtedly was, and I think muſt have been, that, when the phalanx was on its march, each ſoldier carried his pike upright, and not upon the ſhoulders of thoſe before him; but when the ſignal was given them to engage, then they inclined them downwards, ſo as to be upon a level with the enemy: And then four *ſariſſae* were over the ſhoulder of each man in the firſt rank, beſides his own, according to the account that Polybius has given of their order of battle. That they ſhould have marched in this manner, is abſolutely incredible; but, as we have ſeen, it was the way in which they fought; and, when they gave over fighting and ſurrendered themſelves priſoners, they held ſtreight up their *ſariſſae*, as Polybius tells us in his account of this battle, (p. 761.) and which Livy has

* P. 265. of the Paris edition in folio.

tranſlated, and rightly tranſlated, from him, (lib. 33. cap. 10). And Polybius has alſo obſerved the diſtinction that I have made, betwixt their manner of marching and their battle order; for he has told us that the left wing of the phalanx was immediately put into diſorder by the Romans δια το τοις αγονιζομενοις ἑπομενοι, πορειας εχειν διαθεσιν, και μη παραταξεως *.

There is none of the editors of Livy, that has taken notice of this error of Livy in tranſlating Polybius, except the laſt edi-

* In Polybius's deſcription of the great battle betwixt Ptolemy and Antiochus at *Raphia* in Coelo-Syria, he uſes the very expreſſion that he uſes in the deſcription of this battle betwixt Philip and Flaminius, καταβαλλοντες παραχρημα τας σαρισσας ὁι περι τον Ανδρομαχον και Σωσιβιον επηγον. Lib. 5. p. 426. Where one ſhould think it was impoſſible to miſtake the meaning, as the troops there are deſcribed as advancing to the combat with the greateſt alacrity. Yet a tranſlator before Caſaubon, one *Perottus*, has miſtaken it, and has tranſlated it as Livy has done, making the men throw away their σαρισσαι; but then he has added what makes his interpretation much more natural than Livy's, though it be the direct oppoſite of the text, that they run away. See what Caſaubon has ſaid in his obſervations upon the former tranſlators of Polybius, contained in his preface to his edition.

tor Crevier; and even he talks ſomewhat doubtfully of it: And the only proof he gives of it, is Polybius's deſcription of the phalanx; whereas, I think I have made it evident, both from other paſſages of Polybius and from Plutarch.

If all Polybius were extant, I believe many more inaccuracies would be found in Livy's tranſlations from him, as I think we may reaſonably conjecture from the paſſages I have mentioned, and particularly the laſt, where the error is ſo groſs, as to convince me that we cannot abſolutely depend upon what the Roman authors have tranſlated from the Greek, much leſs upon what they have collected from them. And I am more and more confirmed in an opinion, which I had formed long ago, that even the hiſtory of the Romans themſelves is beſt learned from the Greek writers, as well as their cuſtoms and manners. So that, in order to be perfectly acquainted with the *princeps terrarum populus*, (a moſt valuable part I think of the hiſtory of mankind, as they certainly were the greateſt people that ever ex-

iſted in arms and government, and in the variety of their hiſtory exhibit to us every ſcene of human nature, the beſt and the worſt, the greateſt virtues and the greateſt vices, the greateſt happineſs and the greateſt miſery), it is abſolutely neceſſary to be a Greek ſcholar.

As to the obſcurity of Livy's ſtile, of which I complain ſo much, it muſt be evident to any man who is a judge of writing, and will take the trouble to compare his ſtile with that of the Halicarnaſſian, who writes upon the ſame ſubject, and of whom I propoſe to ſpeak in this book, or with that of his countryman Julius Caeſar, of whom I ſhall ſpeak in the next chapter.

But although I cannot praiſe the *rhetorical ſtile* of Livy any more than that of his narrative, I ſhould not do him juſtice if I did not ackowledge that the *matter* of his ſpeeches is admirable; nor do I know any better common place book for arguments on every political ſubject: And therefore I think his ſpeeches ſhould be diligently ſtudied by all our parliamentary ſpeakers, not for the

ſtile, which I would not have them imitate, but for the matter: For, as to the ſtile, I cannot help ſaying, though I know that many will think the opinion ſingular, that, when I compare it with the ſtile of Herodotus, or Dionyſius the Halicarnaſſian in Greek, or of Julius Caeſar in Latin, it appears to me the work of a Sophiſter, who beſtows more labour upon words than upon things. This may be excuſed in a ſchool of declamation upon fictitious ſubjects; but where the ſubject is, ſuch as Livy's, the hiſtory of a great people, if the compoſition appear to be overlaboured, it very much offends a judicious reader: And with very good reaſon, becauſe ornaments of that kind, if *they ſtick out*, and as Petronius very well expreſſes it, *extra corpus orationis eminent*, muſt divert his attention from the matter. The worſt fault in ſtile, as I have elſewhere obſerved, is to labour to write ill. And I am afraid that is the caſe of Livy in many paſſages, where his ſhort, ſmart, pointed ſentences, the *vibrantes ſententiolae* of Petronius, muſt have coſt him a great deal of pains.

As from what I have written at ſuch length upon this author, it appears that I have been pretty much converſant with him, I will ſubjoin by way of note ſome obſervations that have occurred to me upon his text as it ſtands in the printed editions *.

* Livy, lib. 9 cap. 15. *Gens dubiae ad id voluntatis?* Is not that a Greciſm? *ad id* for εἰς τοῦτο—that is, *to this time.* Upon this paſſage Crevier has not thought it worth his while to beſtow any note.

In the end of the preceding paragraph the reading in Crevier is thus: *Quin duces ſicut belli, ita inſatiabilis ſupplicii futuros fuiſſe.* I ſay the reading ſhould be *inſatiabiles.* No note of Crevier here neither.

In the 11th chapter of the ſame book, about the middle of it, it is printed, *Pacem ſibi habeat (*ſcilicet *populus Romanus), legiones captas victori reſtituat.* Gronovius would correct this, and read *pacem ne habeat;* but I ſay the ſenſe is much better as it is. And the meaning is: 'Let the Romans do with the peace what they will, 'ratify it or not as they pleaſe; but let them reſtore 'to us the legions, which we once conquered and had 'in our power.' It appears from a note of Crevier upon this paſſage, that neither he nor Gronovius underſtood it. He has no note at all upon the expreſſion in the ſentence that follows, *dignum erat,* which, I doubt,

he did not underſtand to be the ſame with *dignum eſſet*, the common Latin expreſſion: Whereas *dignum erat* is a Greek idiom; for the Greeks would ſay αξιον αν ην, with the verb in the imperfect of the indicative. But that imperfect is alſo uſed in Latin, as where Virgil ſays, ſpeaking of a tree in Media,

> Ipſa ingens arbor, faciemque ſimillima lauro;
> Et, ſi non aliam late jactaret odorem,
> Laurus *erat*.———*Geor*. 2. v. 131.

It is very true that this expreſſion is obſcure in the Latin for want of the potential particle 'αν; but that was a defect in their language, which the Romans could not help. But I think that was a reaſon why they ſhould have uſed, in ſuch expreſſions, the common idiom of their own language rather than the Greek idiom.

Lib. 10. cap. 26. Fabius Maximus, in his ſpeech to the people concerning a coadjutor to him in the war againſt the Etrurians, ſays, '*Caeterum ſi ſibi adjuto-* '*rem belli ſociumque imperii darent, quonam modo ſe obli-* '*viſci P. Decii conſulis, per tot collegia experti, poſſe?* Where we may obſerve, firſt a very fine imitation of what Diomede in Homer ſays, when it was propoſed to him to chuſe an aſſociate in his night expedition;

Πως αν επειτ Οδυσηος εγω θειοιο λαθοιμην.

In the ſecond place, the meaning of the word *collegia* there is certainly extraordinary, and might have been taken notice of by Crevier. It denotes not what we

call *colleges*, but what we would call *colleagueſhips*, that is, offices in which before they had been colleagues, of which there were ſome, as appears from the preceding part of the hiſtory. Upon this paſſage Crevier ſays not a word. There is a paſſage in the end of the ſame chapter, where Crevier rejects an emendation of Gronovius, but does not make one himſelf, which I think is as eaſily made as it is neceſſary. It is where Livy ſays, that both the conſuls went to this Etrurian war, *cum quatuor legionibus et magno equitatu Romano, Campaniſque mille equitibus, delectis ad id bellum, miſſis, et ſociorum nominiſque Latini majore exercitu quam Romani.* Where I think we ſhould read, in place of *Romani*, *Romanorum*; or otherwiſe there muſt be an ellipſis ſuppoſed, and we muſt underſtand *confecerant* or *emiſerant*; but I would rather chuſe the correction, becauſe I think the ellipſis too violent.

CHAP. II.

Of Julius Caeſar's Commentaries.—The ſubject of them of great importance.—The character of the Man.—His military actions, the greateſt that ever were.—The ſtile of his Commentaries, *the beſt hiſtorical ſtile among the Romans;—wonderful conſidering how haſtily it muſt have been written amidſt ſuch great occupation.*

I SHOULD think what I have ſaid in the preceding chapter, upon the ſubject of the Latin hiſtorians, very imperfect, if I did not add ſomething concerning Julius Caeſar, the beſt of them all in my opinion in point of ſtile; and, for the ſubject of his hiſtory, tho' it take in but a ſmall extent of time, and be not the hiſtory of a nation or kingdom, it contains events of ſuch importance, and is treated by the au-

thor in ſuch a manner, that he may be reckoned among the firſt hiſtorians of antiquity; for his Commentaries contain an account of the greateſt military operations that are to be found in the hiſtory of mankind. He was at the head of the nobleſt army, in my opinion, that has been ſince the heroic ages, and more attached to him than I believe ever any army was to a general: And I think with good reaſon; for he was poſſeſſed of all the qualities that could gain the hearts of men. He was brave, magnanimous, moſt liberal in rewarding merit, and at the ſame time of a moſt merciful and forgiving diſpoſition. Although there never was a general that ſhowed more conduct, by which he ſometimes conquered without fighting, as in his war againſt Afranius and Petreius, Pompey's generals in Spain, yet he aſcribes the moſt of his victories to the valour of his ſoldiers; and generally concludes the deſcription of his battles by telling us that the enemies *diutius virtuti noſtrorum militum reſiſtere non potuerunt*. And in one of his greateſt battles, that with Arioviſtus, he gives a great ſhare of the glory of the victory to the

preſence of mind and good conduct of one of his officers, young Craſſus, who gave the ſignal to the body of reſerve to advance and ſupport one of his wings, which was overpowered by the multitude of the enemy, and was beginning to give ground. In ſhort, he was ſo beloved by his officers and ſoldiers, that, when they happened to fall into the hands of his enemies, ſome of them rather than ſerve againſt him choſe to be put to death *.

The martial exploits of Julius may be praiſed in the ſame way that Neſtor praiſes the heroes that lived before him: 'They 'were the braveſt of men,' ſays Neſtor, 'and fought with the braveſt of men †'. For Julius had not to deal with enemies ſuch as ſome generals of late had to deal with, whom to conquer would have been no glory, tho' to be conquered by them

* De Bello Africano, cap. 44. et ſeq.

† Κρατιστοι δη κεινοι επιχθονιων τελεθον ανδρων·
Κρατιστοι μεν εσαν, και κρατιστοις εμαχοντο.
Iliad 1. v. 266.

was the greateſt diſgrace; but he had for adverſaries a great nation, who at that time excelled all the nations of the world in the glory of arms, as the Romans themſelves confeſſed*, and of whom, for that reaſon they were more afraid than of any other nation; I mean the Gauls;—alſo the Helvetii, who, for the love of glory and of conqueſt, did, what I believe no other nation did ſince the beginning of the world, left their whole country, with their wives and children, deſtroying their towns to the number of *twelve*, villages to the number of *four hundred*, and all other houſes beſides, in ſhort, every thing they could not carry with them, even the corn that they did not take with them, in order to conquer Gaul, and make a ſettlement in ſome of its fertile provinces †. Theſe I think he could not have conquered, his army not being either ſo numerous, or ſo well formed and diſciplined when he fought with them as it was afterwards, if it had not been for very

* Cicero, who was a cotemporary of Julius Caeſar, makes this confeſſion. See p. 9. of this volume.

† Caeſar. *De Bello Gallico*, lib. 1. cap. 5.

good conduct on his part, by which he deſtroyed one fourth of the Helvetii before he came to an engagement with them *, and great raſhneſs and fooliſh confidence on their part, which made them attack him with all the advantages of ground. Then he fought alſo with a people ſtill more fierce and warlike than the Gauls, or even the Helvetii, I mean the Germans; and, having overcome them in a great battle, drove them out of Gaul, and followed them even to their own country, being the firſt of the Romans that croſſed the Rhine. And, laſt of all, he fought with his own countrymen the Romans, then the greateſt people in the world, with one of the greateſt generals at their head they ever produced, I mean Pompey, who was ſupported by all the authority of their ſtate, and all the forms of their government; and who, beſides a very great army, which he commanded himſelf in Theſſaly, very much more numerous than the army of Julius, had a veteran army commanded by his Lieutenants, with which he occupied the province of Spain; and over and above all

* Caeſar. lib. 1. *De Bello Gallico*, cap. 12.

this, had the abſolute command of the ſea, which he covered with his ſhips.

I know it will be ſaid in anſwer to all this praiſe which I have beſtowed on Julius, that he overturned the conſtitution, and deſtroyed the liberties of his country. This indeed I ſhould think a great charge, if it could be proved to my ſatisfaction, that the Romans were at that time capable of liberty, and fit to govern themſelves, or that it was not the greateſt good fortune which could befall them to have ſuch a maſter as Julius. For my part, I believe it was true what he ſaid, that the commonwealth at that time was nothing but a name without a ſubſtance *. But if it had

* Suetonius, *in Vita Caeſaris*, cap. 78. His words are, *Nihil eſſe rempublicam, appellationem modo, ſine corpore et ſpecie.* Nor was this the opinion of Julius only, but alſo of Cicero, who was of the contrary party; for in his epiſtles to Atticus, where he ſpeaks his ſentiments of the ſtate of the republic more freely than any where elſe, he thus expreſſes himſelf: *Amiſimus, mi Pomponi, omnem non modo ſuccum ac ſanguinem, ſed etiam colorem et ſpeciem priſtinam civitatis. Nulla eſt reſpublica, in qua delecter, in qua acquieſcam.*——Lib. 4. Ep. 17.

been otherwiſe, I think he was not only provoked to do what he did, but it was in ſelf defence; for he muſt have been ruined and undone by the violence and injuſtice of his enemies, if he had not ſought protection from his army. This was what he himſelf ſaid in the field of battle of Pharſalia, when he ſaw ſo many of the Romans lying dead. '*Hoc voluerunt: tantis rebus geſtis, C. Caeſar condemnatus eſſem, niſi ab exercitu auxilium petiſſem**.'

Such was the man whoſe actions are related in theſe commentaries. The ſubject of them muſt be acknowledged to be great and noble: And, as to the manner of treating it, there is no author exceeds him. His deſcriptions of battles and other military operations are ſuch, that he is equalled by none unleſs perhaps by Polybius. And even him he exceeds in explaining the councils by which they were conducted: Nor need we wonder at that, as they were his own councils; tho', to explain even them as he has done, is no common

* Suetonius, *in Vita Caeſaris*, cap. 30.

merit in an hiſtorian, as Hirtius has well obſerved in his preface to the eighth book of the Gallic war.

Long ſpeeches in memoirs would have been improper; but he has ſhort ones, as many as are proper, and theſe exceedingly well compoſed, all of them full of ſenſe and matter, without the affectation of any ornament of words. And what he has given us, by way of digreſſion, upon the ſubject of the manners of the Gauls and Germans, is very much to the purpoſe, and is extremely inſtructive, being the account, the moſt to be depended upon, of the manners of thoſe two great nations at that time.

As to the ſtile of theſe commentaries, I think I need ſay nothing of it after the eulogium that Cicero has beſtowed on it *,

* Cicero *de Claris Oratoribus*, cap. 75: Where, ſpeaking of Caeſar's Commentaries, he ſays, That they are, '*nudi, recti, et venuſti, omni ornatu orationis, tanquam veſte, detracto.*' Here is a character of ſtile, which I think is the juſt reverſe of the ſtile of Livy and Tacitus. Cicero ſeems to compare it to a fine naked Greek

which is to be the more regarded, for two reaſons: *Firſt*, That Cicero did not like the man, being of the oppoſite party in in the ſtate; and, 2*dly*, Becauſe the ſtile

ſtatue, which, all Connoiſſeurs agree, could not be improved by any dreſs, but on the contrary disfigured. He adds: 'Nihil enim eſt in hiſtoria, pura et illuſtri brevitate dulcius.' Now the brevity of Livy and Tacitus is neither pure nor perſpicuous. See what I have further ſaid of Julius Caeſar's ſtile, in vol. 3. cap. 20. p. 383.

There are ſome, I know, pretending to be critics, who are offended with the repetition of words in theſe Commentaries, particularly with the repetition of the *noun* with the *relative*, which is very frequent in Caeſar: But it gives, I think, a great perſpicuity to the ſtile; and I have obſerved, for want of it, ambiguities both in Latin and Engliſh. Such critics find fault alſo with the ſame word occurring at the diſtance perhaps of two or three lines: But, for my part, I approve more of that than of a ſtudied and affected change of the word, which, I know, ſome writers labour very much, tho' I think it is what Terence calls *obſcura diligentia*. I have heard of a Frenchman, who acknowledged that the *matter* of Caeſar's Commentaries was very fine: 'But,' ſays he, if I had been to write them, the *ſtile* 'would have been very different:' And I am perſuaded it would have been ſo; and it is likely would have been more approved by our reviewers and ſuch critics as I have been mentioning.

of them is very different from Cicero's own ſtile, which was diſliked, as is well known, by ſeveral of his own cotemporaries, as not altogether chaſte and Attick, but having a good deal of Aſiatic tumor. I ſhall therefore only ſay one thing more in commendation of Caeſar's ſtile, that, if it be the greateſt praiſe, as I think it is, of a ſtile, to draw your attention to Things more than to Words, there is no ſtile in that reſpect preferable to the ſtile of theſe Commentaries. When you ſit down to read them, you attend ſo little to the words, and are ſo drawn on by the matter, that you dont know where to ſtop: Which I myſelf experienced upon this occaſion; for, having begun to read them, that I might give a better account of the ſtile of them, I was ſo carried on by the matter that I could not ſtop till I had read them almoſt all over, tho' I had done ſo ſeveral times before, being the firſt book of Latin that was put into my hands, and a book that I always admired.

What Hirtius ſays of him, in his very elegant preface to the eighth book of the

Gallic war, is I think remarkable. 'Others,' ſays he, 'know how well they 'are written, but I know how quickly.' And indeed, when I conſider what a wonderful deal of buſineſs he carried on, civil as well as military, I am perſuaded that his Commentaries were little more than an extempory performance. Nor will this appear incredible to thoſe who conſider the wonderful acuteneſs and comprehenſion of his mind. He dictated, as Pliny informs us *, to four at a time, and, when he was doing nothing elſe, to ſeven. And even when he was riding he could dictate to two or more, as Plutarch, in his life, informs us †. A man therefore who was ſo much a man of buſineſs, and capable of doing ſo many things at the ſame time, might write Commentaries of his own actions as well as he has written, and as haſtily, in the midſt of the greateſt occupations.

* Lib. 7. cap. 15.

† *In Vita* Caeſaris.

CHAP. III.

Of the Roman hiſtories of the Halicarnaſſian and Polybius,—if they had not been preſerved to us, the Roman empire would have appeared to have been the work of chance, not of wiſdom and virtue.—And firſt of Dionyſius.—He as well prepared for writing his hiſtory as any man could be;—learned the Latin language for that purpoſe;—his account of that language.—The firſt book of the Halicarnaſſian, the beſt piece of archeology extant.—The author's diligence in collecting from ſo many different authors Greek and Latin.—Of the Aborigines,—*the* Latins,—*and* Romans;—*all the ſame people under different names, and originally from Arcadia.—The* Pelaſgi *alſo,—and the colony that came with Evander, likewiſe from that country.—Of thoſe that came with Hercules;—an account of that hero.—The ſixth and laſt migration into Latium from*

Greece, was that of the Trojans under the conduct of Æneas.—The Trojans also originally from Arcadia.—Of the genealogy of Æneas.—His voyage from Troy to Latium very well traced by our author; —proved by the universal belief of the people of Rome, and 50 Trojan families still existing when our author wrote.—The Romans, mixed as they were of different colonies, all originally Greeks.—So noble a descent given to them by Dionysius, makes his history credible.—Livy's account of the Romans, compared with that of the Halicarnassian:—For any thing Livy has said, they might have been all originally barbarians, fugitives, and slaves. —Some of them, according to his account, were really slaves.—The noblest descent not sufficient, without good education, laws, and institutions.—The Romans bred as well as born to be masters of the world.—Of the institutions of Romulus. —1st, The Patronage and Clientship he introduced.—The happy consequences of this institution.—Next, *The form of government instituted by Romulus; not so democratical as it became in after times,*

but well mixed and poiſed;—the moſt antient and beſt of all governments.—The beſt of all Romulus's inſtitutions was the family-government, which he eſtabliſhed. —This the chief cauſe of the Roman grandeur.—The happy conſequences of it:— Vainly attempted by other nations, even by the Spartans.—Livy mentions but one of Romulus's ſeven inſtitutions, and that very ſhortly.—Of the religious inſtitutions of Romulus.—The ſtate of religion in Latium in his time;—a good ſyſtem of Theiſm, without the mixture of thoſe impious fables, which diſgraced the Greek religion in the days of our author.—This pure religion not introduced by Romulus, but imported by the Greek colonies that had ſettled in Latium *before his time. —Romulus inſtituted religious feſtivals, and ſacrifices, and many prieſthoods.—Livy not more full upon the religious inſtitutions of Romulus than upon the civil; —wonderful that he ſhould have ſaid ſo little of ſo great a King and the founder of Rome;—one of the greateſt men that ever exiſted;—an altar erected to him by an Italian in later times.—Livy fuller*

upon the religious inſtitutions of Numa; —but not ſo full and diſtinct as the Halicarnaſſian;—omits one of the civil inſtitutions of Numa of great importance.—Dionyſius, a moſt religious hiſtorian, but not ſuperſtitious, becauſe he believes in demons and extraordinary interpoſitions of divinity.—The people of Rome, the moſt religious people in the world;—more religious than the Greeks or Egyptians;—lived with their Gods, and conſulted them upon all occaſions public and private. —The wonderful effect that this muſt have had upon their lives and manners. —In their degenerate ſtate they neglected religion.—This a certain proof of degeneracy in all nations.—Apology of the author for inſiſting ſo much upon the ſubject *of the Halicarnaſſian's hiſtory in a work which profeſſes only to treat of* ſtile.—*Of the Stile of the Halicarnaſſian's hiſtory;—the greateſt beauty both in the narrative and rhetorical part of it;—not ſo figured as the ſtile of Thucydides, nor ſo plain as that of Xenophon.—His ſpeeches all ſpeeches of buſineſs,—neither Sophiſtical nor declamatory.—Photius's judgment*

of the Halicarnaſſian's ſtile, ill founded;—no obſcurity or perplexity in his ſtile, except where the MS. is faulty.—Of the Halicarnaſſian's critical works;—a new edition both of theſe and of his hiſtory, recommended to the Scholars of Oxford.—Faults in the preſent edition that may be corrected;—one of them mentioned.

I COME now to ſpeak of two Greek hiſtorians of Roman affairs, (and I ſhall mention no more, neither Greek nor Latin), Dionyſius the Halicarnaſſian and Polybius. Without theſe two, tho' every other Greek or Roman writer upon the ſubject of Rome had come down to us entire, I ſhould have been diſpoſed to think, as many of the Greeks did at the time the Halicarnaſſian wrote *, that this great empire of Rome was either the work of mere chance, or rather, as I believe that nothing in the univerſe is produced in that way, of a ſupernatural and miraculous interpoſition of the divine provi-

* Dionyſ. lib. 1. cap. 4. et 5.

dence. But, from the ſtudy of theſe two authors, I have learned that their government, their inſtitutions religious and civil, their military art, in which they exceeded all nations that are, were, or, I believe, ever will be;—and, laſtly their manners, without which no people can be great, good, or happy, were ſuch, that I no longer wonder they ſhould become the greateſt people in the world, eſpecially when I conſider how inferior all the other nations of the world were to them in theſe reſpects at the time they roſe to univerſal empire.

I will begin with the Halicarnaſſian, who, I think, was as well prepared for the great work of hiſtory he undertook as any man could well be. For he tells us in his preface, that he was two and twenty years in Rome preparing materials for his hiſtory, during which time he learned the Latin dialect of the Greek, which he ſays was for the greater part Æolic *; and, af-

* Dionyſ. lib. 1. *in fine.* Where he ſays that all that the Roman language had ſuffered by the mixture of ſo many people with them, was, το μη παση φλογγοις ομοιωσαι.—Here I think the Halicarnaſſian does full ju-

ter having converſed with the moſt learned in Rome upon the ſubject of their hiſtory, and got all the information he could from them, and from the antient Roman hiſtorians he mentions, ſuch as Porcius Cato, Fabius Maximus, Valerius Antias, and other reſpectable authors, he then, and not till then, began his work *. And it appears, that he not only conſulted authors, and the learned men then living, but alſo records, ſuch as the tables of the cenſors

ſtice to the Roman language, and more than juſtice; for, tho' I do not believe that there was a great mixture of barbarous words in it, and tho' I be perſuaded that it was a dialect of Greek, having more of the Æolic, as the Halicarnaſſian tells us, than of any other, yet I hold it to have been a very antient dialect, (probably brought into Latium by Œnotrus and his Arcadians, 17 generations before the Trojan war), which came off from the parent language before it was completely formed. This, I think, is evident from its want of one of the parts of ſpeech, and that a moſt material part, I mean the *article*, and from its deficiency in that greateſt art of language, *flection*. This deficiency is ſo great, that, beſides its want of ſeveral tenſes which the Greeks have, it has no preſent participle paſſive, nor paſt participle active. See what I have further ſaid of the defects of the Latin language in the preceding vol. lib. 1. chap. 9. & 10.

* Dionyſ. lib. 1. cap. 7. et 74.

preſerved in the ſeveral families who had enjoyed the honour of that office.

His firſt book I think the moſt curious book of archeology that is extant; and the facts as well atteſted as we can expect facts ſo antient to be. The account he there gives of the antient inhabitants of Italy makes, I think, no inconſiderable part of the hiſtory of Man, as it tends to ſhow that there has been a conſtant migration, from the moſt antient times, of men from the eaſtern parts of the world to the weſtern: For I hold that man is one of thoſe many animals, which were not originally in every part of the earth, but only in certain countries, ſuch as horſes, aſſes, oxen, buffaloes, and the like. I therefore think that his native land is certain countries of the eaſt; and that the great difference betwixt him and other animals is, that he is by nature deſtined to live in every country and climate of the earth. And, when he comes to be civilized and formed into ſocieties, he in the beginning of that ſtate multiplies ſo much, much more than any animal of the ſame ſize in the wild ſtate,

that the produce of the country cannot maintain him. He therefore of neceſſity migrates from his native country to other countries, where he can find ſuſtenance. The Halicarnaſſian in his firſt book mentions five ſeveral migrations into Italy, of which I ſhall ſpeak more fully by and by. All theſe appear to have been occaſioned by the want of ſuſtenance in the country from whence they came, except that of the Trojans, who were driven out of their country by ſuperior force. And as late as thoſe migrations of the Goths and Vandals from the eaſtern parts of Europe and Aſia, which overwhelmed the Roman empire, we are aſſured by a cotemporary hiſtorian, Procopius, that it was abſolute want of the neceſſaries of life which obliged them to leave their country *.

* See Procopius, *De Bello Vandalico*, lib. 1. cap. 3. and in ſeveral other places.—See an extraordinary inſtance, which he gives of the multiplication of people in an iſland that he calls *Brittia*, lying betwixt Britain and Scandinavia; *Gothicae Hiſtoriae*, lib. 4. p. 467. The Romans, as Livy informs us, tho' they were engaged in almoſt continual wars, in ſome of which they ſuffered great loſſes, yet multiplied ſo faſt, that, when

The firſt colony, which, as the Halicarnaſſian tells us, came to Italy from the eaſt, were the people called *Aborigines*; for they were not, as many think the name implies, αυτοχθονες, or *original inhabitants of the country*, but were originally from Arcadia, from whence they came under the conduct of Œnotrus, 17 generations before

their city was no more than 543 years old, they had ſent out 30 colonies, (lib. 27. cap. 9.) Sigonius makes the number of them to be no leſs than 53; for he ſays, that Livy only reckons thoſe colonies who were obliged to ſend recruits to their armies. But there were 23 more, that, by their original conſtitution, were free from that duty; and who, on that account, are ſaid by Livy, *ſacroſanctam vacationem habere*; (ibid. cap. 38) And, notwithſtanding their prodigious loſſes in the ſecond Punic war, in which they loſt four battles ſucceſſively, the laſt of which was the great battle of *Cannae*, where, as Polybius informs us, 70,000 of them lay upon the field of battle, and about 10,000 were made priſoners, they, in leſs than 20 years after that battle, ſent out five colonies, 300 families in each; (ibid. lib. 32. cap. 29.) And in more antient times the multiplication of men in thoſe ſmall ſtates of Italy was ſtill greater; for *Alba Longa*, the *metropolis* of Rome, peopled Latium with its colonies, ſending forth no leſs than 30 in a much ſhorter time than Rome ſent out the ſame number. (Dionyſ. lib. 3. cap. 31.)

the Trojan war *. They poſſeſſed themſelves of a part of the country, then occupied by the *Umbri*, and they were called *Aborigines* from their chuſing to live in mountains, their native country of Arcadia being a mountainous country †. Theſe *Aborigines*, he tells us, kept that name till the Trojan war: Then from their King *Latinus* they were called *Latins*; and, laſt of all, they took the name of *Romans*, from the city of *Rome*, which was built by Romulus, and called after his name ‡. With the Aborigines were mixed ſome *Pelaſgi*, a people of whom we hear a great deal in the antient hiſtory of Greece. They were a very vagrant people, and inhabited ſundry countries in Italy, in Theſſaly, and even in Aſia; for they are mentioned by Homer among the Trojan auxiliaries. Theſe too our author derives from the ſame country of Peloponneſus; and I ima-

* Lib. 1. cap. 11.

† Lib. 1. cap. 13.

‡ Ibid. cap. 9.

gine they were originally an Arcadian people as well as the Œnotrians; for he ſays they had their name from Pelaſgus, the ſon of Niobe, an Arcadian woman, by Jupiter *.

The third Greek colony which came to Latium was alſo from Arcadia, which appears to me to have been the parent country of all the Greek colonies to the weſtward. The conductor of this colony was Evander, who, about 60 years before the Trojan war, ſettled with his followers upon the *Palantine*, or, as it was afterwards called, the *Palatine* hill, (for the Arcadians, as I have obſerved, loved hills), which was one of the ſeven hills of the city of Rome.

The fourth colony from Greece to Latium came with Hercules, who left there a conſiderable number of his followers. They, as our author tells us, were received in a friendly manner by the Greeks under Evander, being probably their countrymen,

* Lib. 1. cap. 17.

and ſettled near them upon the hill called *Saturnius* by the natives, and afterwards the *Capitoline hill* by the Romans *. Of this hero the Halicarnaſſian has given us the beſt hiſtory I believe extant, in which he diſtinguiſhes very properly the fabulous part from the hiſtorical †.

The fifth and laſt migration of Greeks into the country of Latium came with Æneas and the Trojans who had eſcaped from Troy ‡. That the Trojans were originally Greeks who came from Arcadia the parent country, as I have obſerved, of ſo many Greek colonies, our author informs us, had been proved by ſeveral writers before him; which proof, however, he ſhortly, but very diſtinctly, ſtates; and aſſigns a very good reaſon for the migration, pointing out alſo the ſeveral ſtages of

* Lib. 2. cap. 1.

† Ibid. cap. 39. et ſeq.

‡ All theſe five migrations are reckoned up by our author in the beginning of his ſecond book.

it, and accounting very well how they came to ſettle at laſt in Aſia upon the Helleſpont, where a part of them, under the conduct of a leader, named Idaeus, ſettled upon the mountain from him called *Ida*, the Arcadians, as I have obſerved, loving to dwell in mountains. And here he gives us a very exact genealogy of Æneas, much the ſame, I think, with that given us by Homer *.

That Æneas came from Troy to Latium he proves at great length, beſtowing many chapters upon it, as it was a point, he ſays, diſputed. That he eſcaped from Troy, and came to Thracia, is related by Helenicus a very antient Greek writer †; and of this he ſeems to think there could be no doubt. But it was much queſtioned, whether he did not remain and die there, or at leaſt in ſome place betwixt Thrace and Italy. But, I think, our author has traced his voyage all the way from Thrace to Italy by memorials,

* Ibid. cap. 61.

† Ibid. cap. 48.

ſome of which were remaining in his time, in ſuch a manner, that, for my part, I have not the leaſt doubt of the fact *. And indeed the univerſal belief of a whole people, I mean the Romans, and ſo many Trojan families as were exiſting among them even at the time our author wrote, (no leſs than 50†, one of which was the Julian family,) put the thing out of all doubt.

It appears, that, before thoſe nations from Peloponneſus came into Italy, there were other nations there, ſuch as the Umbri, the Siculi, and the Tyrrhenians. From whence theſe nations came, we cannot tell; and indeed of the two firſt mentioned we hardly know any thing more than their names. We cannot therefore judge of their origin, otherwiſe than from what happened in later times; and, if we judge by that rule, we muſt ſuppoſe that they likewiſe came from the eaſt. As to the Tyrrhenians,

* Lib. 1. cap. 49. et ſeq.

† Lib. 1. cap. 66.

Dionyſius is of opinion *, that they were an indigenous nation in Italy; which is no more than ſaying, that he did not know from whence they came. But it is now diſcovered that they ſpoke a dialect of the Latin, and uſed the antient Greek character as the Latins did †. We may therefore,

* Lib. 1. cap. 30.

† See the famous Etruſcan monument called *Tabulae Lugubinae*, publiſhed by Johannes Baptiſta Paſſerius, with very learned notes; from which it appears to me that the Tyrrhenians, a much more antient people of Italy than the Romans, ſpoke an antient dialect of the Greek or Latin, which I conſider as the ſame languages, and alſo uſed the Greek character, which was alſo the antient Roman character. There are ſeveral other things concerning the Etruſcan arts, publiſhed by this Paſſerius, along with the *Tabulae Lugubinae*; and, in the volume containing theſe *Tabulae*, the reader will find a reference to every thing that has been publiſhed on the ſubject of this antient and great people, great not only in extent of territory, but in arts, being the people from whom the Romans derived all their arts till they became acquainted with the Greeks.

Herodotus makes the Hetrurians, or Tyrrhenians, a colony of the Lydians in Aſia. This, I find, is doubted by ſome Italian antiquarians; but, be that as it will, it is evident that they had the ſame language, the ſame

I think, reaſonably preſume that they were originally from the ſame country, tho' a colony, no doubt, much more antient than even the Œnotrians or Aborigines.

And here we may obſerve in paſſing, that the Arcadians, who ſent out ſo many colonies into Italy, were not themſelves indigenous in Peloponneſus, but came from Egypt, where there was a diſtrict and a city of the name of Arcadia. This is a very curious fact of antient hiſtory, of which we are informed by Euſtathius in his Commentary on that part of Homer's *Catalogue* where he ſpeaks of the *Arcadians*. And, if it be true alſo, what, I think, I have elſewhere proved *, that the Athenians were likewiſe a colony from Egypt, it appears, that not only arts and civility came from Egypt into Greece, but a great part of the people. And, as the Arcadians and Athe-

religion, the ſame arts and manners, that the Greeks had. It is therefore evident that they muſt either have been originally the ſame nation, or derived all the things I have mentioned from ſome other nation.

* Vol. 1. of this work, book 3. chap. 13. p. 638.

nians were the moſt antient people of Greece, I think it is not unreaſonable to preſume, that all the inhabitants of Greece have at different times come from that parent country of men, as well as of arts and ſciences; for we are ſure that the Egyptians ſent colonies into many other countries, tho' there be no memory preſerved of their ſending any into Greece, except the two I have mentioned *.—But to return to Dionyſius.

This part of the Halicarnaſſian's work muſt have coſt him, as he himſelf tells us †, a great deal of labour; and he appears to

* The Italian antiquarians, who have publiſhed ſo many curious works upon the Etruſcan monuments, have endeavoured to prove that the Etruſcans came originally from Egypt. This opinion Bonorottus has maintained in his work, *De origine Etruſcorum ex Egypto*; ſect. 47. p. 103. & 104. of his appendix *ad Opus Demſterianum*. The ſame is maintained by another famous Tuſcan antiquarian, Gorius, tom. 2. *Muſæi Etruſci*, differt. 1. See alſo what this laſt mentioned author has ſaid of the Etruſcan alphabet in his *Hiſtoria Etruſca Antiquaria*.

† Lib. 1. cap. 89.

have valued himſelf ſo much upon it, that from this part of his work he has entitled the whole hiſtory, *Roman Archeology*. He muſt, in compoſing it, have diligently peruſed a great many books Greek as well as Latin, from ſome of which he has given us extracts. And here I obſerve a great difference betwixt him and Livy, who does not appear to have read any one Greek book upon the ſubject of the Roman hiſtory or antiquities, Polybius only excepted *. And the older Roman hiſtorians and antiquarians, ſuch as Porcius Cato, and Caius Sempronius, tho' they affirmed that the Aborigines were from Peloponneſus, yet produced no authorities from any Greek author †. But this defect our author has abundantly ſupplied ‡.

* He mentions him in three places, lib. 34. cap. 50.; lib. 36. cap. 19.; et lib. 39. cap. 52.; but without any eulogium, tho' from what is preſerved of Polybius, it is evident he has taken from him almoſt his whole hiſtory, (particularly the military operations) during the period of which Polybius treats.

† Dionyſ. lib. 1. cap. 11.

‡ Ibid. cap. 12.

Thus Dionyſius has ſhown that the people whoſe hiſtory he writes, tho' mixed of different colonies coming to Latium at different times, were all originally Greeks, and of the moſt antient and braveſt people in Greece, with whom the wiſdom of the oracle would not permit even the Lacedemonians to meddle, as Herodotus has informed us *. To ſhow that the Romans were thus nobly deſcended, I think, was very well worth the pains he has beſtowed upon it; ſince, otherwiſe, I could have hardly thought his hiſtory credible: For I ſo firmly believe that there is a difference of character in nations, as well as of families in the ſame nation, that, with the beſt inſtitutions and manners, and in the beſt country and climate †, and with all other

* Herod. lib. 1. cap. 66.

† This the Romans enjoyed; and we have a deſcription of the country and climate of Italy given by the Halicarnaſſian, (lib. 1. cap. 36. et 37.), of which the diction is fully as beautiful, for proſe, as Virgil's praiſe of Italy in the Georgics is for verſe, and the matter very much ſuperior; for it contains a full enumeration of all the advantages that a country can enjoy from ſoil, climate, and variety of ground.

advantages that fortune could beſtow, I do not think that any nation could have excelled ſo much in the great arts of life, arms, and government, and have produced ſuch illuſtrious characters, and eſtabliſhed ſuch an empire over mankind, if they had not been of the race of the nobleſt people that ever exiſted, and the moſt eminent in arts, in arms, and in government.

Now, let us compare what Livy has done in this matter with what the Halicarnaſſian has done. Livy gives no account at all of the antient inhabitants of Italy before the Trojans landed there. He has indeed named the Aborigines as being there before the Trojans: But who they were, or from whence they came, he has not told us. Neither has he ſhown that the Trojans were originally Greeks. Nay, he has not proved that they came to Italy, but has taken it for granted, tho', as I have obſerved, it was a controverted point. For any thing, therefore, we can learn from Livy, the Romans might have been thoſe barbarians, fugitives, and ſlaves, which ſome of

the Greeks ſuppoſed them to be*. And indeed, if we can believe Livy, a conſiderable part of them muſt have been originally ſlaves; for, he ſays, that in Romulus's aſylum all were received, freemen and ſlaves without diſtinction †. Whereas the Halicarnaſſian has expreſſly told us, that only freemen were received ‡. And indeed it is hardly credible, that Romulus would have done a thing ſo unjuſt, as to receive and protect fugitive ſlaves; for he muſt have made himſelf and his people deteſted by the whole neighbourhood, and conſidered as a public nuiſance.

But as the nobleſt birth and beſt natural abilities will not make great and good men without a proper education and good laws and inſtitutions, our author has been at pains to make his hiſtory probable alſo in this reſpect, by ſhowing us that the Romans were bred and lived under laws and

* Lib. 1. cap. 4.

† Livy, lib. 1. cap. 8.

‡ Lib. 1. cap. 15.

inſtitutions fitted to make them the governors of mankind. This he has done, firſt, in his account of the reign of Romulus, whoſe inſtitutions both civil and religious, and particularly his civil inſtitutions, he has explained at great length, and with very proper obſervations upon them, and compariſons betwixt them and the inſtitutions of other nations *.

I will only mention a few of them, beginning with the firſt he mentions, namely, the connection Romulus eſtabliſhed betwixt the nobles and the lower ſort of people by the means of Patronſhip and Clientſhip, which our author very juſtly celebrates as an excellent contrivance for connecting together, as much as was poſſible, two orders of men, whoſe intereſt appeared to be directly oppoſite; and he obſerves, that it far exceeded any thing of the kind practiſed by other nations; and to it he aſcribes what otherwiſe, I think, is unaccountable, that, for 630 years, in all the diſputes that were during that time, betwixt

* Lib. 1. cap. 7. &c.

Patricians and Plebeians, there was no bloodſhed, tho' ſome of them were very violent, and one of them went to the extremity of a ſeceſſion of the Plebeians *.

2*do*, The form of government, or conſtitution as we call it, was the beſt of the mixed kind that can be contrived; for it was not ſo popular as it became at laſt, but was much more ariſtocratical, yet not wholly ſo; for, tho' it was only the nobles who governed, that is, held the great offices of ſtate, it was not without the conſent of the people; for the people had three great privileges, that of creating magiſtrates, enacting laws, and declaring war. But theſe they could not exerciſe, except under the controul of the King and Senate: So that, without their approbation, what the people determined was not effectual †.

* Lib. 2. cap. 9. 10. & 11.

† Livy, lib. 1. cap. 17. Where he tells us, that, tho' this was altered in after times, when the government became almoſt quite popular, the form was ſtill kept up; for the judgments of the people were not valid, unleſs they were ratified by the authority of the ſenate. But, before the people determined, the ſenate became *auctores in incertum eventum comitiorum*.

This form of government is much the ſame with the heroic government of the Greeks at the time of the Trojan war, as deſcribed by Homer; and I hold it to be the moſt natural of all governments, by which the beſt men, who are by God and Nature deſtined to govern, do accordingly govern, but not without the conſent and approbation of the people.

3*tio*, But, ſays our author*, tho' the form of the government be ever ſo excellent, and all public matters regulated in the beſt manner poſſible, yet if the private lives of the citizens are not ſuch as they ought to be, it is impoſſible that ſuch a ſtate can be great and flouriſhing. Now, for that purpoſe, he ſays, two things were deviſed by Romulus, ſuch as were not to be found in any other ſtate; namely, his law of marriage, which he made an indiſſoluble ſociety among the Romans, whereof the huſband was the abſolute ruler; and, 2*dly*, the power he gave to fathers over their children, even that of life and death. By theſe two, the

* Lib. 2. cap. 24.

domeſtic government, which is the foundation of the happineſs and proſperity of every ſtate, was better regulated among the Romans than among any other people, and was, in my opinion, the chief cauſe of the proſperity and greatneſs of the Roman people, tho' I do not obſerve that it is much inſiſted upon in what has been written on that ſubject in modern times; but the Halicarnaſſian, as I have obſerved, lays due weight upon it *. In a family ſo governed, men learned the two moſt important leſſons in human life, to obey and to command: And they learned them in their proper order; firſt to obey while they were ſons of the family, and then to command when they were maſters. It was no wonder, therefore, that out of ſuch families there came the beſt citizens, fit to diſcharge every office of the ſtate civil or military; and to ſuch an education muſt be aſcribed what both Livy and the Halicarnaſſian tell us, that, tho' other nations in the neighbourhood of Rome might have better armies, there was none

* Lib. 2. cap. 24.

that had ſo many good generals. Of the neceſſity of ſuch a domeſtic government many ſtates, as our author obſerves*, ſeemed to have been ſenſible; but they could not make it effectual: And, particularly, they could not contrive how to regulate the conduct of the women, upon which, however, it is apparent, that the happineſs of a ſtate in a great meaſure depends. And accordingly we are informed, that Lycurgus, after regulating every thing elſe in the Lacedemonian policy, wanted laſt of all to lay reſtraints upon the women, and to preſcribe a life for them as well as for the men; but he could not effectuate it, and ſo was obliged to leave one half of his citizens without manners or diſcipline. The conſequence of which was, that the ſtate of Sparta, the beſt formed of any, I think, next to that of Rome, was ruined by the luxury and vanity of the women, which introduced wealth among them, and by that means ruined the ſtate, as the oracle had foretold †.

* Lib. 2. cap. 24. et 25.

† Ἁ φιλοχρηματια Σπαρταν ολει, αλλο δε ουδεν.

The laſt of the political inſtitutions of this great King was alſo mainly conducive to the power and the greatneſs of the Romans: And that was his forbidding the exerciſe of ſedentary, mechanic, and money-making arts by his citizens, as illiberal and tending to impair both mind and body. Theſe he left to be practiſed by ſlaves and ſtrangers that happened to be in Rome. But neither did he confine his citizens entirely to the exerciſe of arms; but divided the buſineſs of their lives betwixt war and agriculture; eſteeming, as our author ſays, each of theſe lives to be imperfect without the other. And in this reſpect he prefers, I think, very juſtly, the policy of Romulus to that of Lycurgus, whoſe citizens practiſed arms only, while the neceſſaries of life were ſupplied to them by the labour of others *. The conſequence of this life of the Roman ſoldier muſt have been, that he was more able to endure all toils and hardſhips of living, better than the Spartan, and had the uſe of the ſpade and of other inſtruments of

* Lib. 2. cap. 28.

huſbandry, without which it does not appear to me that they could have conquered the world *.

I come now to ſpeak of the religious inſtitutions of Romulus, upon which he enlarges as much as might be expected from ſo religious an hiſtorian, who every where inculcates that there can be no happineſs in a ſtate without religion; for, ſays he, it is the favour of the Gods that makes every thing proſper among men †. He introduces his account of theſe inſtitutions by informing us of the difference betwixt the religion of the Greeks in his time, and that of the Romans, which is really

* See what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, vol. 3. of Ant. Metaph. p. 113.

† Lib. 2. cap. 18. See alſo cap. 62. of the ſame book, where he ſays, 'That the Gods are the guardians 'of men and the givers to them of all good things.' And, in another paſſage of the ſame book (cap. 68.) he mentions thoſe who profeſs that godleſs philoſophy, 'if,' ſays he, 'it can be called philoſophy, which re'jects all extraordinary interpoſitions of divinity in the 'affairs of men, with which they ſaid the Gods took 'no concern.'

ſurpriſing, if we conſider that they were the ſame people, and worſhipped the ſame Gods: But, ſays he, the Romans did not admit into their creed thoſe impious ſtories, told by the Greeks, of the caſtration of the Gods, and their deſtroying their own children, of their wars, wounds, bonds, and ſlavery, and ſuch like things as are not only altogether unworthy of the Divine Nature, but diſgrace even the Human. They had no wailings and lamentations for the ſufferings of their Gods, ſuch as the Greeks had, nor any Bacchic rites or vigils of men and women together in the temples. And if, at any time, for ſome particular reaſon, they admitted a foreign religion into their city, ſuch as that of Cybele, or the Idean Goddeſs, the rites were performed under the inſpection of the Roman magiſtrate; nor, even in his time, he ſays, when the manners were ſo much changed for the worſe, did any Roman diſguiſe himſelf to act thoſe ridiculous mummeries that were acted by the prieſts of Cybele *.

* Lib. 2. cap. 19. et 20.

From this account of the Roman religion, upon which he makes moſt judicious reflections, it appears to have been the pureſt religion, (and indeed the Halicarnaſſian ſays it was ſo), then known in the world. And, I think, it can hardly be denied, that it was a genuine ſyſtem of Theiſm, if we only admit, that the buſineſs of Nature may be carried on, and the affairs of men directed by inferior intelligences, without the immediate interpoſition of the Supreme God: For, that the Romans, as as well as the Greeks, admitted that there was ſuch a God, the Father of Gods and Men, and the Supreme Governour of the univerſe, is evident. Now, a man, who believes that there is the ſame gradation of intelligences, as we know there is of other natures animate and inanimate, and, conſequently, that there are intelligences far ſuperior to man, interpoſed betwixt him and the Supreme Being, can have little difficulty to believe, that thoſe intelligences are employed to ſuperintend the operations both of Nature and of man, which I can prove to be the doctrine of our Scripture as well as of philoſophy, were this

the proper place for ſuch an inquiry. So far, therefore, our theology and theirs agree: But they differ in this, that theirs was not derived from philoſophy and the ſtudy of Nature, but came from Crete, (ultimately from Egypt); and their Gods were not immortal and immaterial beings, but mortal men born in Crete, to whom they aſcribed all the powers of Gods.

But, be that as it will, (for neither is this a place for ſuch inquiries), I cannot agree with the Halicarnaſſian, that this pure religion was firſt introduced into Latium by Romulus, and that he found there a religion ſuch as that of the Greeks in the days of our author, which he rejected, and would not permit in his dominions. On the contrary, I believe that the religion of Latium, in the days of Romulus, imported into that country by the ſeveral colonies which came into it from Arcadia, was that ſame pure religion, not corrupted and diſguiſed by the abſurd and impious fables above mentioned, the inventions of poets, promoted by the craft of prieſts working upon the ſuperſtition and ignorance of the

people: For, that there was a great growth of the Grecian mythology in later times, which we can trace from the days of Homer and downwards, is evident to any man converſant in the writings of that poet. Now, it is in this way that I account for the difference betwixt the later Greek religion, and the antient Greek religion imported into Latium by the Greek colonies who ſettled there, one of them, and the principal, 17 generations before the Trojan war, when I am perſuaded the Greek theology was much purer than it was in the days of Homer.

But, tho' I think the Halicarnaſſian is miſtaken in ſuppoſing that Romulus introduced a new religion into Latium, I muſt believe what he relates of his inſtituting feaſts and feſtivals in honour of the Gods, ſacrifices, and prieſts, more, ſays he, than ever were in any new city or ſtate, (no leſs than ſixty, according to Terentius Varro, who preſided over the public religion), beſides thoſe who took care of the private religion of families *; and whatever was

* Lib. 2. cap. 21.

added in ſacred matters by Numa and ſucceeding Kings, was only building, he ſays, upon the foundation laid by Romulus *.

I have dwelt the longer upon the Halicarnaſſian's account of theſe inſtitutions of Romulus, as I think it ſhows our author not only to have been a great critic, rhetorician, and hiſtorian, but a philoſopher, and a man of great political knowledge. And as to Romulus, whom he praiſes ſo much, I think he muſt have been one of the moſt extraordinary men that ever lived; and I can almoſt forgive a great ſcholar, who lived ſoon after the reſtoration of letters, and who gave himſelf the claſſical name of *Pomponius Laetus*, for building an altar to him. And indeed, being ſo young when he formed the Roman ſtate, I ſhould have believed him ſomething more than man, if the Halicarnaſſian had not told us that he conſulted with his grandfather Numitor, and was guided by the wiſdom of his age. Now, I have a high opinion of the wiſdom of thoſe antient times; and I believe

* Lib. 2. cap. 23.

that the philoſophy of government was very well known long before the philoſophy of Plato and Ariſtotle was heard of.

Livy is as ſparing upon the ſubject of the religious ordinances of Romulus as upon his civil; and he only mentions one temple that he dedicated to the God Feretrius, where he hung up the firſt *ſpolia opima*, that he had taken from a King of a neighbouring nation whom he had killed in battle. This ſilence of Livy upon the ſubject of ſo great a King as Romulus, and the founder of the Roman ſtate, we muſt think very extraordinary, unleſs we believe that the many particulars Dionyſius mentions of him are mere fiction; and it muſt appear more extraordinary ſtill, that one of the few particulars he mentions of the civil adminiſtration of Romulus, ſhould be a fact not true, and which reflects ſuch diſhonour upon the origin of his nation;—I mean the making his aſylum a ſanctuary for fugitive ſlaves.

Livy is more full in the account he gives us of the religious inſtitutions of Numa; but not ſo full and ſo accurate even there

as the Halicarnaſſian, who has told us that Numa divided the miniſters of the Gods among the Romans into eight claſſes *, the office of each of which he has diſtinctly explained. And he has mentioned one of the civil inſtitutions of Numa, which I think was of conſiderable conſequence, but is omitted by Livy: For it tended to promote that, by which only a virtuous community can ſubſiſt; I mean agriculture. He divided the land poſſeſſed by the Romans into *pagi* †, which, as he has explained elſewhere ‡, were tracks of land appropriated to ſome kinds of fortification upon high places or tops of hills, which ſerved as a refuge to the farmers in caſe of an invaſion by an enemy. Over theſe he appointed rulers and inſpectors, who took an account how every man belonging to the *pagus* cultivated his land, rewarding thoſe that cultivated well, and puniſhing thoſe that cultivated ill.

* Lib. 2. cap. 63.

† Lib. 2. cap. 76.

‡ Lib. 4. cap. 15.

From this account, given by the Halicarnaſſian, of the religious inſtitutions of Romulus and Numa, it is evident that he himſelf was, as well as Livy, a moſt religious man, as appears from ſundry particular paſſages which I have quoted above. Nor do I think that he was ſuperſtitious, becauſe he believed in ſome extraordinary interpoſitions of divinity, ſuch as that for the juſtification of a Veſtal virgin, who was accuſed of having let the ſacred fire go out through her fault *; nor for doubting, whether, as all things are mixed in Nature, there might not be a race mixed of divine and human natures, commonly called *daemons*, out of which race thoſe called *heroes* were produced. This doubt he ſtates when he relates the ſtory of Ilia the Veſtal virgin being impregnated by Mars †.

From what Livy, Dionyſius, and many other authors have told us of the religion

* Lib. 2. cap. 68.

† Lib. 1. cap. 77.

of the Romans, it is evident that they were the moſt religious people that ever exiſted. They not only worſhipped the great Gods who governed the univerſe, I mean the 12 Gods of the Greeks; but they had alſo tutelary Gods of their city, whom they called *Penates*. Further, each *curia* had its particular place of worſhip, and particular ſacrifices which they performed there; and there was one general place of worſhip for them all *: Beſides all theſe, each family had its tutelary Gods, or *Lares*, as they were called, to whom they were conſtantly making oblations. Now, of this kind of Deities neither Greeks nor Egyptians appear to have known any thing. Then the Romans did nothing of any moment, even in their private affairs, without conſulting the Gods by augury or haruſpicy; which does not appear to me to have been ſo conſtantly practiſed either by Greeks or Egyptians. The Romans therefore may be ſaid to have lived with their Gods; and, if we believe that ſuch a communication with Superior Beings is what

* Lib. 2. cap. 13. 65.

exalts our nature moſt, and beſtows upon us the greateſt felicity of which we are capable, we muſt ſuppoſe the Romans to have been the greateſt and happieſt people that ever exiſted. And, tho' we ſhould ſuppoſe all their Deities to have been mere fictions, and that there were no Daemons or ſuperior intelligences, with whom they had communication, and who revealed future events to them, and directed them in the management of their affairs, ſtill the belief, *intereſſe rebus humanis coeleſte numen*, as Livy expreſſes it *, and that they were under the guardianſhip and protection of ſuperior beings, who had a fatherly care of them, rewarding them when they did well, and puniſhing them when they did otherwiſe, muſt have been of wonderful influence upon their lives and manners, eſpecially when we conſider what the Halicarnaſſian has very well obſerved, that they imputed nothing to thoſe Beings, impure, wicked, flagitious, or any way unworthy of a Divine Nature. And one of the ſtrongeſt proofs of their degeneracy in la-

* Lib. 1. cap. 21.

ter times was the neglect of religion, as both Livy and the Halicarnaſſian have obſerved; and, in general, I think, we may conclude with the greateſt certainty, that where there is little or no religion among a people, they muſt be in a moſt wretched ſtate, and weak as well as wicked.

Nor is it only in the account he has given of the inſtitutions of Romulus that the Halicarnaſſian has ſhown his political wiſdom, but alſo in the ample Commentary he has made upon the inſtitutions of Servius Tullius, the fifth King of Rome; who added every thing to the political ſyſtem of Romulus, which the great increaſe of his citizens, and of wealth and poſſeſſions, made neceſſary. What I mean is his inſtitution of the *Cenſus*, and of the *Centuriata Comitia*, by which he contrived with wonderful ſkill to lay the burden of war and of taxes upon the rich, and, in return for that, to give them almoſt the whole power of the ſtate in the election of magiſtrates and in making war or peace or laws, reſerving at the ſame time the form of the popular government, tho' he took

away the ſubſtance. How the new *Comitia*, which he introduced, anſwered this purpoſe, Livy has ſufficiently explained, tho' not ſo fully as the Halicarnaſſian. But he has not explained near ſo well the policy of the inſtitution, which appears to me to have been a wonderful contrivance to ſatisfy the people by giving them a ſhare in the government, but ſuch a ſhare as could not almoſt in any caſe be hurtful to the ſtate; which I muſt own, I think, a wonderful contrivance, and ſuch as no legiſlator but himſelf ever diſcovered. And it reconciled in ſuch a manner the ariſtocratic with the popular government, that the Roman polity might have laſted forever, if it had not been for that which ſooner or later has been the deſtruction of all governments, and I may add of all nations as well as of Sparta, I mean money, from which aroſe all thoſe diſorders in the Roman ſtate that ended at laſt in its ruin.

There was another of the inſtitutions of Servius, contributing very much to what was the foundation of the Roman grandeur;—the number of their citizens. This

was one of the things, as Dionyſius has obſerved, that diſtinguiſhed them from all the ſtates of Greece, and particularly the Spartan, which, for want of a ſufficient number of citizens, was ruined by the loſs of a ſingle battle *. And in this reſpect he commends very much the policy of Romulus, which he ſays ought to have been imitated by the Greek ſtates, that, inſtead of putting to the ſword, or making ſlaves of the people in the cities that he conquered, he tranſplanted them to Rome, and gave them the freedom of the city, or made Roman colonies of them. And by this means, and by the aſylum which he opened, he increaſed the number of his citizens from 2000 foot, and 300 horſe, their number in the beginning of his reign, to 46,000 foot, and very near 1000 horſe, which was their number at his death †. The inſtitution of Servius I now ſpeak of was, I think, no more than carrying on and compleating the ſyſtem of Romulus;

* Lib. 2. cap. 17.

† Ibid. cap. 16.

for, as Romulus received in his aſylum, and gave the freedom of the city to all free men without diſtinction, whether they were born free or not; ſo Servius thought it was proper to give the freedom of the city to thoſe ſlaves who had been emancipated by the Romans themſelves, as well as Romulus had given it to thoſe who had been emancipated by the citizens of other ſtates. It is in this way that Dionyſius defends this new method of creating citizens, in his ſpeech which he puts into the mouth of Servius *; where we have excellent obſervations upon the advantages of ſuch an inſtitution, which, however, he obſerves, was in later times very much abuſed: And he recommends it to the magiſtrates of Rome, and particularly the cenſors, to take notice of the abuſes committed in the exerciſe of that privilege by maſters †; and accordingly we find, that in later times ſome regulations were made for that purpoſe, which are to be found in the books of the Roman civil law.

* Lib. 4. cap. 23.

† Ibid. cap. 24.

But, however advantageous this inſtitution was at the time it was made and for ſome ages after, it was undoubtedly a novelty introduced by Servius into the Roman ſtate: And not only was it new in that ſtate, but in every other ſtate then exiſting; for it was a thing unknown in any of the cities of Greece, that a man by emancipating his ſlave, had the power of making a citizen of him *. This makes it the more

* In Sparta the privilege of the City was ſo much valued, that there is no inſtance of its having ever been beſtowed, even by public authority, except upon two men for very particular reaſons mentioned by Herodotus, (lib. 9. cap. 35.); much leſs was it in the power of any private citizen to beſtow it upon his ſlave. And this, no doubt, was one reaſon among others why the number of citizens in Sparta was ſo much reduced at the time when Ariſtotle wrote his *Books of Polity*, compared with what it was in the days of Lycurgus: Whereas this inſtitution of Servius in Rome, joined with other cauſes of population, had all the effects that I have mentioned in a preceding note (p. 93. & 94.). To which I have only to add, that, after the prodigious loſſes they had ſuſtained in the ſecond Punic war, and particularly in the fatal battle of *Cannae*, they carried on the war not only in Italy againſt Hannibal, and all the ſtates of Italy that joined him after that battle, but in Sicily and in Spain, and againſt Philip of Macedon,

ſurpriſing that Livy, when he gives an account of the other novelties introduced by Servius, ſuch as the *Cenſus* and the *Comitia Centuriata*, ſhould not have mentioned this inſtitution, much more extraordinary than either of theſe, and unprecedented in any other ſtate. And here, I doubt, he cannot be defended againſt Caligula's cenſure of him, that he was negligent in his hiſtory. That the fact really happened as the Halicarnaſſian has told it, I think, cannot be doubted; for, in the firſt place, it cannot be believed, that ſo extraordinary a cuſtom ſhould have prevailed among the Romans without a particular law enacting it, which, it is not pretended, was made by any King

and with no leſs force than 21 legions of more than 5000 men each: And, after the ſecond Punic war was at an end, they carried on war againſt the ſame Philip of Macedon, whom they reduced to the neceſſity of demanding peace;—carried their arms into Aſia againſt Antiochus the greateſt King in that country;—put an end to the kingdom of Macedonia, and led in triumph Perſeus the laſt King of that country; and during all that time were ſending out colonies to different parts of Italy, as Livy informs us.

other than Servius Tullius. And, in the ſecond place, there is not, I think, the leaſt reaſon to believe that the Halicarnaſſian has, any more than Livy, forged any facts*. Nor do I believe, that he has adorned them ſo much with feigned circumſtances and poetical deſcriptions as Livy has done: But, on the contrary, I ſee him examining facts with the greateſt ſcrupuloſity, where there is any difference among the hiſtorians about them; as in the caſe of the two daughters of Servius Tullius, who were married, ſome ſay, to the ſons of the preceding King Tarquinius Priſcus, others to his grandſons. Livy mentions this difference of opinion among the hiſtorians, but he unfortunately adopts the former of the two, as the moſt probable, being the opinion, as he ſays, of of the greater number of authors †. Whereas the Halicarnaſſian, examining the matter more nicely than it appears Livy did, has proved, I think, to demonſtration, both from facts and dates, that they muſt have been the grandſons, and not the ſons of

* P. 32. of this vol.

† Livy, lib. 1. cap. 46.

Tarquinius Priſcus *. And, in other paſſages that might be quoted, he obſerves the difference of opinions of authors concerning facts, and gives us reaſons why he prefers one opinion to another. This convinces me that he did not any more than Livy invent facts like our Scotch hiſtorian Hector Boece †, but related them as he found them in antient authors.

There are, I know, ſome French critics, who would make us believe, that the whole hiſtory of the firſt ages of Rome was little better than a romance. If it were ſo, I think it muſt be allowed to be a fine romance, and much better than any that has been written in modern times, and which deſerves to be diligently ſtudied for the fine leſſons of morality and policy it gives us. There is a late French writer, *Monſ. Gibelin*, who allegoriſes the whole antient hiſtory of Greece, and the hiſtory of Rome down even to the time of Romulus, whom he makes to be the Sun; a very good hiero-

* Dionyſ. lib. 4. cap. 6.

† See p. 33. of this vol.

glyphic, I think, for ſo great a King and Legiſlator. Such conceits, I muſt confeſs, do not even amuſe me.

After the expulſion of the Kings and the eſtabliſhment of the commonwealth, the narrative of Livy, as well as of the Halicarnaſſian, is fuller and more circumſtantial, probably becauſe the authors they copied were more ſo. But ſtill the narrative of Livy, compared with that of the Halicarnaſſian, is, as I have ſaid *, rather an abridgement of hiſtory, than a hiſtory; for he ſeems to have been of the opinion of thoſe readers he mentions in his preface, who had little curioſity about the firſt ages of Rome, being in haſte to come to later times, when a ſtate which proceeded from ſuch ſmall beginnings was grown to ſuch a prodigious ſize, *ut magnitudine laboret ſua.* But, for my part, I have much more pleaſure in reading the hiſtory of wiſdom and virtue in the firſt ages of Rome, than of vice and folly, faction and corruption, violence and bloodſhed, in theſe later times,

* P. 27. of this volume.

when, as Livy tells us, the Romans *could neither bear their vices nor the remedies of them.* The meaning of which words, as I underſtand them, is, that the Romans were then ſo vicious and ſo much degenerated, that they were incapable of governing themſelves, ſo that it was abſolutely neceſſary they ſhould have a maſter: But, tho' they had loſt their antient virtue, they ſtill retained ſo much of their antient ſpirit, that they would not ſubmit to that remedy. This made them aſſaſſinate Julius Caeſar, their firſt maſter, and the beſt they ever had: And it made the reign of Auguſtus very troubleſome and dangerous, ſo that it is ſaid he deliberated about reſigning the government; and the fear of the ſame ſpirit produced all the cruelties of Tiberius and the ſucceeding Emperors.

In ſo ſuccinct a narrative, therefore, as Livy's is, of thoſe beſt times of Rome, as I think them, it is no wonder that many important particulars are either altogether omitted, or but ſlightly touched. Of theſe I ſhall give ſome examples. And, firſt, with reſpect

to the creation of the firſt dictator Titus Lartius, a moſt important event in the hiſtory of the Roman government, by which they again eſtabliſhed another deſpotic power not above fourteen years after they had got free of the tyranny of their Kings; this important event Livy has mentioned only in a few lines *, without telling us upon what occaſion, or from what reaſons of neceſſity, ſo great a change in the government was made: But of this the Halicarnaſſian has informed us at great length, telling us that it was upon occaſion of the people refuſing to inliſt to fight againſt the Latins, unleſs their debts were diſcharged †; and the conſuls could not compel them by any puniſhment they might decree againſt them, becauſe from that decree there was an appeal to the people by the law propoſed by Valerius Poplicola, and enacted after the expulſion of the Kings ‡. Upon

* Lib. 2. cap. 18.

† Lib. 5. cap. 63.

‡ See the account of this law given by the Halicarnaſſian, cap. 19. lib. 5.

this occaſion there was great difference of opinion in the ſenate, and Dionyſius has, I think, very properly given us the ſpeeches made upon each ſide of the queſtion. The debate ended in naming, with the conſent of the people, a ſupreme magiſtrate, who was to be abſolute and uncontroulable, but his authority to laſt only for ſix months. How prudently and wiſely this magiſtrate exerciſed his power our author has related at ſome length, but of which Livy has hardly ſaid a word. The Halicarnaſſian has alſo upon this occaſion made ſome excellent political reflections upon the neceſſity of having recourſe to ſuch an expedient in all democratical governments: And accordingly, he ſays, it was practiſed not only by the Romans, but by the Lacedemonians and Theſſalians; and he quotes an author, one Licinius, who relates, that it was practiſed alſo in Alba Longa, and under the ſame name of *Dictator* *. And, tho' ſuch reflections be no doubt a digreſſion, yet I think they were very proper upon ſo important an occaſion.

* Ibid. cap. 73. et 74.

Another great event in the Roman government, and greater ſtill in its conſequences, was the inſtitution of a new magiſtracy, unknown not only in Rome, but, I believe, in any other ſtate antient or modern; I mean the tribunes of the people, which truly made two ſtates of one, as Menenius Agrippa expreſſed his fears * that it would do, and entirely changed the form of the Roman government from ariſtocratical to democratical. Of this great revolution Livy has ſaid a good deal more †, than of the choice of the firſt dictator; but his account is not near ſo full or circumſtantial as that of the Halicarnaſſian, or as ſo great an event merited; for it was the greateſt change that was made in the Roman government from the time of the expulſion of the Kings to the total change of the government under the Emperors; and it was produced by a diviſion of the people, and a ſeceſſion of the greater part of them, in ſuch a hoſtile manner, from the reſt, as

* Lib. 6. cap. 88.

† Livy, lib. 2. cap. 32.

threatened abſolute deſtruction to the ſtate. Of the whole progreſs of this great affair the Halicarnaſſian has given us a full and accurate account. And in very fine ſpeeches he has given us the arguments on both ſides at great length: And which, it may be obſerved, in paſſing, ſhows us the uſe of ſpeeches in hiſtory; for, otherwiſe, Dionyſius could not have given us thoſe arguments without a very long digreſſion; and which could not have been ſaid with propriety to be a part of the work. Livy, however, who is abundant enough in ſpeeches upon other occaſions, has given us none upon this, unleſs you will call the fable of Menenius Agrippa a ſpeech *. And of the facts that happened before the final agreement of the parties, he has given us a very ſhort, and not very accurate account; and, what is worſe, he has related but a part of the terms of the agreement itſelf, upon which peace was reſtored; for he has only mentioned the eſtabliſhment of the tribuneſhip of the peo-

* Liv. lib. 2. cap. 32.

ple: Whereas the Patricians not only granted them that, but a remiſſion of all the debts which the poorer ſort then owed *. For money was the ſubject of this great quarrel betwixt the two orders, as well as of the former, which produced another change of the conſtitution, by the introduction of dictators: So that, in about 20 years after the eſtabliſhment of the commonwealth, there were two remarkable changes of the government, both produced by wealth or money; and therefore Lycurgus, that his government might not be deſtroyed in that way, the only way in which the oracle ſaid it could be deſtroyed, proſcribed the uſe of money in Sparta.

The conſequence of the eſtabliſhment of this extraordinary magiſtracy in Rome, was, that the government of the beſt mixed form that ever was, being partly regal, (for I underſtand the conſuls to have come in place of the Kings), partly ariſtocratical, partly popular, and, upon particular occa-

* Lib. 6. cap. 83. et 88.

ſions, altogether deſpotic, became, in not much more than 40 years after the inſtitution of the tribuneſhip, altogether democratical; for, in year 306 of the city, a law was paſſed, by which the people were allowed in the *Comitia Tributa* to make laws binding upon the whole people *. Now the *Comitia* of this kind were held without any previous decree of the ſenate, which was abſolutely neceſſary both for the *Comitia Centuriata* and *Curiata*, and without the auſpices which at that time were in the hands of the Patricians †. And in theſe *Comitia* every man had an equal vote whatever his rank or fortune was. And this popular government ended as it has always done and ever will do in all ſtates, in tyranny or abſolute government, firſt under the name of

* Dionyſ. lib. 11. cap. 45.

† Lib. 9. cap. 41. Where he explains very accurately the difference between the *Comitia Tributa et Curiata*, which were the ſame with reſpect to the voters, the pooreſt and meaneſt citizens having an equal vote with the richeſt and nobleſt, but differed in the two particulars mentioned in the text.

a perpetual Dictator, and then under the name of Emperors.

But, beſides theſe conſequences of the tribunitian power, which happened in proceſs of time, there was one immediate conſequence of it, that brought the Roman ſtate to the brink of ruin, from which it was ſaved only by the prayers and tears of a woman,—the greateſt diſgrace that ever befell the Roman people. The event I mean was the baniſhment of a noble youth, Marcius Coriolanus, who, contrary to all the forms of juſtice that had been practiſed ſince the eſtabliſhment of the commonwealth, was tried in the *Comitia Tributa* *, and condemned for no other fault, but that he made a ſpeech in the ſenate adviſing the ſenators not to lower the price of corn, which had been very much raiſed by the ſeceſſion of the people, and the neglect of agriculture thereby occaſioned †. The Halicarnaſſian has enlarged

* Lib. 7. cap. 59.

† Lib. 7. cap. 24.

very much upon this great event, and has given us many long ſpeeches upon the occaſion, and ſome of the beſt in the book, particularly that of Appius Claudius*: For the length of theſe ſpeeches he makes an apology †, tho' I think it needed none, and gives very good reaſons why an hiſtorian ſhould be as particular and circumſtantial in his account of ſuch important civil tranſactions as of military operations: For, ſays he, if I had told ſimply, but ſhortly, that the Patricians had given up their privileges by ſubmitting to have one of the moſt conſpicuous of their order tried by the mob of Rome, it would have appeared a thing incredible. I have therefore, ſays he, given the reader in ſpeeches all that was to be ſaid both for the meaſure and againſt it ‡. On the other hand, Livy has given us a very ſhort account of the facts, and no ſpeeches at all, unleſs you will call a ſpeech an invective of a few

* Lib. 7. cap. 48.

† Ibid. cap. 66.

‡ Ibid.

lines, which Coriolanus ſpeaks againſt the people in ſome ſhort, pointed ſentences, and a ſhorter invective ſtill, in the ſame ſtile, put into the mouth of the people againſt Coriolanus *.

And thus much for the ſubject of the Halicarnaſſian's hiſtory, upon which many of my readers will think, that I have beſtowed a great deal too much time in a work which profeſſes only to treat of ſtile; but as, in my reading, I can never ſeparate the *words* from the *matter*, which I conſider as principal in every writing, and which, if it be not of ſome value, the work itſelf can be of none, however elegant and fine the words may be, I have thought proper, after the example of both Livy and Dionyſius in their preambles, to enlarge upon the importance of the ſubject of their hiſtory. If this were leſs to the purpoſe than I think it is, it has furniſhed matter for a compariſon and criticiſm of thoſe two authors, which, I hope, will not

* Liv. lib. 2. cap. 34. & 35.

be diſagreeable or uninſtructive to the reader.

I come now to ſpeak of what undoubtedly belongs to my ſubject, the *ſtile* of the Halicarnaſſian, in which, I think, he excels Livy ſtill more than in the *matter*. And indeed, I do not know any hiſtorical ſtile in Greek or Latin, that I think equal to the Halicarnaſſian's, unleſs it be that of Herodotus, which, by the ſweetneſs of the dialect in which he writes, and a certain ruſt of antiquity, and ſomething of the grandeur of Homer in his manner, as well as a reſemblance in his language, pleaſes me ſtill more. But, I think, there can be nothing better in the Attick than the narrative of Dionyſius; for it has all the ſweetneſs and elegance of that dialect; and it is ſo adorned with different figures of compoſition, that there is the greateſt variety in it that I know in any ſtile, that of Demoſthenes only excepted, and at the ſame time the greateſt perſpicuity; for his figures are not ſo many, or ſo violent as thoſe of Thucydides, yet ſufficient to give a caſt and colour to his ſtile, that diſtin-

guiſhes it perfectly from common diſcourſe. And in this, his ſtile is, I think, preferable to that of Xenophon, which, wanting theſe figures, is, as I have obſerved, too like to the Socratic dialogue, that is, to converſation and common diſcourſe. His rhetorical ſtile, too, is excellent of its kind; for it is evident from his critical writings, that he had ſtudied the rhetorical ſtile as much as the hiſtorical, and knew perfectly the difference betwixt them. And accordingly his ſpeeches are very different from his narrative, being compoſed in much longer periods, but ſo well compoſed, that there is no obſcurity in them, tho' ſome of them run out to a great length, and are much diverſified with parentheſes and other figures *. He has a great many ſpeeches, more, I think, than any other hiſtorian, except Thucydides, and ſome of them very long. And there is one in particular of extraordinary length;

* There is one in the end of Tullus Hoſtilius's ſpeech to the army of Romans and Albans, upon the ſubject of the treachery of Mettus the Alban general, (*Antiquit.* lib. 3. cap. 28.) which is a period of almoſt half a page, and yet perfectly clear, tho' with more than one parentheſis thrown into it.

but it was upon a ſubject very important and intereſting, namely, the ſeceſſion of the Plebeians to Mount Aventine *. And what I admire the moſt in him, is, that, tho' he was by profeſſion a teacher of rhetoric, they are all ſpeeches of buſineſs, with nothing of that artificial ſophiſtry, or σοφιστικη περιεργια, as the Greek critics call it, or thoſe arguments from general topics ſo much laboured in the ſchools of declamation, in which I am perſuaded he never practiſed, but formed his ſtile of ſpeaking upon the ſtudy of Demoſthenes and other great authors, who do not draw their arguments from ſuch topics, but from the nature and circumſtances of the caſe; which diſtinguiſhes a ſpeech of buſineſs from a declamation, or ſpeech of ſhow and oſtentation.

From this account I have given of the Halicarnaſſian's ſtile, it is evident that my judgment of it is very different from that

* Antiq. lib. 7. cap. 66.

of Photius, who ſays, that he affects novelty in his words and phraſes and does violence to the language, in order to make his ſtile ſingular and uncommon. This cenſure of the Halicarnaſſian, like his praiſe of Diodorus Siculus, whom he commends for writing a ſtile not too Attic, only ſhows that the elegance of Attic compoſition was not in his time reliſhed or well underſtood.

Upon the whole, therefore, I think, that the Halicarnaſſian's Roman hiſtory is, both for the matter and ſtile, one of the moſt pleaſant, as well as moſt inſtructive books in the world. The ſtile is finely tempered betwixt the auſtere gravity of Thucydides and the ſweetneſs of Herodotus, and, I think, it is more perſpicuous than either: For I do not know that there is one obſcure or difficult paſſage in the whole work, except where the text is corrupted; and, even where that is the caſe, ſo clear and perſpicuous is his ſtile, that a good Greek ſchólar can in many places correct the text almoſt at firſt ſight; and it is ſurpriſing how many corrections Henry Stephen and his ſcholar Sylburgius have made, that are

now confirmed and aſcertained to be the true reading by the Vatican MS. which was collated when the Oxford edition was printed.

To conclude what I have to ſay of his hiſtory;—If any one think, that, in comparing him with Livy, I have done injuſtice to Livy, let him read what men of a much more learned age than this have ſaid upon the ſame ſubject. Their teſtimonies are prefixed to the Oxford edition. I ſhall only quote one of them, that of Paulus Benius *de Hiſtoria*, whoſe words are, *Hiſtoria Halicarnaſſei nobiliſſima, et rerum copia, ordine, perſpicuitate, eloquentia, et, quod caput eſt, veritate, ſine ulla dubitatione Livianae ſuperior.* Now, I have not ſaid, nor indeed could I well ſay, more than this.

Of the Halicarnaſſian's critical works I have ſpoken elſewhere, and given my opinion both of their matter and ſtile *. I ſhall only add here, that I beg leave again to recommend, to the ſtudious of Greek

* Book 2. cap. 5. *in fine*, of the preceding vol.

learning and fine writing, a moſt diligent peruſal of them; as it is from the antients that we muſt learn both to write and judge of writing. Now, this the Halicarnaſſian teaches us in the beſt way poſſible, by precept as well as example, and not only by his own example, but by the example of others, who have written both well and ill, pointing out to us the beauties of the one and the faults of the other. For my own part, I muſt confeſs, that, if I had never ſtudied his critical writings, tho,' perhaps, by ſome natural taſte, which I may have, I might have perceived ſome beauties or faults in proſe writing, yet I never ſhould have had any art of criticiſm, or been able to judge, by any rule or principle, of what was good or bad in that kind of writing. And, as to *poetry*, if I had not ſtudied Ariſtotle's *poetics*, I ſhould not have ſo much as known what poetry was, but ſhould have thought as, I believe, many do, that verſification and fine diction make poetry, and that an art, taught in verſe, with all the ornaments of poetical diction, ſuch as the *Georgics* of Virgil, was a *poem*. I would therefore again recommend it to the ſcholars of Ox-

ford, as a work that I think would be very uſeful to the learned world, to publiſh a portable pocket edition not only of Dionyſius's hiſtory, but of his critical works, ſuch as the Glaſgow editions of ſome Claſſics, which might travel or go to the country with one; for his works are of thoſe *Exemplaria Graeca*, which a ſcholar ought to ſtudy at home and abroad, day and night *.

* In this edition, if it be reviſed by a ſcholar, he will find ſeveral faults to correct in Hudſon's edition. I will only mention one, which happens at preſent to be under my view. It is a fault in punctuation, ſuch as I obſerved in Herodotus (vol. 4. p. 426. of this work); and, as it relates to a very important inſtitution of Romulus, that of *Patrons and Clients*, it deſerves to be attended to. As it ſtands pointed at preſent it is not ſenſe, neither in the original nor the tranſlation: But, if it be read and pointed thus, it is perfectly clear. After the paſſage, (lib. 2. cap. 9.) which aſſigns to the Patricians and Plebeians their ſeveral occupations, concluding with theſe words; γεωργειν δε και κτηνοτροφειν, και τας χρηματοποιους εργαζεσθαι τιχνας, there ſhould be a full ſtop: Then a new ſentence ſhould begin with the addition of the particle δε to make a connection; and it ſhould be read thus: Ινα δε μη στασιαζωσιν, ασκιε ειν ταις αλλαις πολεσιν, η των εν τελει προπηλακιζοντων τους ταπεινους, η των φαυλων και απορων τοις εν ταις υπεροχαις φθονουντων, Here there ſhould

be a comma inſtead of the full ſtop in Hudſon's edition; then go on, (leaving out the δὲ after παρακαταθήκας, which ought to have been inſerted in the preceding member of the ſentence), and read as follows, παρακαταθήκας ἐδωκε τοῖς πατρικίοις τοὺς δημοτικοὺς, ἐπιτρέψας ἑκατὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους ὃν αὐτὸς ἐβούλετο τιμῆσαι πρώτους. As thus read, the ſenſe is clear, and a very good reaſon given for the inſtitution of Patrons and Clients, but which has no connection with what goes before concerning the buſineſs of Patricians and Plebeians. One thing every ſcholar may be aſſured of, that this author is ſo perſpicuous as well as elegant, that, if there be any where an obſcurity as to his meaning, there is ſome fault either in the MS. or printed copy. There are other paſſages of the ſame kind, which may be corrected in a new edition; but, what I chiefly inſiſt on in that edition, is, that the readings of the Vatican MS. or the conjectural emendations of Henry Stephen or Sylburgius, ſhould be taken into the text. This would not only ſave me the trouble of looking down to the bottom of the page, but alſo the mortification of being able only to diſcover that the text is faulty, which is often the caſe, but not to correct it as Henry Stephen and Sylburgius have done. This, I know, will ſeldom or never be the caſe of the great Greek ſcholars in Oxford, who will enjoy the pleaſure of diſcovering that they are as great Greek ſcholars, and as acute critics, as the two commentators I have mentioned; but they ought to conſult the eaſe and ſatisfaction of others as well as of themſelves.

CHAP. IV.

The hiſtory of Polybius may be conſidered as a continuation of the Halicarnaſſian's hiſtory.—Theſe two hiſtories the moſt valuable in the world;—but have come down to us ſadly mutilated.—Some excerpts from them preſerved.—What Polybius calls his hiſtory, *comprehends only a period of* 53 *years, beginning with the ſecond Punic war, and coming down to the conqueſt of Macedonia.—His two firſt books are only preparatory and introductory to his hiſtory.—His hiſtory takes in the moſt glorious period of Rome.—Deſcription of their glory at that time.—The moderation they ſhowed in the uſe of their power, and their clemency to thoſe that had offended them.—The grandeur of the Roman ſenate at that time,—when ambaſſadors from all parts of the earth, and even Kings in perſon, attended them.—Their virtue ſtill preſerved, and not im-*

paired either by power or wealth.—The hiſtory of the later and more glorious part of this period, not preſerved to us in what we have of Polybius;—but this ſupplied by what we have of Livy.—What we have left of Polybius, ſhows us more of the diſtreſſes and calamities of the Romans than of their triumphs.—Their loſſes both by ſea and land in the firſt Punic war very great; and their loſſes in the ſecond Punic war, ſuch as brought them to the brink of ruin.—That war the fineſt ſubject of hiſtory, on account of the variety of great events in it, and the wiſdom and virtue there ſhown.—The great difficulties that Hannibal had to encounter before he got into Italy, and the prodigious force that was there to oppoſe him.—The ſubject therefore of Polybius's hiſtory the nobleſt that can be imagined;—very proper for enforcing what he recommends ſo much, viz. ſubmiſſion to the Roman government.—No man fitter to write upon ſuch a ſubject than Polybius;—a man of of buſineſs, and who had been employed in great affairs, both civil and military.—The difference betwixt him and the

Halicarnaſſian in this reſpect, and alſo in reſpect of his being much better informed of the facts which he relates.—The ſubject of Polybius's hiſtory more comprehenſive than that of the Halicarnaſſian, in reſpect it takes in the affairs of other nations, as well as of the Romans.—Of the digreſſions in Polybius, which, tho' contrary to the laws of hiſtory, are very inſtructive, particularly with reſpect to the military affairs of the Romans.—His deſcriptions of battles wonderfully clear and lively.—The value of ſuch a body of hiſtory as that of the Halicarnaſſian and Polybius, if it were all preſerved, or if it could be yet recovered;—ſome chance for that;—a MS. of Livy diſcovered to be in the Emperor of Morocco's library.—Of the ſtile *of Polybius;—much inferior to that of the Halicarnaſſian.*—Idiotiſms *of Polybius;—not an obſcure writer, but his ſenſe ſometimes miſtaken both by his traſlator Caſaubon and Livy.—His Greek not elegant, but very intelligible and perſpicuous;—very little of the rhetorical ſtile in his ſpeeches;—no affectation or la-*

bour to write ill.—General obſervations upon the Greek hiſtorians compared with the Latin.

THE hiſtory of Polybius, tho' written long before the Halicarnaſſian's, may be conſidered as the ſequel of it; for the Halicarnaſſian begins his hiſtory with the origin of the Roman people, and the foundation of Rome, and carries it down to the beginning of the firſt Punic war. There Polybius takes it up, and continues it till the concluſion of the laſt Macedonian war, when he reckons the Romans attained to the poſſeſſion of univerſal monarchy. Theſe two hiſtories, if they had been preſerved entire to us, would have made both together the nobleſt work of hiſtory that the world has ever ſeen; for they would have been the hiſtory of the greateſt people, and, during the beſt ages of their ſtate, before their morals were corrupted by wealth and luxury, and before thoſe factions and ſeditions, and bloody civil wars, the conſequence of that corruption, put an end to their free government, and at laſt loſt them

the empire of the world, and made them a prey to nations more barbarous, as well as leſs warlike, than thoſe they had overcome. But theſe two hiſtories have come down to us ſadly mutilated; for, of Dionyſius's hiſtory there remains no more than eleven books out of twenty which he wrote*. Theſe eleven books come no farther down than the 312th year of the city. Of thoſe that are loſt, we have nothing but ſome excerpts preſerved to us in the collection of Conſtantine Porphyrogenet, under the head of *virtues*, *vices*, and *embaſſies* †. Polybius's plan was to be executed, as he tells us, in 40 books; tho' he ſays it was doubtful, whether he ſhould live to complete them. It appears, however, that he did write at leaſt 37 of them, as Suidas quotes the 37th book of his hiſtory. But, of this

* Photius Biblioth. Cod. 74.

† In theſe excerpts there are ſome very valuable things, particularly in the beginning of them there is an obſervation of the author upon the diſtinction betwixt Greeks and barbarians, which ſhows a great deal of humanity and good ſenſe.

great and moſt valuable work, there nothing now remains but the firſt five books entire, and excerpts from the 12 ſucceeding, made, we do not know, by whom; but we are ſo far obliged to him, that he has not abridged any thing that he has excerpted, as Juſtin has abridged Trogus Pompeius, but has given us the words of the author entire. We have alſo excerpts from various books of his hiſtory under one of the titles in the great hiſtorical pandects above mentioned, of Conſtantine Porphyrogenet, which Title is inſcribed *de Legationibus*, where we have alſo the text of the author at full length, and not abridged; ſo that this collection makes a very conſiderable part of what is preſerved to us of Polybius.

What Polybius calls his *hiſtory* begins with the ſecond Punic war, that is, in the ſecond year of the 140th Olympiad, and 535th year of the city; and it was continued down to the conqueſt of Macedonia by Paulus Æmilius, a period, as Polybius tells us, of 53 years. But, by way of preparation for this hiſtory, and in order to make us underſtand perfectly the ſtate of

the Roman commonwealth at the time this ſecond Punic war began, he has given us two books, as an introduction to his hiſtory; in the firſt of which he has given us an account of the firſt Punic war, which began in the 489th year of the city; and in the ſecond he relates ſome dreadful wars which the Romans had with the Ciſalpine Gauls, after the concluſion of the firſt Punic war. In this book he has alſo deſcribed to us very accurately the ſtate of affairs in Greece; and particularly of the Achean confederacy in Peloponeſus, at the time when the ſecond Punic war began. This hiſtorical work, therefore, of Polybius, comprehends a moſt glorious period of the hiſtory of the nobleſt people that ever exiſted, beginning with the firſt ſtep they made towards univerſal monarchy, by going out of Italy into Sicily, which indeed was naturally the firſt ſtep, as Sicily was the neareſt iſland to them, and undoubtedly at ſome time or another had been part of Italy, and ending with the conqueſt of Macedon. Then the Romans were at the greateſt height of their glory, though not of dominion

and extent of empire; for they were then not more the conquerors than the ſaviours of mankind, and the deliverers from tyranny and oppreſſion. The greateſt triumph that ever people enjoyed, was what they enjoyed at the Iſthmian games of Greece, when, after having driven Philip out of that country, their conſul Titus Quinctius Flaminius, by proclamation, declared all the Greek ſtates to be free in Aſia as well as in Greece. The thing appeared ſo extraordinary to the Greeks, that they could hardly believe their own ears; they thought they were in a dream; and, to be aſſured that they were not ſo, they deſired that the herald ſhould be brought into the middle of the *ſtadium*, that he might be ſeen as well as heard. Accordingly the herald placed himſelf there, and proclaimed the ſame thing again; upon which there was ſuch a ſhout and ſuch acclamations from the prodigious concourſe of people that was at this *panegyric*, that Polybius tells us it was not poſſible to be conceived by thoſe who were not

preſent *. And Plutarch, in his life of this conſul, tells us, that the cries rent the air ſo much, that the birds, flying over their heads, fell down as thro' a *vacuum*; but this is a circumſtance not mentioned by Polybius, nor by Livy, who appears to have copied Polybius here as well as in many other places. But in this all the three authors I have mentioned agree, that Quinctius was almoſt cruſhed to death by the people crouding to ſee and thank their benefactor; and he was well nigh ſmothered by the flowers and crowns they threw upon him. Livy adds, that, if he had not been a ſtrong young man of 33, he could hardly have eſcaped with his life †. And Plutarch ſays, that he would not have eſcaped, ſtrong as he was, if he had not been prudent enough to have retired in time, before the whole croud came upon him. The reflection of Polybius, upon the occaſion, is, that however extra-

* Polyb. excerpt. 9. under the title of *Legationes*, p. 798. ed. *Caſauboni*.

† Liv. lib. 33. cap. 33.

vagant the joy of the Greeks may ſeem to have been, it was not ſo wonderful as what the Romans had done for them. And indeed there is no example in the hiſtory of mankind, of a people leaving their own country, croſſing the ſeas, engaging in a moſt dangerous and expenſive war with the greateſt King then upon earth, Philip King of Macedon, and all this for no other purpoſe than to beſtow liberty upon a diſtant people, with whom they were no ways connected by treaty or alliance, and without retaining any thing out of the conqueſts they had made, nor exacting from the people they had ſet free any taxes or contributions, not even the expences of the war. This was a generoſity, ſuch as I do not wonder that it appeared, as Livy tells us, romantic to the Greeks themſelves *. But their generoſity and magnanimity was not confined to Greece. The people of Ilyrium they alſo declared free, after having conquered them. To

* See a ſpeech made by the Rhodian ambaſſadors upon this occaſion in Livy, lib. 37. cap. 54. of which Livy ſays, that 'apta magnitudini Romanae oratio viſa 'eſt.'

Antiochus, the great King in Aſia, they gave the very ſame terms of peace, after defeating him in a great and deciſive battle, which they had offered to him in the beginning of the war. Theſe were to abſtain from Europe, and to relinquiſh all he poſſeſſed in Aſia, on this ſide Mount *Taurus*. But they impoſed no tribute upon him, only made him pay a great ſum for the expences of the war; but for which payment they allowed him a certain number of years. And, of all the country they took from him, they kept no part to themſelves, but declared all the cities and ſtates in it to be free *.

* Livii lib. 37. cap. 45. where you have a ſpeech of the ambaſſadors, whom Antiochus ſent to Scipio Africanus and his brother Lucius to beg for peace; in which they ſay, that the Romans, being now maſters of the earth, ought to lay aſide all contentions with men, and, like the Gods, only exerciſe mercy and beneficence to the human race. To which Africanus anſwered, 'That the Romans had every thing from the 'Gods which they could give them: But their mind 'was their own, and it had always been the ſame in all 'fortunes, neither elevated by proſperity, nor dejected 'by adverſity. Of this,' ſays he, 'nobody can inform 'you better than Hannibal who is with you.' And in-

And their moſt inveterate enemies the Carthaginians, by whom they had ſuſtained ſuch prodigious loſſes, as brought them to the very brink of ruin, they did not, after they had ſubdued them, reduce to a ſtate of ſlavery or even ſubjection, but left them their laws and liberties, only ſtripping them of all their foreign conqueſts, and taking other means to prevent their again injuring or inſulting them; ſo that it is true what Salluſt ſays of them while they yet preſerved their antient manners, *neque victis, praeter injuriae licentiam, quicquam adimebant* *. Nor ſhould it be forgot, that, tho' they had made war againſt the Lacedemonians, while they were under the dominion of their tyrant Nabis, yet afterwards, when the Achaeans conquered them, and, aboliſhing the laws and inſtitutions of Lycurgus, under which, ſays Livy, they had lived 1700 years †,

deed the terms he granted them were a ſufficient proof how well they could bear proſperity.

* Catalin. cap. 12.

† Lib. 38. cap. 34.

obliged them to live according to their laws, the Romans again reſtored them to the uſe of Lycurgus's laws and diſcipline *. Their laſt conqueſt, with which is concluded the period of the hiſtory of Polybius, (and the greateſt they ever made, if we conſider the glory of the nation, and how many countries they had ſubdued under Alexander the Great), was the conqueſt of Macedonia, whoſe King their Conſul Paulus Æmilius led in triumph, when, much about the ſame time, their Praetor Anicius led in triumph Gentius, King of Illyrium †. The Macedonians, tho' they had conquered them twice, they did not enſlave, but declared them a free people, and exacted from them only one half of the tribute which they paid to their Kings. In ſhort, at this time, they had not made one province of any foreign country any more than of Italy; but had left all the nations, they conquered, in full poſſeſſion of their laws and liberties, and under the government of their own magiſtrates. And the tranſmarine nations, they had ſubdued, were rather their

* Pauſaniae *Arcadica*, cap. 51.

† Livii lib. 45. cap. 40. 43.

friends and allies than their ſubjects: And I believe they were much of the ſame diſpoſition with the ſtates of Iraly, which Hannibal ſolicited to revolt from the Romans, and to join him, promiſing them their liberty if they would do ſo; but this offer they refuſed, tho' he was then laying waſte their country with fire and ſword, thinking themſelves happier under the Roman government than they were under their own; which, ſays Livy, is the greateſt ſecurity for the fidelity of allies*. The Roman ſenate at this time had ambaſſadors attending them from almoſt all the ſtates and nations of the world then known. Even Kings, and the ſons and brothers of Kings came to wait upon them, ſuch as Eumenes King of Pergamus, and his brother Attalus, Pruſias King of Bythinia, and his ſon Nicomedes;

* Livy ſays, that Hannibal could not ſhake the fidelity of theſe allies, 'quia juſto et moderato regebantur imperio; nec abnuebant, quod unum' (I would chooſe to read *unicum*) 'vinculum fidei eſt, melioribus parere.' (Lib. 22. cap. 13. in fine).;—the greateſt eulogium he could have pronounced, not only upon the Roman government, but upon the ſenſe of their allies.

and they were addreſſed like Gods upon earth; ſome of the ambaſſadors, ſuch as thoſe from Rhodes and from Ætolia, proſtrating themſelves before them, and in that way begging to be forgiven for the offences they had committed againſt the Romans, which accordingly was done.

If Cynias, the ambaſſador from Pyrrhus to the Roman ſenate, had ſeen them in the circumſtances I have deſcribed, attended by ambaſſadors from almoſt every ſtate and country of the world then known, and importuned with prayers and ſupplications even from Kings, one of whom, namely the above mentioned Pruſias King of Bythinia, proſtrated himſelf before them, and even kiſſed the threſhold of the ſenate-houſe*, he would have ſaid that they were like, not to an aſſembly of Kings, but of Gods; and indeed at that time they may be ſaid to have been the arbiters of human affairs, and to have governed mankind with goodneſs and benevolence, and mercy, too, not unworthy of the Divine Nature. And

* Livii lib. 45. cap. ult.

not only did they govern in this manner the ſtates of Europe and Aſia, with which they had any connection; but their power extended even to Egypt, not to make conqueſts there, or acquire any thing for themſelves, but to prevent violence and injuſtice; for they interpoſed to ſave from Antiochus that kingdom, which he wanted to wreſt from the lawful heirs, the children of Ptolemy the laſt King, who had ſhown a friendly diſpoſition to the Romans in the firſt Macedonian war, tho' he had been of no ſervice to them. To Antiochus the ſenate ſent an ambaſſador, Popilius by name, who delivered to him letters from the ſenate, requiring that he ſhould immediately depart out of Egypt, of which he was then in poſſeſſion. Antiochus anſwered, that he would adviſe with his friends what was to be done. Upon which, Popilius, with the rod, that he had in his hand, deſcribing a circle round the King, 'You 'muſt,' ſays he, 'before you go out of 'this circle, give an anſwer that I can car-'ry back to the ſenate.' The King, confounded by ſo ſtern a demand, after ſome heſitation, anſwered, That he would obey

the ſenate. And accordingly he gave up Egypt, of which he was maſter by ſea as well as by land, having then beaten the Egyptian fleet *. After this ambaſſadors came from him to Rome, who informed the ſenate that he had obeyed their commands, as he would have done thoſe of the Gods. And the ambaſſadors from the children of Ptolemy, whom the Romans had reſtored to their kingdom, acknowledged that they owed more to the ſenate and people of Rome, than to their parents, more than even to the immortal Gods †.

But what is ſtill more wonderful than any thing I have yet related, amidſt all this glory and exaltation, though a great deal of the wealth of the eaſt had then come among them, they ſtill retained their virtue and abſtinence from money, which in later times drew every thing unto it; for Paulus Æmilius, who led in triumph the greateſt King then in the world, and brought

* Liv. lib. 45. cap. 12.

† Livii lib. 45. cap. 13.

ſo much wealth into the Roman treaſury, died himſelf ſo poor that he ſcarce left enough, after his goods were auctioned, to pay his wife's dowry *. And Lucius Scipio, who firſt carried the Roman arms into Aſia, conquered Antiochus, the greateſt King there, and brought from thence to Rome more treaſure than, I believe, ever came thither at one time from the eaſt, could not pay the fine moſt unjuſtly impoſed upon him by the people at the inſtigation of their tribunes, tho' he ſold all his effects for payment of it; but his friends and clients contributed ſo much to reimburſe him for this loſs, that, if he had accepted of it, he would have been richer than ever he was; but he would take nothing from them. What he wanted for the neceſſaries of life, his neareſt relations ſupplied †.

It is with this glorious period of the Roman hiſtory, when not only her arms were

* Livii *epitome*, lib. 46.

† Livii lib. 38. cap. ult.

triumphant every where, and made all the Kings and nations then known bow to her, but her virtue was yet uncorrupted by the greateſt temptations to which virtue can be expoſed, *power* and *wealth*, that Polybius cloſed his hiſtory, of which by far the greater part is loſt, and particularly that part which deſcribed the victories and triumphs of the Romans over all their enemies. This loſs is in ſome meaſure repaired by what is preſerved of Livy, and which very probably was taken for the greater part from Polybius. What remains to us of this author chiefly contains the trials and diſtreſſes of the Romans, in which they ſhowed themſelves greater, if poſſible, than in their greateſt proſperity; for Polybius tells us, that they were never ſo much to be feared, as after ſome ſignal loſs *. There is, however, ſtill preſerved

* After giving an account of the great preparations they made to repair the loſs they had ſuſtained in the ſecond battle with Hannibal, he adds: Τοτε γαρ εισι φοβερωτατοι Ρωμαιοι, και κοινη και κατ' ιδιαν, ὁταν αυτους περιστη φοβος αληθινος. Lib. 3. p. 227. edit. Caſauboni, lit. E.

to us an account, given by him in his introduction to his hiſtory, of one war, in which they were ſucceſsful; I mean the firſt Punic war, in which they ſhowed a ſpirit of reſolution and perſeverance that are without example in the hiſtory of any other nation. In that war they ſoon diſcovered, that, unleſs they could be ſuperior to the Carthaginians by ſea, as well as by land, they could not conquer or preſerve Sicily, which was the object of the war. But how were they to acquire a ſuperiority by ſea over the Carthaginians, the greateſt naval power then in the world? they, who had not ſhips of any kind, not even boats, as Polybius tells us, that could ſail in the ſea, and who could not even have tranſported their troops to Sicily thro' the narrow frith which divides that iſland from the Continent, except by the ſhips with which their allies upon that coaſt furniſhed them. They did not ſo much as know how to build a ſhip of war, till by accident they got a Carthaginian galley that had run aſhore; upon the model of which they built a fleet; and, having exerciſed their rowers at land, in the manner Poly-

bius has deſcribed, they put to ſea with it, and, by the aſſiſtance of a grappling machine which they invented, and by which they brought the enemy's ſhips to cloſe fight, and ſo ſupplied their defect in the ſailing and managing the ſhips, they beat the Carthaginians in a great battle. But after this they ſuffered ſuch loſſes both from the enemy and by ſtorms, that they fairly gave up the ſea: Some time after, however, they took to it again, and fitted out another fleet, which they loſt by a great ſtorm and their unſkillfulneſs in navigation. Upon this they gave up the ſea a ſecond time, and were for a while altogether without a fleet: But having, by a lucky accident, got hold of a Rhodian galley that was in the ſervice of the Carthaginians, they built a new fleet upon a better model than that of their former ſhips; but it was at the expence of the private citizens, the public treaſury being quite exhauſted. With this fleet, which ſailed much better than any they had ever had before, they defeated the Carthaginians in a great deciſive battle, which obliged them to ſue for peace. In this firſt Carthaginian

war the Romans not only ſuſtained prodigious loſſes by ſea, but at land too they loſt in Africa a whole army, and the Conſul Regulus who commanded it.

In the ſecond Carthaginian war they ſuſtained loſſes, not by ſea, but by land and in their own country, ſuch as, I believe, there never was a nation, except themſelves, that would not have ſunk under them: But, inſtead of that, they bore up againſt them, not only with the greateſt firmneſs and reſolution, but with a magnanimity which would have done honour to any ſingle man of the moſt diſtinguiſhed character; but, in a whole nation, was really wonderful, and could not be believed, if it were not ſo well atteſted.

This war was not, for the number of men engaged in it, near ſo great a war as that of Xerxes with the Greeks; nor would the conſequences have been ſo great, if the Carthaginians had prevailed over the Romans, as if Xerxes had conquered Greece*;

* See what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, vol. 4. of this work, p. 417.

but it is, I think, a very much better ſubject of hiſtory, as it was of ſo much longer endurance, and the events in it much more various, and even more virtue and wiſdom ſhown in it, and more of military ſkill and conduct not only on the ſide of the Romans, but alſo of the Carthaginians: For there never was an enterpriſe ſo boldly undertaken, and carried on for no leſs than ſeventeen years with ſuch ſucceſs, as Hannibal's invaſion of Italy, whether we conſider the difficulties he had to encounter before he could enter the country, not from enemies only, but from nature, which appears to have fortified the entrance to Italy on the ſide of Gaul, from whence Hannibal entered it, by a ridge of mountains hardly paſſable by a ſingle man, much leſs by an army; and, after he had got into the country, with the loſs of more than half of the army, he brought with him from Spain, he had to encounter a force of the Romans and their allies, which conſiſted, as Polybius has reckoned it up, of above 700,000 foot, and 70,000 horſe *, to which he had nothing

* Lib. 2. p. 113. *Edit. Caſauboni.*

to oppoſe, but a weather-beaten army worn out with fatigue, of no more than 20,000 foot, and 6000 horſe *. With this handful of men he beat the Romans in four great battles, the laſt of them one of the moſt deciſive victories that ever was gained, maintained himſelf, as I have ſaid, 17 years in the country, and at laſt brought his army out of it unconquered.

And here it may not be improper to obſerve how ſoon the Romans, after the period when Polybius cloſes his hiſtory, fell from that height of glory which they had then attained, and that reputation for juſtice and humanity, which made them ſo much loved, as well as feared by all the nations of the world then known. Very ſoon after Perſeus was defeated and taken priſoner, they pillaged and deſtroyed in one day no leſs than 70 cities in Epirus that had revolted from the Romans and joined Perſeus, and made ſlaves of 150,000 people;—the greateſt calamity, perhaps, that ever befel the human race in ſo ſhort a

* Polyb. lib. 3. p. 209.

ſpace of time. This was done in order to give the plunder to the ſoldiers, who had got a taſte of the wealth and luxury of the eaſt, and could not bear to ſee all the wealth of Macedon carried to the public treaſury at Rome. It was done, too, in a manner unworthy of the Roman greatneſs and magnanimity; for ten of the principal men out of each city were ſent for, and deſired to collect all the gold and ſilver from each of the cities, which was underſtood to be given as the price of the liberty they were to enjoy, as well as the Macedonians. After this was done, upon a ſignal given, the ſoldiers took poſſeſſion of the cities, plundered them, and demoliſhed the walls, making ſlaves, as I have ſaid, of the inhabitants *. Another thing they did ſoon after this, was not ſo cruel, but more unjuſt: They inſiſted that the Achaean confederacy ſhould ſend no leſs than 1000 of their principal men, of whom Polybius was one, to Rome, where they were detained as priſoners for no leſs than 17 years, when they were diſmiſſed; but, by that time, no more than 300 of them

* Livii lib. 45. cap. 34.

were alive, ſuch of them as had attempted to make their eſcape and were catched, having been put to death. The pretence for doing this, was, that they were ſuſpected of favouring Perſeus, and endeavouring to perſuade their countrymen to join him in the war againſt the Romans: But this charge they denied, and deſired to have a fair trial, which, however, they could not obtain *.

Not long after this followed the deſtruction of three remarkable cities by the Romans, Corinth, Numantia, and Carthage. Corinth was a Greek city, ſituated betwixt two ſeas in the iſthmus which joins Peloponeſus to the reſt of Greece, and famous for the works of art that adorned it. This city Mummius the Roman General ſacked, plundered, burnt, put to the ſword all the men, and ſold the women and children for ſlaves †, becauſe, as Livy tells us ‡,

* Pauſaniae lib. 7. cap. 10.

† Ibid. cap. 16.

‡ *Epitome* lib. 52.

ſome inſult had been offered there to the Roman ambaſſadors, probably by the populace. Polybius was himſelf preſent at the ſack of this town, and ſaw ſome fine pictures, two particularly which he mentions, thrown upon the ground, and the ſoldiers playing at dice upon them *.

The deſtruction of Numantia, as deſcribed by Appian, is one of the moſt diſmal tragedies that we read of in hiſtory. The inhabitants of this city appear to have been as valiant a race of men as ever exiſted. They were no more than 8000 fighting men, horſe and foot; and with ſo ſmall a force they not only maintained their liberty and independence againſt the Romans for ſeveral years, but defeated them in ſundry battles, in one of which, with no more than 4000 men, they defeated 30,000 Romans †, and compelled one of their generals to make a peace with them. This peace the Romans

* Of this fact we are informed by Strabo, lib. 8. The paſſage is quoted by Caſaubon in his Collection of the Fragments of Polybius, p. 996.

† Livii Epitome lib. 55.

would not ratify, thinking themſelves juſtified for not doing ſo, by giving up the general who made it; but him the Numantines would not accept, tho' they could not have been blamed if they had taken him, and put him to the moſt cruel death. Not moved by this generoſity of ſo gallant a people, the Romans ſent againſt them the beſt general they then had, Scipio, the ſecond Africanus, who came againſt their city with an army of above 60,000 men. The Numantines, not diſcouraged by ſuch a prodigious ſuperiority of force, offered him battle in the open field. But this Scipio declined, and did what, Appian ſays, and, I believe, truly, no general ever did before, beſieged and incloſed in a city men that were willing to fight him in a fair field. The works he made about this city were ſuch, that it was impoſſible to get either into it or out of it: The conſequence of which was, that, tho' the Romans did not ſo much as attempt to take the city by ſtorm, the Numantines were at laſt reduced to the greateſt extremity by famine; inſomuch that they began to eat their ſick and uſeleſs people. At laſt they offered to ſurrender: But Scipio would give them no other terms, ex-

cept that of giving up their arms and their city at diſcretion. Such terms a great part of them refuſed to accept, and rather choſe to put themſelves to death. Of the ſurviving Scipio made ſlaves, all except 50, whom he reſerved for his triumph; and razed the city to the very foundations *.

The third town I mentioned deſtroyed by the Romans was Carthage, which contended ſo long with them for empire. The tragedy of this city is ſtill more lamentable than that of Numantia, and was of much longer endurance; for the ſiege laſted three years, and was concluded with a ſack and a maſſacre of the inhabitants, which laſted ſeven days. And the Romans were guilty of a ſtill greater breach of faith to the Carthaginians than to the Nu-

* Appian *De Bellis Hiſpanicis*, p. 310.—See his whole account of this war, which is very well worth reading. According to Livy, if I underſtand him right, they all killed themſelves. (Epitome lib. 59.) The words are: 'Numantini, fame coacti, ipſi ſe, per 'vicem tradentes, trucidaverunt.' What the meaning of the words *per vicem tradentes*, is, I do not well know; but, I think, it is pretty plain he meant that they all killed themſelves.

mantines, and acted in a more indirect manner, and which may truly be called knaviſh, altogether unworthy of Roman generoſity and magnanimity. In the firſt place, their pretence for beginning the third Punic war was the moſt ſlender that can be imagined. It was becauſe they had entered into a war, in ſelf-defence, with Maſiniſſa, the ally of the Romans; in which war they were worſted, and loſt a great number of men. In ſatisfaction of this offence given to the Romans, or rather taken by them, as a pretence for deſtroying their city, they firſt ſent, at the deſire of the Roman ſenate, 300 of the children of their noble families to Rome. Upon this, the ſenate promiſed that they ſhould have their liberty; but they ſent, however, both an army and a fleet againſt them; and the conſul, who commanded the army, inſiſted, that, in order to have the liberty promiſed them, they muſt give up their arms, and all their machinery for the defence of the town. Even this they complied with: But, not ſatisfied with this, the conſul, in name of the ſenate, inſiſted that they ſhould leave

the town, which they and their forefathers had dwelt in for 700 years, and remove to any other place they chose, at the distance of 80 *stadia* from the sea;—a demand most unexpected to the Carthaginians, and which, if it was ever to be made upon a people, with whom they had concluded a treaty of peace and amity upon their own terms, which the Carthaginians had most religiously observed, having given up their ships and their elephants, and paid up punctually the tribute imposed upon them, and, over and above that, had voluntarily assisted them in their three wars with Philip, Antiochus, and Perseus, ought certainly to have been made before they received the hostages, or at least before they took their arms and their warlike stores from them; but *delenda est Carthago*, was the word among them, upon any pretence, for security of their wealth and power. When this so unjust and unexpected demand was made, the Carthaginians, as may well be imagined, were quite frantic, and tore in pieces the senators who advised them to send hostages, and give up their arms. But after their fury had subsided, they pro-

pared for their defence; and, tho' in the moſt deſtitute condition, without arms, ſhips, or engines of war of any kind, having contrived, with incredible invention and induſtry, to make new arms to themſelves, new engines, even ſhips of war, and a new port, when the old one was blocked up by the Romans, they made a reſiſtance, ſuch as we do not read of the like in hiſtory, for no leſs than three years, againſt the force of Rome, then miſtreſs of almoſt the whole known world, worſted their enemies in ſeveral encounters, till at laſt the Romans having ſent againſt them their beſt general, the ſecond Scipio Africanus, who blocked up the city both by ſea and land, and thereby cut off from them all ſupplies of proviſions, ſo that many of them died of famine, he at laſt took the city by ſtorm; and continued, as I have ſaid, the ſack and devaſtation of it for ſeven days; all the circumſtances of which Appian has deſcribed ſo pathetically *, (for he excels in ſuch deſcriptions), that one cannot read the paſſage without

* *De Bellis Hiſpanicis*, p. 302.

horror. One remarkable particular he has mentioned, that Scipio himself was so much moved with the sight, that he shed tears; and, reflecting upon the fate of this and other great cities which had been destroyed in like manner, he repeated the lines of Homer, where he makes Hector prophecy the destruction of Troy *; and, when he was asked by Polybius, who then happened to be beside him, what he meant by repeating these verses? he plainly applied them to his own city, presaging that some time or other Rome might have the fate of Carthage and other great cities. This, says Appian, Polybius has related in his history of this third Carthaginian war.

This manner of treating conquered cities was very different from what they practiced in the better times of the commonwealth. Then they conquered, in the manner Sallust has described in the passage above quoted, and deserved that fine eu-

* Ἔσσεται ἦμαρ, ὅτ' ἂν ποτ' ὀλώλῃ Ἴλιος ἱρή,
Καὶ Πριάμος, καὶ λαὸς ἐϋμμελίω Πριάμοιο.
Iliad Z. v. 448.

logium, which Virgil has beſtowed on them in the following beautiful lines:

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento,
(Hae tibi erunt artes) paciſque imponere morem,
Parcere ſubjectis et debellare ſuperbos.
Æneid. lib. 6. v. 852.

Beſides the deſtruction of theſe three cities, I cannot help regretting, that they did not ſpare, for ſome time longer, the laſt remains of liberty in Greece;—I mean the Cities of the Achaean league, but made a province of the whole country of Greece, to be governed by Roman laws and Roman magiſtrates. This, I think, was not neceſſary for their ſafety at that time, after they had conquered Macedonia, and had driven the great King of Aſia, Antiochus, beyond Taurus.

The prediction of Scipio above mentioned was ſo far accompliſhed in later times, that Rome was thrice ſacked by the Goths: And one of their Kings, Totila, had once reſolved to deſtroy it as totally as Scipio had deſtroyed Carthage; for he was to have made a ſheep-park of it, and

had actually demoliſhed a part of the walls.

Theſe events happened at a very diſtant period; but the decline of the Roman manners, which ended in the ruin of their ſtate, began after the conqueſt of Macedon, when Polybius concluded his hiſtory. And firſt, with reſpect to foreign ſtates, they did not, as I have ſaid, ſhow that benevolence, goodneſs, and compaſſion, which before diſtinguiſhed them, as the moſt humane and generous conquerors that ever exiſted, and made them the admiration of mankind; on the contrary, in ſome of the inſtances I have given, they were not only not generous, but unjuſt and fraudulent, and mean in their dealings. But, after the deſtruction of Carthage, they became very much worſe; and thoſe vices, which wealth and power had produced in them, having no longer any objects to operate upon abroad, turned againſt themſelves, and made them prey upon one another. And accordingly, after they had accompliſhed the long wiſhed for deſtruc-

tion of Carthage, we have in Rome almoſt one continued ſcene of diſorder and confuſion, faction and ſedition, murders, maſſacres, proſcriptions, and bloody civil wars, till there was an end of their liberty and the republic under Auguſtus Caeſar, who was ſucceeded by ſome of the moſt cruel tyrants that we read of in hiſtory. And ſo things went on from bad to worſe, with ſome variety of good Emperors, but no change of the people for the better, not even under the reign of the philoſopher, Marcus Aurelius, till at laſt the events I have mentioned happened; and Rome, once the miſtreſs of the world, and the moſt magnificent city that ever exiſted in reſpect of its buildings, and the works of art that were there, collected from every part of the world where art was to be found, has undergone more deſolation and miſery than any city ever did that was not totally deſtroyed.

If it be aſked, from what cauſe this wonderful change of fortune proceeded? the anſwer is ſimple, and, I think, obvious;—From *money*. It was this that ruined Spar-

ta, as the oracle had foretold, tho' there was very little of it there; and it was this that ruined all the antient heroic kingdoms in Greece, tho' there was ſtill leſs of it in them. But, little of it as there was, it made tyrants of thoſe heroic Kings *, who continued till the ſeveral ſtates, with the aſſiſtance of the Lacedemonians, got free of them, and, in their place, eſtabliſhed ariſtocracies or democracies †.

* Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 13.

† Ibid. cap. 17. And here it may be obſerved, that to the wiſdom of Lycurgus, more than human, as the oracle thought, who recovered Sparta from a ſtate of the greateſt diſorder and miſrule, as Thucydides, in the paſſage here quoted, informs us, and eſtabliſhed in it a government which laſted ſo long, we owe the arts of Greece; for, if the ſtates there had continued under their tyrants, the ſpirits of the people would have been debaſed, and they never would have excelled neither in arts nor arms. To the Lacedemonians therefore in the firſt place, and in the ſecond place to the Lacedemonians and Athenians joined together, who drove Xerxes out of Greece, we owe the preſervation of arts and ſciences.—See what I have ſaid in p. 417. of the preceding volume, of the conſequences which would have followed, with reſpect to arts, if the Perſians had ſucceeded in that enterpriſe.

However paradoxical it may ſeem, it is certainly true, that in every country where there is much wealth there is more poverty: For wealth neceſſarily makes the rich luxurious; and, as the lower ſort of people always imitate the manners of the great and rich, luxury muſt deſcend from them to the loweſt of the people; the conſequence of which is, that by far the greater part of the people become very poor, and little better than abſolute beggars; and, as there can be no bounds ſet to luxury, even the rich become indigent. Beſides, money begets money; and, therefore, wealth of neceſſity runs into few hands: And, as land is the moſt certain fund of wealth, the rich become great monopolizers of land. Accordingly, the land of Italy, inſtead of being poſſeſſed in ſmall farms by free citizens, as it was of old, became the property of the great and rich, and was cultivated, as Livy tells us, by ſlaves *. In this way the people of Rome were driven from the Country into the Town; where they lived, as Salluſt tells us, in the great-

* P. 25. of this vol.

eſt indigence, having no poſſeſſions, nor any thing but their daily bread *, and this was furniſhed them, for the greater part, by public diſtributions of corn. When Julius Caeſar was Dictator, there were no leſs than 320,000 citizens maintained in that way, which number Julius reduced to 150,000 †. This number of poor muſt appear very extraordinary, when we conſider, that, in the laſt *cenſus* mentioned by Livy, which was made by the ſame Julius, there were no more cenſed than 150,000 ‡, that is, ſo many males above the age of puberty. The effect, therefore, of wealth in a country is not only to corrupt the manners of the rich, but very much to increaſe the number of the poor, and at laſt to depopulate the country; as we may ſee from the example of antient Italy.

But, beſides the influence of wealth upon the Roman ſtate, of wealth infinitely

* Salluſt. *Catalin.* cap. 48.

† Suetonius *in Caeſaris vita*, cap. 41.

‡ Livii *Epitome* lib. 115.

greater than that which deſtroyed Sparta and the other antient kingdoms of Greece, and which truly might be ſaid to have been the whole wealth of the world at that time, there was an imperfection in the Roman government in later times, ſo great even in that golden age of the Roman ſtate, which is the ſubject of Polybius's hiſtory, that it would have fallen to pieces, and deſtroyed itſelf, as it did in after times, if it had not been for the extraordinary virtue of the people during that period. The Roman government, in its original inſtitution, and as it continued under the Kings, was an heroic government, ſuch as we find obtained in the ſeveral ſtates of Greece at the time of the Trojan war; for, as the Halicarnaſſian has obſerved, there was a great reſemblance betwixt the inſtitutions and manners of the antient Romans, and thoſe of the heroic ages. Now Homer has deſcribed to us very exactly this heroic government, at the head of which was a Chief, or King, a man of high birth, and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of the people by ſuperior abilities both of mind and body. This King was aſſiſted in his government

by the men of diſtinguiſhed rank among the people, who compoſed the βουλη γερο-ντων, or the *Senatus*, as the Romans called it. The King with this council firſt deliberated what was proper to be done upon any extraordinary occaſion; and, when they had come to a reſolution, they aſſembled the people, and deſired their concurrence with what the Senate had reſolved: For the people were not treated like ſlaves, who are only to obey the commands of a maſter; but, like rational creatures, they were to be convinced before they acted. And, therefore, it was neceſſary, that thoſe heroic Kings ſhould excel not only in council and fight, but in eloquence alſo, ſo as to be able to perſuade the people to agree to the reſolutions of the ſenate. And accordingly we find from Homer, that the Greek heroes valued themſelves upon their eloquence, as well as upon their valour.

The firſt King among the Romans was undoubtedly, by his mother at leaſt, whoever might be his father, of heroic race; and I have no doubt but that his 100 Senators, and the whole order of Patricians,

out of which both Senators and Knights were choſen, were, probably for the greater part, of Trojan families that came with Romulus from Alba to the new city, 50 of which the Halicarnaſſian tells us, were exiſting even in his time *. The whole adminiſtration of government was in the hands of thoſe Patricians, and the people only conſulted upon extraordinary occaſions, ſuch as the election of a King.

And here it may be obſerved, that this heroic form of government ſeems to have been of very antient uſe, not only among civilized nations, but among the nations we call barbarous. The government of the Hurons, the moſt antient nation in North America, was, about the middle of laſt century (for, I believe, they are now almoſt quite exterminated), as it is deſcribed by Gabriel Sagard †, who was a miſſionary for ſeveral years among them, exactly

* Lib. 1. *Antiquitatum* cap. 85.

† See an account of this author in p. 471. of the ſecond edit. of vol. 1. of this work.

of the ſame kind with the heroic governments in Greece; and, as I am very well informed by people that have been in the country, the more ſouthern tribes of Indians in that part of the Continent are governed in the ſame way. And every body, who has been among the Indians, knows, that a Chief among them is not valued, if he does not excel, like the Greek heroes, in eloquence as well as in fight.

The kingdom of Rome having ended in the ſame way as the antient kingdoms of Greece above mentioned, by the avarice and cruelty of the laſt of the Kings, Tarquinius Superbus, the government that was eſtabliſhed after his expulſion was likewiſe a mixed government; but it had, I think, too much of democracy in its compoſition; for, in the firſt place, the people had the election of the magiſtrates that were to govern them, particularly of the two chief magiſtrates who came in place of the King, and were elected annually, which put a great deal more power into the hands of the people, than if they had been for life,

as the Kings were. *2do*, No law could be enacted but in the aſſemblies of the people. *3tio*, They deliberated, and determined alſo, as to peace and war. *4to*, They were judges of capital crimes in the laſt reſort *. And, *laſtly*, under the republic there was an alteration of the conſtitution, which gave much more power to the people than they had under the Kings; for then nothing that the people determined or enacted was valid, unleſs ratified by the ſenate, and that form was kept up in later times, but then, as Livy tells us, it was no more than a form; for, ſays he, before the people gave their ſuffrages, the ſenate ratified what they ſhould do. His words are: *Priuſquam populus ſuffragium ineat, in incertum comitiorum eventum patres auctores fiunt* †. And I ſhould have thought the government little better than an abſolute democracy, if it had not been for two things, *firſt*, the *Comitia Centuriata*, a moſt political device, as I have already obſerved ‡, to moderate the power of the

* See Polybius, lib. 6. where a moſt accurate account is given of the different powers belonging to the Senate, the People, and the Conſuls.

† Lib. 1. cap. 17.

‡ P. 124. of this vol.

people, which, at the ſame time that it laid the burden of the taxes upon the rich, threw into their hands a great part of the power of the ſtate; and, *ſecondly*, the magiſtrates and governours, tho' elected by the people, muſt be all of the Patrician order, that is, of the beſt race of men among them, and who, therefore, were the moſt proper to govern them. And in the hands of theſe men was the religion and the wealth of the country, and alſo the laws, by which every man's private property was ſecured to him. And yet, with all theſe reſtraints upon the people, I ſtill think, that the government was too democratical. And I am perſuaded, that, if the government of Sparta had been as democratical, it never could have laſted 700 years, nor half that time. There was, to be ſure, a mixture of popular government in the Spartan conſtitution; for, upon extraordinary occaſions, we find the people were aſſembled and conſulted; as when they deliberated whether they ſhould break the 30 years truce with the Athenians, and begin the famous Peloponeſian war *. But there

* Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 87.

was a very ſmall mixture of it, of which we need no other proof than this, that we read in their hiſtory of no diviſions or diſorders in their ſtate by diſputes betwixt their Patricians, or Spartiates, as they called them, and the reſt of the Lacedemonians, ſuch as we find among the Romans, almoſt every year, betwixt their Patricians and Plebeians.

But in progreſs of time the Roman government, under the republic, became more and more democratical, till at laſt it was little better than a pure democracy, or rather *Ochlocracy*. The firſt ſtep towards this total change of the government was the creation of the Tribunes of the people; by which, as was foreſeen at the time*, of one ſtate there were made two, in oppoſition to one another. This event, as I have ſaid, was produced by *money*, the root of all evil, as it is moſt properly called in our Sacred Books, and what is the neceſſary conſequence of money, the wealth of a few, and the poverty of many. If the Tribunes

* P. 136. of this vol.

had been elected in the *Comitia Centuriata*, inſtituted by Servius Tullius, the miſchief would not have been ſo great; for the Patricians, by the means of their Clients and Dependents, might in thoſe *Comitia* have got Tribunes elected that were in their intereſt. But, by the violence of the Tribunes, which had almoſt brought things to the extremity of bloodſhed, a law was made enacting, that the Tribunes ſhould be elected in the *Tributa Comitia*, in which every man, whatever his rank or fortune was, had an equal vote *.

But the demands of the people ſtill roſe higher; and at laſt they got a law enacted, by which every law that paſſed in the *Comitia Tributa* was binding upon the whole citizens †, by which the legiſlative power was put wholly into the hands of the people.

* See the account of this law given by Livy, lib. 2. cap. 56. 57. & 58.——See alſo what I have ſaid in p. 139. of this vol. of the difference betwixt the three kinds of *Comitia*, viz. *Centuriata*, *Curiata*, and *Tributa*.

† Dionyſ. lib. 11. cap. 45.

The Patricians, however, ſtill continued a diſtinct order of men from the Plebeians; nor was their race contaminated by any mixture with them. But this, too, the Tribunes got altered; and a law was made permitting what the Decemvirs had prohibited, and which was part of the common law, and the conſtitution of the country;—the marriage of Patricians and Plebeians. By this law the race of governing men was confounded with the people who were to be governed, and that diſtinction deſtroyed, which I hold to be eſtabliſhed by nature among all herding animals, betwixt thoſe who are fit to lead, and thoſe who by nature are deſtined only to follow. Such a mixture of races muſt produce the ſame effect among men, as we know the mixture of horſes of blood with common horſes produces in the horſe kind; for I hold that Horace argues well, when he ſays:

> Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis;
> Eſt in juvencis, eſt in equis patrum
> Virtus.——*Carminum* lib. 4. ode 4.

And he might have ſaid the ſame of all animals; for I hold, that the excellency of every ſpecies of animals is confined to a few races, or families, in that ſpecies.

As yet, however, the Patricians retained the right of being Conſuls only; ſo that they ſtill had in their hands the executive power of government, tho' elected by the people, and under the controul of the popular aſſembly of the *Comitia Tributa*; but this laſt of their privileges was alſo taken from them, and the Tribunes carried through a law, by which Conſuls might be choſen out of the Plebeians. From that time, I hold that the Roman government ceaſed to be a mixed government, and may be ſaid to be altogether popular.

The conſequences of ſo great a change, and ſo much for the worſe, ſoon appeared. The firſt Plebeian Conſul that commanded an army fell into an ambuſh, was killed, and his army totally routed; upon which, tho' it was a great public calamity, the Patricians exulted, as it may be believed, very much, ſaying, that the people by a law might ſo far offer violence to the religion of the country, as to take from them the right of auſpices, of which they had been in poſſeſſion ſince the foundation of Rome, but they could not perſuade the immortal

Gods to give ſucceſs to enterpriſes undertaken under ſuch unhallowed auſpices *: For, till this law was made, the *auſpicia*, by which the Romans were directed in all their enterpriſes, were intirely in the hands of the Patricians, as indeed was the whole religion of the country. A much greater calamity than this did afterwards befall them under a Plebeian Conſul, the greateſt that ever they ſuffered from a foreign enemy. This was the battle of *Cannae*, where Terentius Varro, the ſon of a butcher, commanded as Conſul. He was choſen by the people, as a *vere plebeius* or *novus homo*, and preferred to two Patricians who ſtood againſt him †; for the Tribunes told them, that the Plebeians, who had been promoted to Curule offices, and in that way had become noble, adopted the ſentiments of the Patricians and the antient nobility, and no longer minded the intereſts of the people ‡.

* Livii lib. 7. cap. 6.

† Ibid. lib. 22. cap. 35.

‡ Ibid. cap. 34.

Theſe, and many other miſchiefs which might be mentioned, were all owing to the prevalence of the popular government among them. It was by their driving into exile the greateſt general they then had, Camillus, that their city was taken and deſtroyed by the Gauls, and all that was left of their power and glory was nothing but the Tarpeian rock, which was alſo very near taken, and only ſaved by the valour and ſtrength of one of their citizens. It was the popular faction, too, that reduced to a ſtate of beggary, as I have obſerved *, Lucius Scipio, who firſt carried their arms into Aſia, defeated the greateſt King of the Eaſt, Antiochus, and brought into the public treaſury prodigious wealth. His brother the firſt Africanus, to whom they owed the preſervation of their ſtate, and who, perhaps, was the greateſt man they ever had, they drove out of their city, to ſome obſcure place upon the coaſt of Baiae, where he died, and was, by his own order, buried, being reſolved not to leave even his bones in his ungrateful country.

* P. 168. of this volume.

The reader may perhaps think it ſtrange, that, in a work which profeſſes to treat only of ſtile, I ſhould have ſaid ſo much of the ſubject of Polybius's hiſtory; but it is by the choice of the ſubject, a material thing in every work, that the hiſtory of Polybius, is diſtinguiſhed above all the hiſtories that ever were written; for it is the hiſtory of the moſt glorious period of the nobleſt people, and the greateſt in arms and government that ever exiſted. The choice of the ſubject is one reaſon, and, I think, a good one, why the Halicarnaſſian has preferred the hiſtory of Herodotus to that of Thucydides*; and for the ſame reaſon, I think, the hiſtory of Polybius preferable to any other hiſtory, at leaſt of Roman affairs. I thought it alſo not improper to give ſome account of the fall of the Romans from a ſtate of ſuch high exaltation; for Polybius has told us in more than one place, that, unleſs we can diſcover the reaſons and cauſes of events, we do not profit by the reading of hiſtory.

* See vol. 4. p. 419. of this work.

I will ſay no more of the ſubject of Polybius's hiſtory, except to add, that it was moſt proper for recommending what may be called the moral of the hiſtory both of the Halicarnaſſian and of Polybius, namely, a ſubmiſſion, by all other nations, to the government of the Romans, as a people deſtined by God and Nature, and fitted by their laws and inſtitutions, to be the rulers of mankind, degenerate as men then were; and that therefore the nations could do nothing better, or more for their own intereſt, than to ſubmit to their government, it being for the intereſt of every individual, as well as of every nation, to be governed by better men than themſelves.

Of this ſo noble a ſubject Polybius has made the moſt inſtructive hiſtory that ever was written, and the beſt ſchool in which a man can be formed, either for civil or military buſineſs. And there was no man more fit to write a hiſtory of that kind, as he was both a ſtateſman and a ſoldier, and had been employed in great affairs of both kinds. He was a man of birth and rank, being the ſon of Lycortas, the praetor of the

Achaean league, and was employed by his country in public buſineſs of the greateſt conſequence. And, when by the misfortunes of his country he was brought to Rome, there his merit, for it could be nothing elſe, releaſed him from captivity, and made him be taken notice of by the greateſt men of thoſe times, particularly the firſt Scipio, and his friend Laelius, with whom he lived in the greateſt intimacy. And he was the educator and inſtructor of the ſecond Scipio Africanus *, by whom he was employed in military affairs when Scipio took Carthage and put an end to the third Carthaginian war. And, as to his reputation in his own country of Arcadia, the many ſtatues erected to him there bear witneſs; one particularly in the town of Acaceſus, with this moſt honourable inſcription: 'That, if the Greeks had fol-
'lowed his advice, they would not at firſt

* This is a circumſtance of his life very probable indeed in itſelf, but recorded by no author ſo far as I know, except by Appian *De Bellis Punicis*, in a paſſage quoted above, p. 183. where Appian relates what Polybius heard Scipio ſay, when he ſaw the deſolation of Carthage.

'. have erred; but, having erred, he alone ' ſaved them from deſtruction*.' The meaning of which is, that he was at great pains to diſſuade the Achaeans from breaking with the Romans; but, having failed in that, he had intereſt enough with the great men of Rome to procure them the beſt terms after their defeat. And the ſame author tells us, that he was employed by the Romans to ſettle the government of the ſeveral cities belonging to the Achaean league, and to give them laws. Conſidered, therefore, as a man of buſineſs and action, I know only two other hiſtorians of antiquity that can be compared with him, Julius Caeſar and Xenophon.

In this reſpect he was far ſuperior not only to Livy, but to Dionyſius, who was nothing but a man of letters, a rhetorician, and an excellent writer. Polybius, therefore, by his experience of buſineſs and obſervations, muſt have been able to relate civil tranſactions, and the intercourſe betwixt different nations, and particularly military

* Pauſanias *in Arcadicis*.

operations, (of which it was impoſſible the Halicarnaſſian could have any knowledge, except by reading books), much better than the Halicarnaſſian: And we are further to obſerve, that he had a much better opportunity of being informed of what he relates of the ſecond Punic war, and downwards to the extinction of the Macedonian empire, which is what he calls his Hiſtory, (the two books before it being no more than an introduction), and which may be conſidered as the hiſtory of his own times; for he relates nothing during that period but what he might have been informed of by perſons then living. And that he was at the utmoſt pains to get ſuch information, his hiſtory itſelf bears witneſs, tho' he had not told us ſo. But, beſides he has told us, that, with reſpect to the actions of Scipio in the ſecond Punic war, he had his information from Laelius, his friend and aſſiſtant in all his exploits. And, with reſpect to Hannibal, it appears that he had ſeen a record made out by him, relating to the ſtate in which he left affairs when he marched to invade Italy: And he has given us an accurate account, taken from a monument which

was to be ſeen in Italy in his time, namely a column in the town of Lacinium, of the army with which Hannibal entered Italy, viz. 20,000 foot, and 6000 horſe; and this pillar, with theſe numbers engraved upon it, he ſays, was erected by Hannibal himſelf *. Whereas Livy has given us no more than reports upon this ſubject, exceedingly different from one another †. And, that he might be the better able to deſcribe the military actions he mentions, he took the trouble of going to the places where they happened, and particularly, he ſays, he went to the place where Hannibal paſſed the Rhone and the Alps, and informed himſelf by people then li-

* Lib. 3. p. 209. lit. B.

† Livii lib. 21. cap. 38. I obſerve that Polybius was very curious about antient monuments when he he could find them; and he has given us a copy of one very antient, and in a language ſo different from the Latin that was ſpoken in his time, that it was hardly underſtood by the moſt learned among the Romans. This was the firſt treaty that was made betwixt the Romans and Carthaginians under the firſt Conſuls, Brutus and Marcus Horatius, and which was ſtill preſerved in Rome, when Polybius wrote his hiſtory. (Polybius, lib. 3. p. 177.)

ving, who had been eye-witneſſes of what had happened, of an event, which, by many hiſtorians that had written before him, had been repreſented as altogether ſupernatural, and not to have been effectuated but by the immediate aſſiſtance of the Gods. He was alſo in Spain, which was the ſcene of the great actions performed by the firſt Scipio; and indeed he appears to have been in almoſt every part of the world then known. And his travels were not confined to the land; for he was entruſted with the command of a fleet, which was ſent by the Romans to make diſcoveries in the Atlantic ocean on the coaſt of Africa *.

For theſe reaſons, it is evident, that the facts related by Polybius muſt be much better authenticated than thoſe collected by the Halicarnaſſian from antient authors, none of whom wrote the hiſtory of their own times, (for writing hiſtory, as he tells us, began very late among the Romans), but related what they wrote from tradition

* Polybii lib. 3. p. 211. lit. D.—Plinii Nat. Hiſt. lib. 5. cap. 1.

or common report. At the ſame time, I am perſuaded, that Polybius was not learned enough to have written ſuch a book of Archeology as the firſt book of Dionyſius, or to have collected from ſo many authors, Greek and Latin, the hiſtory of the firſt ages of Rome.

As to the *matter*, therefore, I think the hiſtory of Polybius more valuable than that of the Halicarnaſſian, not only becauſe, as I have obſerved, he writes the hiſtory of the nobleſt period of the Roman ſtate, when they excelled all other nations not only in arms, but in virtue and goodneſs; but becauſe he was a man of buſineſs, and much better informed of the facts he relates than the Halicarnaſſian poſſibly could be, of thoſe which are the ſubject of his hiſtory. And he appears to me to have been alſo better informed, than Livy, of ſome facts particularly of one very important fact, namely, the taking of Rome by the Gauls. That Rome was ſo taken, both Polybius and Livy agree: But Livy ſays, that the Gauls were defeated by Camillus, the Ro-

man General, in two battles; in the laſt of which they were totally deſtroyed, *et nè nuncius quidem cladis relictus* *. Whereas Polybius ſays, that they made peace with the Romans upon their own terms, and went off quietly in order to defend their country againſt a neighbouring nation, whom he calls *Veneti*, who had invaded them †. I do not believe that Livy has willingly falſified this fact; but has copied it from ſome Roman hiſtorian before his time, who thought it was not for the honour of the country that the Gauls, after taking the city, ſhould go off with impunity, and therefore invented the ſtory of Camillus defeating and deſtroying the whole army of Gauls; but Polybius, I think, could hardly be miſtaken as to a fact, which happened not 200 years beforehis time, and could not then have been forgotten, neither by the Romans themſelves nor by the neighbouring nations. And he certainly had no prejudice againſt

* Livii lib. 5. cap. 49.

† Polybii lib. 1. p. 5. lit. E.; et lib. 2. p. 106. lit. C.

the Romans or favour for the Gauls, that could have made him misrepresent the fact so much.

The subject, too, of Polybius's history is more comprehensive than the Halicarnassian's subject, not indeed in point of time, (for it does not take in near so many years), but in this respect, that he does not confine his history to the Romans, but mixes it with the history of other nations, with whom the Romans had intercouse after they had carried their arms first to Sicily, then to Spain, Greece, Macedonia, and Asia; and indeed from that time the history of Rome became the history of the world, as far as it was then known; so that, as he observes, the history of Rome could not have been understood without relating many particulars concerning those other nations.

And not only has he given us much information, and information that, I think, was necessary, concerning the affairs of other nations; but also, where he treats only of Roman affairs, he has many digres-

ſions upon the ſubject of their government, and particularly their military diſcipline. Upon this laſt mentioned ſubject I do not remember that the Halicarnaſſian has ſaid any thing; and indeed I believe he was as incapable to give the reader any information concerning it as Livy was: Whereas Polybius appears to have underſtood military affairs perfectly well; and his deſcriptions of battles are ſo accurate and lively, that they may be called pictures, which we not only underſtand but ſee, and imagine ourſelves preſent in them: And he never fails to let us know by what councils and conduct the ſeveral battles were won or loſt. His battles, therefore, I perfectly underſtand, as I do thoſe of Julius Caeſar; whereas there are few battles deſcribed by Livy that I can make ſenſe of.

Before I have done with the *matter* of Polybius, I cannot help obſerving, that, if we had the whole hiſtory of the Halicarnaſſian and of Polybius preſerved to us, it would be the fineſt body of hiſtory in the world, containing the riſe and progreſs of the greateſt people that ever exiſted, from

their firſt origin down to the zenith of their power and glory. If it could be yet recovered, it would be the greateſt diſcovery that has been made ſince the reſtoration of letters: And I have ſome hopes that it may be diſcovered; for I have certain information, that there is a MS. of Livy in the Emperor of Morocco's library at *Fez*. If it ſhould be a complete copy, containing the 105 books of Livy that are loſt, even that would be a great acquiſition. But I ſhould think it a much greater, if the hiſtories of the Halicarnaſſian and Polybius could be found complete; and, I think, it not impoſſible that they will be ſo found: And indeed it appears to me more extraordinary that Livy ſhould be there found, than that any Greek author ſhould not be found, as it is well known that the Arabians were much more curious about the Greek than the Roman learning. One thing I know, that Mr Mattra, our Conſul at Morocco, who is authoriſed by our government to ſearch for MSS. in the Emperor's library, will not be wanting in diligence to procure them; for I know the man, and correſpond with him.

But, as much as the Halicarnaſſian is inferior to Polybius in the *matter*, ſo much and more he ſurpaſſes him in the *ſtile* of his hiſtory; for the ſtile of Polybius appears to me to be not Attic Greek, but the common Greek of the times, as it was ſpoken in Peloponeſus, with a mixture of ſome idioms peculiar to his country; for that there are ſuch Megalopolitan idioms, as I call them, in Polybius, is not only my opinion, but appears to have been the opinion of a very learned man of the laſt age, namely, Burman; for there is a copy of Polybius in the Advocates library in Edinburgh, which once belonged to Burman; and there is a note of his hand writing upon the margin of a paſſage in the beginning of the firſt book, where Polybius ſpeaks of the utility of hiſtory, a topic, ſays he, which not one or two have enlarged upon, αλλ' απαντες, ὡς ἑπος ἑπειν, αρχη και τελει κεχρηνται τουτῳ. *Hoc Graeci dicunt*, ſays Burman, θρυλλειν ανω κατω. From theſe words, one ſhould believe, that Burman did not think he wrote Greek. But I am of a different opinion, and think it is Greek and very intelligible, and his ſtile

would be full as clear and perſpicuous as that of Herodotus, if his idioms were as carefully collected and explained, as thoſe of Herodotus are by Henry Steven *.

But, clear and perſpicuous as it is, the ſenſe of it is miſtaken in ſome places by Livy, and in ſome very important paſſages; one I have already mentioned, where he makes noneſenſe of a great battle which the Conſul Flaminius had with Philip King of Macedon, when the Romans firſt encountered that phalanx, which had conquered ſo great a part of the world. I will here give another example of a like miſtake of his. It is where he deſcribes the paſſage of Hannibal over the Alps, which he has copied from Polybius; and indeed he could not follow a better author than one who,

* I had begun a collection of theſe idioms; but I found them ſo numerous, that I grew weary of the taſk, and was ſatisfied to underſtand them by Caſaubon's tranſlation, tho', I think, ſome of them he has not tranſlated well; as for example, ἐξ ὁμολογου, he has tranſlated *ex compactu*, (p. 261. of his edition). Now, I think, it is clear that it ſignifies nothing more than *confeſſedly and without diſpute.*

as he has told us, had been upon the ſpot, and, by the information he had got from people who were ſtill living, and had been eye-witneſſes of what they told him, could trace the paſſage of Hannibal over the Alps, a journey which he himſelf made *. He ſays, that, in going down the Alps, the Carthaginians came to a great ſlough, or gulf, of extent a *ſtadium* and a half, that is, above 750 feet. The difficulty of paſſing here Polybius has moſt accurately deſcribed. It was cauſed by the new ſnow which had fallen above the old of laſt year. This new ſnow being ſoft and not very deep, they eaſily got through it, and came to the old ſnow, upon which, being hard and firm, they ſlid as upon ice; and, when they fell, and endeavoured to riſe again, ſtruggling with their feet and hands, this only ſerved to carry them the faſter down the hill. The horſes that carried their luggage, when they fell and endeavoured to get up again, piercing thro' the under ſnow, ſtuck in it, and remained fixed as if they had been frozen in it. For theſe reaſons, finding

* Lib. 3. p. 302. lit. C.

that the ſnow was impaſſable, unleſs a way was made through it, he fell to work, and in one day's time filled up the ſlough, ſo that his cavalry and baggage horſes could paſs over it; and in two days more he made it paſſable for his elephants*. Now, in this way, it is not at all incredible, that the paſſage ſhould have been made; but, in the way that Livy has told the ſtory, it is abſolutely incredible; for, inſtead of a ſlough or gulph, he has made a precipice of no leſs than a thouſand feet. And it was a rock, he ſays, which hardly a ſingle man unarmed could go down, hanging by ſhrubs and roots. The rock, he ſays, was diſſolved by vinegar poured upon it when it was hot; a fable which Juvenal has very juſtly ridiculed. And in this way, having conſumed a thouſand feet of rock, he, in the ſpace of four days, made a way over it for his elephants†. When the reader compares theſe two narratives, he muſt ſu-

* Lib. 3. p. 207. lit. E.; et p. 208. lit. A.

† Livii lib. 21. cap. 36. et 37.

ſpect, not that Polybius, who was ſo well informed, has told ſo incredible a ſtory, but that Livy has miſtaken his meaning *.

Caſaubon, the tranſlator of Livy, was a very learned man; and his tranſlation, upon the whole, is, I believe, the beſt tranſlation that we have of any Greek author. But

* Polybius's words are, (lib. 3. p. 207.) That they came to a place in deſcending the Alps ὁν ουτε τοις θηριοις ουτε τοις ὑποζυγιοις δυνατον ην παρελθειν δια την στενοτητα, σχεδον επι τριακ ἡμισταδιας της γης απορρωγος και προ του μεν ουσης, τοτε δε και μαλλον ετι προσφατως απορρωγυιας. Now, the three half ſtadia, which Livy underſtood to be the depth of the gulph, is only its extent in length; for this the Greek words clearly denote. And it is evident, from the account which Polybius gives of the difficulty of paſſing it, that it was not a precipice, as Livy has deſcribed it, but a very ſlippery path, down which men might have ſlid, but horſes, eſpecially if they were loaded, could not paſs, much leſs elephants. The difficulties of the paſſage, which Polybius, as I have obſerved, has deſcribed moſt accurately, but Livy in ſuch a manner, that I ſhould not have underſtood him, if I had not before read Polybius, Livy applies to the hills at ſome diſtance from this paſſage, and not to the paſſage itſelf. And theſe difficulties he repreſents as unſurmountable; and therefore, ſays he, Hannibal was obliged to diſſolve the rock, 1000 feet high, with vinegar.

I have obſerved ſome places in which, I think, he has miſtaken the ſenſe. In the very paſſage juſt now quoted concerning the gulph or ſlough, which Hannibal met with in deſcending the Alps, he ſeems to have underſtood the deſcription of it as Livy has done; for he deſcribes it thus: *Locus, jam ante praeceps in pedes fere centum nonaginta, recenti inſuper lapſu terrae magis erat abruptus.* And, in his tranſlation of the account of the battle of Cannae, he has fallen into a very material error *.

* It is where Polybius relates the way in which Terentius Varro ranked his foot in that battle. After having told us, that he drew up his horſe upon the right wing by the river, he adds: Τους δε πλειους συνεχεις τουτοις επι της αυτης ευθειας εξεταξε πυκνοτερας η προσθεν, τας σημειας καθιστανων, και ποιων πολλοπλασιον το βαθος εν ταις σκηψεσι του μετωπου. The meaning of which words, I think, plainly is, That he placed his manipuli thicker and cloſer upon one another than was formerly uſed, making his files, that is, the depth of the men, double or more than double the number of thoſe in front, which he might very well do, as he was ſo much ſuperior in number to the enemy. Now, Caſaubon has tranſlated this in a way, which, I confeſs, does not to me make ſenſe of the paſſage. He ſays, 'Signa magis conferta in extrema acie quam in prima ſtatuit, numero cohortium quae in fronte conſiſtebant in poſtremis

There is one praiſe which the ſtile of Polybius certainly deſerves, that, though he has nothing like the Attic elegance of

'*ordinibus multiplicato.*' (Lib. 3. p. 263. lit. A.) And, what has led him into this erroneous tranſlation is, that he has underſtood προσθεν, *of place*, and not *of time*, and made it to be the ſame with μετωπον, which juſt follows; ſo that Polybius, according to him, has ſaid the ſame thing twice in the ſame ſentence.

There is alſo a paſſage in the deſcription of the battle of Zama, (p. 701. lit. A.) which Caſaubon has not properly tranſlated, tho' the error be only in a ſingle expreſſion. It is where Polybius ſays, Παντες οντες εν χειρος και κατ' ανδρα της μαχης, which Caſaubon has tranſlated *Quum in dextra omne certamen eſſet*, which will apply to any way of fighting, either cloſe fight, or at a diſtance. Whereas Polybius means to deſcribe the cloſeſt fight that can be imagined, where the men fought not with ſpears or ſwords, as he tells us in the ſame ſentence; conſequently it muſt have been with their daggers.

In ſome paſſages of Polybius I have obſerved the text, as it ſtands in Caſaubon's edition, not correct, particularly in a paſſage where he gives an account of the loſs of the Romans in the battle of *Cannae* (p. 267. A.) The paſſage is thus read in Caſaubon's edition: Εκ δε των πεζων μαχομενοι μεν 'ιαλωσαν εις μυριους. 'Οι δ' εκτος οντες της μαχης εξ αυτου δε του κινδυνου τρισχιλιοι μονον ισως εις τας παρακειμενας πολεις διεφυγον. 'Οι δε λοιποι

Dionyſius, there is no affectation in his ſtile; nor does he labour to write ill, which, as I have obſerved elſewhere, is the greateſt fault that a ſtile can have; nor is it cut

παντες, οντες εις ἑπτα μυριαδας, απεθανον ευγενως. Here there ſhould be no full ſtop at the word μυριους; and the parcicle δε, which follows, ſhould be left out; and alſo the word μαχομενοι, which is alſo ſuperfluous, and tends to confound the ſenſe; for theſe 10,000 were not taken fighting in the battle, but in the camp, as Polybius tells us in the ſame page. The text therefore ſhould be read thus: Εκ δε των πεζων μεν ἑαλωσαν εις μυριους ὁι εκτος οντες της μαχης· εξ αυτου δε του κινδυνου τρισχιλιοι μονον ισως εις τας παρακειμενας πολεις διεφυγον. But Caſaubon has both pointed and tranſlated the paſſage wrong. The ſingularity of this battle, and which makes it in every reſpect the moſt memorable battle, perhaps, that ever was fought, was, that not one Roman was taken priſoner in the field of battle. Of the foot 70,000 were killed upon the ſpot, and only 3000 eſcaped; and, of their 6000 horſe, only 70 made their eſcape. And, of thoſe that thus eſcaped, and had fled to the neighbouring towns and fortifications, the greater part were made priſoners. A few days after this ſo great calamity, the Romans got the news of a Praetor of theirs in Ciſalpine Gaul having fallen into an ambuſh, and he and his army totally deſtroyed. Under ſuch accumulated diſaſters there is no nation that ever exiſted, which would not have ſunk except the Romans.

down or minced into ſhort ſentences like a great deal of the Roman writing, but there is compoſition in it, without which it is impoſſible that the meaning can be properly conveyed either in narrative or argument; and, therefore, I hold, that an author who affects to write in that way has not ſo much as the idea of what good writing is. The compoſition indeed of Polybius is, I believe, as the Halicarnaſſian ſays, defective in the rythm and melody, which in general, he ſays, was very much neglected by all the later writers *. But this is a defect which cannot offend our ears, as they are not formed to judge of the numbers or the melody of the Greek language; all I can perceive is, that there is not that variety of arrangement in the ſtile of Polybius, nor, conſequently, that beauty of compoſition which I find in the ſtile of the Halicarnaſſian and other Attic writers.

I will conclude this long chapter with obſerving, that from what I have ſaid of

* Dionyſ. *De Compoſitione.*—See the paſſage quoted by Caſaubon, p. 997.

the Latin writers of hiſtory compared with the Greek, it muſt be evident to every reader of taſte and diſcernment, that Virgil, among other arts that he mentions*, in which the Greeks excelled his countrymen, ſhould have mentioned the art of writing hiſtory; for it appears, that, though the Romans learned that art of writing as well as every other from the Greeks, yet they were very unſucceſsful in imitating, and even tranſlating the Greek authors. It may appear very wonderful to one who has not ſtudied the hiſtory and philoſophy of man, and does not know how different the genius and talents, not only of individuals, but of nations, are, that a people ſhould have been able to perform ſuch wonderful actions, and yet not to relate them properly; but, though the Romans excelled mankind in arms and government, they were not favoured by the Muſes and Graces as the Greeks were; and therefore, compared with them, they have not excelled in any art. A Roman ſtatuary or painter of any eminence never was heard of; and to theſe

* Æneid. lib. 6. v. 847.

arts, in which Virgil confeſſes the Greeks excelled, he might, I think, have added poetry; for, without excepting even Virgil himſelf, I do not think that any Roman has excelled in poetry, except Horace, who having been educated in the ſeat of learning and good taſte, I mean Athens, and having firſt introduced into the Roman language the Greek Lyric poetry, and given them a variety of verſification which they had not before, may be truly ſaid to be a great poet, though, I am perſuaded, he himſelf did not think that he was to be compared with Pindar, Alcaeus, Steſichorus, or even Sappho.

Of their hiſtorians Livy is undoubtedly the beſt, for Julius Caeſar I reckon only a memoir writer, and accordingly he has entitled his work Memoirs. But, though his hiſtory be no doubt very inſtructive, containing a great deal of moſt important facts, and, though his orations be full of very good argument, his ſtile is ſuch, that, I muſt confeſs, I cannot lay down Herodotus or the Halicarnaſſian, to take up Livy and read him with any pleaſure.

In oratory, as well as in other arts, Virgil acknowledges the ſuperiority of the Greeks over his countrymen. But, in later times, Cicero, and not Demoſthenes, became the ſtandard of that art among the Romans; '*Ille ſe profeciſſe ſciat*,' ſays Quinctilian, '*cui Cicero valde placebit* *:' And, from what he ſays in that chapter, and in other places, it is evident that he preferred Cicero to Demoſthenes; and, in general, I obſerve, that, after the days of Auguſtus Caeſar, the Romans, forſaking the ſtudy and imitation of the Greek authors, ſet up, for models in every kind of writing, authors of their own nation. Thus Virgil became the ſtandard for epic poetry in place of Homer; and, accordingly, it is evident, that Lucan, Statius, and Silius Italicus, imitated his diction and verſification. And, as to hiſtory, it is evident, that Tacitus imitated Salluſt, and made a bad model much worſe; but the imitation of Tacitus was reſerved only for the ignorance and ill taſte of modern times.

* Lib. 10. cap. 1. ſect. 3.

CHAP. V.

Of modern hiſtorians, particularly Buchanan.—His hiſtory of Scotland written in very good Latin.—In his learned age the Latin was a living language among the learned.—In the next age Milton wrote Latin perfectly well.—Buchanan's ſtile of narrative *better compoſed than that of Livy, and not ſo obſcure.—His ſpeeches alſo good, but few of them.—Moſt of them indirect;—one direct and of conſiderable length, againſt female government;—an heroic ſpeech he puts into the mouth of a woman.—The ſpeech of* David I. *King of Scotland on the death of his ſon, containing a topic of conſolation not common.—Of Milton's Engliſh hiſtory.—It is an abridgement of hiſtory;—therefore the compoſition of it not ſo fine as might otherwiſe be expected.—Of Lord Little-*

ton's hiſtory of Henry II. :--*Not an abridgement like Milton's hiſtory;—therefore ſtill more copious;—the beſt ſtile of Hiſtory that has been written in this age.—His account of the Norman invaſion fuller and better than that of Milton.—Of the Hiſtories of modern times:—The actions of barbarous nations, ſuch as thoſe who made themſelves maſters of the provinces of the Roman Empire in the middle ages, not a fit ſubject for hiſtory.—The ſubject of* Hiſtory *concluded with an advice to authors to form their ſtile upon the the antient models;—to imitate theſe and to tranſlate from them;—but from the Greek rather than from the Latin;—to tranſlate as Queen Elizabeth did.—The advantages of this practice.—The uniform ſameneſs of arrangement in the modern languages ought to be avoided as much as may be.—Examples of the common order of words being changed with elegance and without obſcurity.—The connection betwixt the* relative *and its* antecedent *ought to be well marked, ſometimes by the repetition of the word.—There may be a claſſical repetition of a word, as well as*

an ellipſis.—Where there are caſes in our language formed by a change of the word, advantage ſhould be taken of that to alter the common arrangement:—Example of this.—By ſuch tranſpoſitions the ſtile of Thucydides may be imitated.—Of variety in the compoſition of periods, and their ſeveral members:—In this the Halicarnaſſian excells wonderfully.—Milton the beſt compoſer in Engliſh, both in verſe and proſe.—Of his verſe both blank and rhymed:—Style of his polemical writings more compoſed in periods than that of his hiſtory.—Examples of ſome periods from theſe writings:—Wonderful variety of matter in them.—Dr Johnſon's cenſure of Milton's ſtyle.—The Doctor, not being a Greek ſcholar, no judge of it.—His preference of the Paradiſe Loſt *to* the Iliad *abſurd and ridiculous.—Dr Johnſon's attack upon Milton's Latin, as ill founded as upon his Engliſh.—Apology for what the author has ſaid of Dr Johnſon.—Recommendation to hiſtoriographers and all authors to form a good taſte of writing before they begin.—If their taſte be bad, the more they labour their compoſition, the worſe it*

will be.—Example of that.—But the moderns very deficient in it.—Of the neceſſity of forming a good taſte before one begins to write.—If not, the ſtyle, the more it is laboured, the worſe it will be.

TO what I have ſaid of antient hiſtorians I will add ſomething concerning modern; and I will begin with my countryman Buchanan, who has written the hiſtory of his own country in Latin, and in ſuch Latin, that I am not affraid to compare his ſtile with that of any Roman hiſtorian. He lived in an age when the Latin language was very much cultivated; and among the learned it was not only the only language in which they wrote, but a living language; for they ſpoke no other when they converſed together, at leaſt upon learned ſubjects. Even in the next age, I mean the 17th century, it was written with the greateſt purity and elegance; nor do I know any writer of the Auguſtine age that ſhows a more perfect knowledge or greater command of the Latin

language than Milton does. In ſuch an age, and with all the advantages of a learned education, did George Buchanan write the Hiſtory of Scotland from the earlieſt times down to his own time; And I heſitate not to pronounce that the ſtile of his narrative is better than that of Livy; for it is as pure and elegant, is better compoſed in periods not intricate and involved like thoſe of Livy, and without that affected brevity which makes Livy's ſtile ſo obſcure. Even in ſpeeches, in which Livy is ſuppoſed to excel ſo much, I think his compoſition is better; and he has none of thoſe ſhort pointed ſentences, the *vibrantes ſententiolae*, which Livy learned in the ſchool of declamation. At the ſame time I muſt acknowledge, that there is not ſo much variety of facts and arguments in Buchanan's ſpeeches as in Livy's: They are but few in number compared with thoſe of Livy, and very much ſhorter; the greater part of them being indirect, that is, in the way of narrative, and very few of them formal orations. Of this kind there is one almoſt as long as any in Livy, being upon a ſubject that the author was

very fond of, and that was the inconvenience of female government. He puts it into the mouth of James Kennedy, Archbiſhop of St Andrews, upon occaſion of a debate in parliament, whether the widow of James II. ſhould be regent during the minority of her ſon, or whether the parliament ſhould chooſe one or more of their number for that office *. The matter in this ſpeech is moſt fully and accurately argued; and as the biſhop had on his ſide the authority of ſo many precedents, and indeed the invariable cuſtom of the kingdom, it is no wonder that his opinion prevailed. The ſtile too of the ſpeech is, I think, excellent; for it is compoſed in very good periods and perfectly clear and perſpicuous.

The next ſpeech I ſhall mention is that of an heroic lady to her huſband upon a very ſingular occaſion. The King of England, after the death of the great King Robert Bruce, was beſieging Berwick, of which the then governour was one of the noble family of Seton, who, being hard

* Lib. 12. cap. 10.

preſſed by the enemy, agreed, that, if he was not relieved againſt a certain day, he would give up the town; and in ſecurity of his fulfilling this agreement, he gave for hoſtage one of his own ſons, and another of them was taken priſoner during the ſiege. A Scotch army being in march to relieve the town before the day of ſurrender, the Engliſh King being deſirous to have the town without the hazard of a battle, produced before the town theſe two ſons of the governor, in a place where they could be ſeen from the walls, and erected a gallows, on which they were to be immediately hanged, if the town was not given up. Such a ſight, as may be believed, moved the father exceedingly: But his wife, in a ſhort ſpeech, which Buchanan puts in her mouth, exorts him to prefer his duty to his King and country, and the honour of his family, to any private conſiderations; and accordingly ſhe prevailed, and the two ſons were hanged *. Here was a ſubject very like thoſe that

* Lib. 9. cap. 13.

were handled in the ſchools of declamation among the Romans. But we ſee here nothing at all of *Portius Latro**, but plain good arguments, ſuch as were very proper to prevail with a man of a noble and generous diſpoſition.

I will only mention one other ſhort ſpeech of his, which he puts into the mouth of the *Firſt* David, King of Scotland, addreſſed to his nobles, who had come to comfort him upon occaſion of the death of his only ſon, a youth of great hopes. It is a ſpeech of great magnanimity, ſhowing that he bore his misfortune as a man and a Chriſtian ought to do. It contains many excellent topics of conſolation; but I will only mention one of them, which I think will apply to every man who has loſt a relation or a friend that he was very fond of, as I think it is one of the beſt and moſt natural that can be ſuggeſted, to make us bear patiently ſuch a loſs. I will give it in the words of the author. 'Quod ſi

* See concerning this author and the ſchools of declamation, vol. 3. of this work, p. 250. &c.

'mali tantum morerentur, jure quidem in 'propinquorum obitu dolendum eſſe. Ve- 'rum cum bonos etiam decedere videamus, 'et homini Chriſtiano eſſe debeat tam per- 'ſuaſum, quam quod eſt certiſſimum, bo- 'nis (neque vivis neque mortuis) quicquam 'mali evenire poſſe; quid eſt cur hanc 'disjunctionem a propinquis, praeſertim 'tam brevem, adeo moleſte feramus? cum 'non tam nos reliquerint quam ad com- 'munem patriam praeceſſerint, quo nos 'eos, etiamſi longiſſimum vitae ſpatium 'tranſigamus, tamen brevi ſequemur. Fi- 'lius autem meus, ſi hanc peregrinationem 'prius ſuſcepit, ut parentes et fratres meos, 'homines ſanctiſſimos prior videret, eorum- 'que conſuetudine prior frueretur; id ſi 'moleſte feremus, providendum erit ne 'potius illius invidere felicitati, quam mala 'noſtra lugere, videamur. Vobis autem, 'viri optimi, cum ob alia plurima officia, 'tum ob hanc erga me caritatem, et illius 'piam et jucundam memoriam, uterque '(ut pro filio etiam ſpondeam) plurimum 'debere profitemur *.' Here is a thought

* Lib. 7. cap. 35.

uncommon, yet natural enough, and which has nothing of the quaint turn of the ſchools of declamation: 'When a friend,' ſays he, 'has gone before us to enjoy a 'better world, if we mourn for him, we 'ought to conſider, whether it has not 'more the appearance of envying his fe-'licity, than lamenting our own loſs.'

As I have mentioned modern hiſtorians, it would be improper to omit the greateſt writer in Engliſh, both in verſe and proſe, and who has alſo merit as an hiſtorian; I mean Milton, who has given us a hiſtory of England from the earlieſt times down to the conqueſt. As to the matter of this hiſtory, it appears that he has collected it from a great many authors, very faithfully, I am perſuaded, but not fully; for his hiſtory is to be conſidered as an abridgement, and therefore we have no ſpeeches in it; ſo that if he had not written any thing more, we ſhould have known nothing of his rhetorical talents, which in my opinion were very great. The ſtile of this hiſtory is altogether claſſical, ſuch as might be expected from ſo great a ſcholar

as Milton. But it is not ſo much compoſed in periods, as I am perſuaded it would have been, if it been a formal hiſtory at full length; and I am perſuaded that, if the abridgement, which the Halicarnaſſian made, of his hiſtory, had come down to us, it would have been found to have been compoſed in the ſame manner. There is nothing however in Milton like what I call the ſhort cut of ſtile; and he has diſtinguiſhed his language from common ſpeech by all the variety of arrangement, and all the abbreviations, which the language could admit of: And, upon the whole, though I do not think it one of the beſt of Milton's writings, it is a work that does him no diſhonour, and is ſuch that the writers of hiſtory at preſent may profit by it.

The next Engliſh writer of hiſtory I ſhall mention, is an author whom I had the honour of knowing and correſponding with, and whom I admired very much both as a ſcholar and a man of taſte. The author I mean is George Lord Littleton,

who has chosen for the subject of his history, not the whole English History, but a period of it, namely, the reign of Henry II. with the history of the Conquest, and of the Norman Kings preceeding Henry II. by way of introduction: And to this period of history, I think he has done more justice than he could possibly have done, if he had undertaken, like some other authors, to write the whole history of the country from the earliest times down to the present. The *matter* of his history he has been at very great pains to collect, with the greatest diligence and accuracy, from many authors whom he has done the reader the justice to quote on the margin; and his collection appears to me to have been much fuller than that of Milton, as I think is evident from the only part of the history in which their narratives coincide, I mean the history of William the Conqueror's expedition into England, and the battle of Hastings, with which Milton concludes his history. For Lord Littleton's account of that expedition and battle is very much fuller, and in every respect more instructive and more entertaining

than that of Milton. And though his *ſtile* be more in the preſent taſte, and therefore not ſo claſſical as that of Milton, yet it is a more copious ſtile, as being not an abridgement, but a full and compleat hiſtory of that event; and upon the whole I think it is the beſt ſtile of hiſtory that has been written in later times, either in Engliſh or in any other language that I know.

To a man that dwells as much as I do in the antient world, there is no ſubject of hiſtory that gives any pleaſure except that which ſhows

——quid virtus et quid ſapientia poſſit,

like the Odyſſey of Homer, Herodotus's account of the invaſion of Antient Greece by Xerxes, or like that period of fifty-three years of the Roman hiſtory, which Polybius has choſen for the ſubject of his hiſtory. If I am to read of vice and folly, it muſt be the vices and follies of heroes, ſuch as make the ſubject of the Iliad; not the vices, follies, and weakneſſes of men ſuch as we, which may make a very good

ſubject for a comedy or a mock heroic poem, ſuch as the *Batrachomyomachia* of Homer; but I think are not a proper ſubject for ſo grave and noble a compoſition as hiſtory. It is ſufficient, I think, that they are recorded in Newſpapers and Annual Regiſters.

That Milton did not think the actions of the barbarous nations, who poſſeſſed themſelves of the provinces of the Roman Empire in the middle ages, were a fit ſubject for hiſtory, appears from a paſſage in his hiſtory of England, which I have quoted *; yet, barbarous as thoſe nations were, they were men much ſuperior to us in ſtrength both of mind and body, and accordingly their exploits were very great. The Cruſades, by which they carried on a war betwixt Europe and Aſia for more than two centuries, are not to be paralleled in antient hiſtory, except by Xerxes's invaſion of Greece. The migration too of the Goths from Crim Tartary, where both the name and the Language of the people are yet pre-

* Page 10. of this vol.

ſerved, to Scandinavia and the northern parts of Europe, under their leader *Odin*, of whom they made a god that we may call the Jupiter of modern times, is a great event in the hiſtory of mankind. The conqueſts of their deſcendants the Danes and Norwegians, and the diſcoveries they made of countries quite unknown before, ſuch as Iceland, and Greenland, and even the new world of America, which they certainly diſcovered before the Spaniards, are wonderful events; yet the actions even of ſuch men, very fierce and brave indeed, but without council or conduct, I hold not to be a fit ſubject of a work ſuch as hiſtory ought to be, and it is ſufficient that they are recorded in the barbarous chronicles of that age.

The only proper ſubject therefore of ſo dignified a work as hiſtory, I hold to be the actions of nations as far advanced in the arts of life as the Greeks and Romans were; men who excelled not only in fight, but in council and eloquence, and who therefore may be ſuppoſed to make ſpeeches, which we could not without abſurdity

put into the mouths of barbarians; for I hold that ſpeeches give not only a beautiful variety to hiſtorical compoſition, but that they are a very material part of it, as they beſt explain the reaſons and motives of action, and ſtate every thing that can be ſaid for or againſt any meaſure. They give likewiſe to hiſtory what, I have obſerved elſewhere *, is one of the greateſt beauties of compoſition; for they make it *ethical*, that is, imitative of characters and manners, which are better expreſſed by making the perſons ſpeak themſelves than by any thing the author could ſay upon the ſubject. Beſides that the deſcriptions of characters of men, as well as reaſonings of the author upon the juſtice or injuſtice, the utility or inutility of actions, ſtick out of the work, and deſtroy that unity and integrity which is eſſential to every good compoſition. If therefore our modern hiſtoriographers, not content with the hiſtory of antient times, which the antients

* See on the ſubject of the *ethical* ſtile, vol. 3. lib. 4. cap. 8.; and p. 390. of volume 4th.

themſelves have left us, will undertake to write it anew, they ought certainly to give us the ſpeeches by which we know certainly that their councils were directed, and which therefore are matters of fact that ought to make part of the narrative: And accordingly Thucydides informs us *, that the many ſpeeches in his hiſtory were all actually made, he having either heard them himſelf, or having learned the ſubſtance of them from others that had heard them. Or if our hiſtoriographers will deſcend from thoſe antient times to write the hiſtory of our age, there ought alſo to be ſpeeches in it, eſpecially if it be the hiſtory of Britain that they write, where we know that public meaſures are debated in both houſes of parliament.

Of ſome late writers of hiſtory in Britain, I will ſay nothing; I read not to find fault, but to admire and to be pleaſed. And when I cannot be entertained in that way, I chuſe not to read at all. Now to criticiſe ſuch works, it is neceſſary to read

* Lib. 1. cap. 22

them; and that is a taſk I cannot ſubmit to. Leaving therefore ſuch authors to be praiſed or diſpraiſed by the reviewers, as they are paid or not paid, I will conclude this ſubject of hiſtory by giving to our modern hiſtoriographers and writers of every kind an advice, by which, if they do not profit, thoſe that come after them may. It is acknowledged by all connoiſſeurs that no man can form a taſte, much leſs learn to be a performer in ſtatuary or ſculpture, without ſtudying the antient monuments of that kind which have come down to us; and not only ſtudying them, but copying them again and again with the greateſt care and diligence. Now, I ſay it is the ſame in the writing art, and that no man can write well, unleſs he not only reads and ſtudies the beſt antient models of the writing art, but copies them both by tranſlation and imitation. And when I know that an author is not a ſcholar, and has not formed his taſte in that way, I am ſure that he cannot write well, any more than a man can excel in painting or ſculpture, that has not ſtudied the antient monuments of art. Cicero was not aſhamed to

form his ſtile by tranſlating from the Greek both of Plato and Demoſthenes: And if he had not done ſo, I am perſuaded he would not have been ſo good a writer. And I would recommend to the young ſtudent of the writing art to follow Cicero's example, and to tranſlate from the Greek rather than the Latin, not only as the moſt perfect language of the two, but alſo becauſe its idiom agrees better with the Engliſh than with the Latin in ſundry reſpects, but chiefly becauſe we have an article and an active participle paſt which the Latins have not. And I would alſo adviſe him, if he deſire to be thoroughly acquainted with the geniuſſes of the two languages, to practiſe, as Queen Elizabeth did, double tranſlation, that is from Engliſh to Greek, and back again from Greek to Engliſh *. By this means he will know perfectly the difference betwixt the two

* See what I have ſaid of this practice of Queen Elizabeth, in Vol III. of this work chap. 20. p. 389. where I mention alſo Lady Jane Grey, who not only wrote but ſpoke Greek, and carried her ſtudies beyond claſſical learning, even to philoſophy, and read Plato as well as the Greek hiſtorians and orators.

languages, and will obſerve how near we can bring our language to the ſtandard of the moſt perfect language; for he ought to know that the nearer he can bring his Engliſh ſtile to the Greek, the more perfect it will be. It was in this way that Milton, both in his proſe and verſe, has formed a ſtile, which I call the *Engliſh Attick*, but which is now reckoned uncouth and pedantic, particularly in his proſe, as the Attick Greek was in later times *.

By practiſing in this way the young ſtudent will learn to avoid as much as poſſible that uniform arrangement of the words in the modern languages, which is ſo tireſome and offenſive to an ear accuſtomed to the variety of antient compoſition, and will throw them out of that order, which the unclaſſical reader would call the natural order, as much as the ſtinted genius of the language will admit. Thus, for example, ſuch a reader will tell us that according to the natural order of the words,

* See vol. 3. of Ant. Metaph. in the Preface, p. 63. and 64.

the *antecedent* ought to go before the *relative*; and that no doubt is the order in which a ſchool-boy conſtruing them will put them. But the elegant writer will very often (not always, for there muſt be variety in writing as well as in other arts) invert that order, and put the relative firſt, ſaying, for example, as the tranſlators of our Bible ſay, *Give me alſo this power, that, on whomſoever I lay my hands, he may receive the Holy Ghoſt* *; beſides many other inſtances that might be given of the ſame kind. Here what is called the natural order would be, 'that he

* Acts of the Apoſtles, chap. viii. ver. 19. The verſe in Greek is Δοτε καμοι την εξουσιαν ταυτην, ἱνα ὁ ἐαν ἐπιθω τας χειρας, λαμβανῃ πνευμα ἁγιον. Hefe our tranſlators have followed the Greek idiom in tranſpoſing the Relative and giving it the place of the Antecedent, but they have not carried their imitation of the Greek ſo far as to omit the Antecedent; and I think they have done well, for that omiſſion would have made the expreſſion obſcure in Engliſh. But Milton has in ſome paſſages left out the Antecedent with great elegance I think, and without any obſcurity, as in *Paradiſe Loſt*, Book vii. ver. 38. where addreſſing himſelf to his muſe, he ſays,

——So fail not thou, who thee implores.

may receive the Holy Ghoſt, on whom-'ſoever I lay my hands.' With reſpect to the *relative*, it may be obſerved, that the perſpicuity of the ſtile depends very much upon our perceiving readily the connection betwixt it and the *antecedent*. For this purpoſe the Greeks very often make the *relative* agree with the *antecedent* in caſe, though the verb which governs it require another caſe. This we cannot do in our language, having no caſes

which is much more beautiful, and no leſs clear to the ſcholar, than if he had added the pronoun *him*, and had ſaid,

——So fail not thou *him*, who thee implores.

And in that moſt beautiful paſſage where he deſcribes Eve going out of the bower, and leaving the Angel and Adam in it, and which I think ſhould be ſtudied by every lady who would deſire to go out of a room gracefully, he uſes the ſame ellipſis, and ſays that Eve,

'With lowlineſs majeſtic from her ſeat,
'And grace that won who ſaw to wiſh her ſtay,
'Aroſe;'——— Book. viii. Ver. 42.

—where the reader may ſupply the ellipſis by underſtanding one or other of the pronouns *him*, *her*, or *them*.

ſuch as the Greeks; but we can do as Julius Caeſar does often, we can repeat the *antecedent* with the *relative*, which not only adds to the perſpicuity, but gives a certain claſſical colour to the ſtile; and the repeating of a word is ſometimes elegant as well as the ſuppreſſing one, or what is called *ellipſis* *. We ſhould take advantage alſo of the few words we have with caſes, ſuch as our pronouns, which enable us to vary the natural order ſo much as to put *the caſe governed* before the *verb governing*, and ſometimes at a conſiderable

* I obſerve that for want of this repetition of the antecedent, there is ſometimes an obſcurity in the language of the New Teſtament, which muſt be the caſe when there are other words and ſometimes members of ſentences betwixt the relative and its antecedent. Of this I have obſerved ſeveral examples, particularly in St Paul's writings: I will mention only two; Rom. chap. iii. ver. 8., and the Addreſs of that Epiſtle to the Romans, contained in the firſt ſix verſes of the firſt chapter, which is ſo compoſed as to be hardly intelligible. It is probably ſuch obſcure paſſages as theſe, that have made one of the fathers, St Jerome, if I am not miſtaken, paſs ſo ſevere a cenſure upon St Paul's writings, as to ſay that he did not underſtand language.

diſtance from it. Of this I have elſewhere † given a notable example from that fine period of Milton in the *Paradiſe Loſt*,

Me, tho' juſt right and the fix'd laws of Heaven
Did firſt create your leader, next free choice,
(With what beſides in council or in fight
Hath been atchiev'd of merit,) yet this loſs,
(Thus far at leaſt recover'd,) hath much more
Eſtabliſh'd in a ſafe unenvied throne,
Yielded with full conſent *.——

where betwixt *me* the caſe governed, and the governing verb *eſtabliſhed*, there are interjected four lines, with two parentheſes, and yet the ſenſe is perfectly clear, and more forcibly conveyed than it could have been without the tranſpoſition of the pronoun. Now I ſay ſuch compoſition uſed now and then (for it ought not to be too

† Vol. 2. of this work, p. 355. and following;—where it is ſhown that not only the ſenſe is more forcibly conveyed, but the period is more compact and better rounded than it could have been in any other way.

* Book II. ver. 18.

frequent) is as beautiful in proſe as in verſe *.

By ſuch tranſpoſitions as theſe a ſtile may be made not unlike the ſtile of Thucydides, which is a kind of ſtile that the Halicarnaſſian praiſes very much when moderately uſed. It is a compoſition, which by the phraſeology, but chiefly by the arrangement of the words, makes the ſtile quite different from common ſpeech. In this way ſome of the examples the Halicarnaſſian gives of this kind of ſtile, which he calls a *made ſtile*, compared with common ſpeech, may be literally tranſlated into Engliſh †.

* I obſerve that the Engliſh tranſlators of the New Teſtament have availed themſelves of the change of the word in the oblique caſes of our pronouns, as in the pronoun *he*; for in ver. 23. of the 2d chap. of the Acts of the Apoſtles, they have imitated the Greek arrangement of the words, and have ſaid, '*Him*, being 'delivered by the determinate counſel and foreknow-'ledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands 'have crucified and ſlain.'

† I will give an example from an oration of Demoſthenes, in which he has imitated the ſtile of Thucydides. It is quoted by the Halicarnaſſian in his

But beſides the uniform arrangement of the words, there is a ſameneſs in the ſtructure of periods and ſentences, and of their ſeveral members, in modern writing, which I think is more offenſive and, at the ſame time, leſs excuſable, becauſe the blame cannot be laid upon the language. As we write at preſent, if there be a period at all, it conſiſts commonly only of two members, and theſe tacked together by the conjunction *and*, and the words of both of the ſame form and ſtructure: And in ſome faſhionable writings of late, the concluſion is commonly tagged with a *noun*, and very often two *nouns* and their attendant *epithets*, which ſuch writers imagine give an agreeable cadence and ſomething like numbers to their compoſition *. And as they think

treatiſe, Περι της δεινοτητος του Δημοσθενους cap. 9. The word are, Ειτ' οιεσθε 'οι μεν (ουδεν) αν αυτον δυνηθηναι ποιησαι κακον, αυτοι δε μη παθειν εφυλαξαντ' αν ισως, τουτους μεν εξαπαταν αιρεισθαι μαλλον, η προλιγοντα βιαζεσθαι? which may be thus rendered: 'Do you think, that who 'could do him no harm, tho' they might be upon their 'guard leſt they ſhould receive harm from him, theſe he 'would rather chuſe to deceive, than to uſe open violence 'againſt them.'

* See alſo p. 133. and 134. of volume 4th.

the parentheſis is a diſjointed compoſition which obſcures the ſenſe and offends their ears, they do not uſe it at all; and I have heard it obſerved, of a late compilement of antient hiſtory which is in high vogue, that there is not a parentheſis in it all. On the other hand, the claſſical writer will ſtudy variety very much in the compoſition of his periods, making them ſometimes of more and ſometimes of fewer members, connecting thoſe members in different ways, by adverſative as well as conjunctive particles, and by relatives and participles, varying alſo the ſtructure of the words and the phraſeology in the ſeveral members, and likewiſe the matter, and throwing in now and then a *parentheſis*, which, by being diſjointed from the reſt of the compoſition, will excite the attention the reader or hearer the more, and, if well compoſed, and well pronounced, will give occaſion to an agreeable ſtop and variation of the voice, one of the greateſt beauties of ſpeaking, and alſo of writing *, as ſpeaking or reading is the beſt teſt of wri-

* See vol. 3. p. 76.

ting. In this elegant variety of compoſition, I think there is no author, not even Demoſthenes himſelf, that exceeds the Halicarnaſſian; for you hardly ever ſee in him two periods together of like phraſeology, or arranged and figured in the ſame way, unleſs where the ſenſe or ſentiment makes ſuch ſimilarity of compoſition a beauty: For in good writing, as I have elſewhere obſerved *, every thing muſt not be altogether different, any more than perfectly alike.

The ſtile in Engliſh likeſt to the Halicarnaſſian's, and liker ſtill I think to that of Thucydides, is the ſtile of Milton, who in my opinion is the greateſt writer both in verſe and proſe that we have in our language. As a poet his merit is generally acknowledged. His blank verſe is ſo written as to be the fineſt compoſition that our language or, I believe, any modern language, is capable of; and his rhyming verſe I think is alſo excellent. In his *Comus*, the beſt poem in my opinion he ever wrote, he has made a very agreeable variety, by

* Pag. 45. and 77. of vol. 3.

mixing together the blank verſe and the rhyme, after the manner of the Italian opera, which he has imitated throughout in that piece, and accordingly has, intermixed with the reſt of the poetry, ſongs in it the fineſt in Engliſh. As to his proſe, if it be true that the antient authors ought to be our ſtandards for that compoſition, and that the nearer we can bring our language to the idiom of Greek and Latin, the more perfect our ſtyle is, it muſt be confeſſed, that Milton's proſe, as well as his verſe, is the beſt we have in Engliſh; for it certainly comes as near to the Greek and Latin compoſition as the imperfect grammar of our language will admit, ſo near that I know it is by many thought to be harſh, obſcure, and perplexed; and ſo I know it muſt appear to thoſe who are not learned. But Milton wrote for a learned age; and I am perſuaded his ſtile was not then obſcure, otherwiſe he would not have been employed ſo much by the parliament and Oliver Cromwell to write on public buſineſs. At the ſame time, conſidering it as a claſſical ſtile, it muſt be allowed to be an artificial one, of the kind which the Halicarnaſſian

calls περιττη και εξηλαγμενη, or what may be called in Engliſh *a made ſtile*, that is, a ſtile very different from common ſpeech. His hiſtory being, as I have obſerved, an abridgement, the ſtile of it is, as it ought to be, much ſimpler and plainer, and ſuch as any man, who has learned the Engliſh grammar, may eaſily enough underſtand. But his controverſial writings are in a ſtile very different; and they ought to be ſo, for they are of the rhetorical kind, and the ſtile of rhetoric ſhould be very different from that of narrative; and it is a difference which Milton appears to me to have perfectly known, as well as the difference betwixt either of theſe ſtiles and the epiſtolary, of which we have evidence from the letters he wrote in name of the commonwealth and Oliver Cromwell to ſundry kings and ſtates, which we have both in Latin and Engliſh, and they are as good letters of buſineſs as ever were written.

That he excelled in this rhetorical ſtile is evident from the ſpeeches of the Paradiſe Loſt, which are out of all degree of compariſon the beſt orations we have in

Engliſh. And it appears to me to be a ſtile which he had practiſed more than any other, having been engaged in controverſies civil or religious from his youth upwards down to the reſtoration. The variety of matter in theſe controverſies is wonderful: They abound more with learning of all kinds, divine and human, and there is in them a greater copiouſneſs of arguments, of facts from antient and modern, civil and eccleſiaſtical hiſtory, of authorities from ſcripture, from Fathers of the Church and modern divines, and laſtly from heathen poets, philoſophers, and hiſtorians, than is to be found in any one book I know; with all this, there is a keenneſs of ſatire, of wit too and ridicule, which is hardly to be paralleled. And he concludes his diſcourſe upon the Reformation in England with an invective upon the Prelatical party, much more violent than any thing that Demoſthenes has ſaid againſt Philip.

The ſtile of theſe Philippics, as they may be called, has all that variety of compoſition, which I have praiſed in the Hali-

carnaſſian, and is brought as near to the Greek and Latin idiom, and as much figured as the poverty of our language will admit. In theſe works there is much more of compoſition in periods, as there ought to be, than there is in his hiſtory. I have given elſewhere an example of what I think a very fine period in the beginning of his *Eiconoclaſtes*, and I will here give an example of two in the beginning of another polemical work of his, entitled *The Reaſon of Church Government urged againſt Prelaty*. He begins his preface thus: 'In 'the publiſhing of human laws, which for 'the moſt part aim not beyond the good 'of civil ſociety, to ſet them barely forth 'to the people without reaſon or preface, 'like a phyſical preſcript, or only with 'threatnings, as it were a lordly command, 'in the judgment of Plato, was thought 'to be done neither generouſly nor wiſely. 'His advice was, ſeeing that perſuaſion 'certainly is a more winning and manlike 'way to keep men in obedience than fear, 'that to ſuch laws as were of principal 'moment, there ſhould be uſed, as an in-

'duction, ſome well tempered diſcourſe, 'ſhowing how good, how gainful, how 'happy it muſt needs be to live according 'to honeſty and juſtice; which being ut-'tered with theſe natural colours and 'graces of ſpeech, as true eloquence the 'daughter of virtue can beſt beſtow upon 'her mother's praiſes, would ſo incite and 'in a manner charm the multitude into the 'love of that which is really good, as to 'embrace it ever after, not of cuſtom and 'awe, which moſt men do, but of choice 'and purpoſe, with true and conſtant de-'light.' Here it may be obſerved the firſt period conſiſts only of two members, the one much longer than the other, ending with the word *command*; the other ſhort, and concluding the period with a very natural cadence. The ſecond period I would divide into four members; the firſt a ſhort member ending with the word *fear*; the other longer, concluding with the word *juſtice*; the other of much the ſame length ending with the word *praiſes*; and the fourth, longer than any of the

former, concludes the period, and in the way in which Ariſtotle ſays it ſhould be concluded, by the natural cadence of the words, and not by the ſenſe only. And the reader will obſerve that the two periods are wholly different from one another, and the ſeveral members alſo different, both in the ſtructure and compoſition of the words, and in their way of being joined together; ſo that we have here that variety without which there can be no beauty, as I have had frequently occaſion to obſerve in the courſe of this work, in any of the works of art,

Beſides this claſſical compoſition in thoſe controverſial works, there is a richneſs of words that I do not find in other Engliſh authors; and, though many of theſe words are now obſolete, they are ſuch as, in my opinion, ought to be revived and brought again into faſhion.

Such a ſtile therefore muſt have, as was ſaid before, a great deal of the colour of Thucydides, whoſe ſtile was varied and diſtinguiſhed from common ſpeech by all

the variety of figures, which even the Greek language will admit. And as Thucydides's ſtile is not to be underſtood except by a very good Greek ſcholar, ſo neither is Milton's (though not near ſo obſcure in Engliſh as Thucydides is in Greek) to be perfectly underſtood, except by a ſcholar who has formed his taſte of good writing upon the antient maſters of the art *. It was no wonder, therefore, that ſuch a critic as Dr Johnſon, who, in my opinion, was neither a ſcholar nor a man of taſte, ſhould pronounce, among the o-

* The edition of Milton's proſe works, I uſe, is in 3 volumes in folio, printed in Amſterdam in 1698. And, as it is printed in a foreign country, by a printer, who, it is likely, underſtood little or no Engliſh, and under the inſpection of a corrector of the preſs, who, we may ſuppoſe, did not perfectly underſtand Milton's Attic Engliſh, it is not to be wondered that there are ſundry errors of the preſs in it, (and indeed I wonder there are not more), which really make it obſcure. There is no other edition that I have heard of; and the book is ſo rare, that I could not find it, when I wanted it, (ſuch is the taſte of the age), in the ſhop of any bookſeller in London. In this manner, ſo great a treaſure of learning, arguments, and words, may be ſaid to be loſt to the public.

ther oracles which he has uttered from his tripod, that Milton does not write Engliſh, (and I have heard ſome of the Doctor's admirers ſay the ſame), but a Babyloniſh dialect. And indeed an unlearned critic, who judges of the Engliſh language, by what is now written in it, will be diſpoſed to cenſure thoſe claſſical idioms of Milton above mentioned as harſh and uncouth; though, if he be more candid and good natured than the Doctor, he may not give ſo hard an epithet to Milton's ſtile, and which indeed is the worſt thing that could be ſaid of any ſtile, as to call it Babyloniſh. But the Doctor, who was not a Greek ſcholar, and could not read the Halicarnaſſian's critical works in the original, which cannot be underſtood in the tranſlation, where the ſeveral ways of diſtinguiſhing ſtile from common ſpeech by the grammatical figures of conſtruction, are better explained than by any other author, knew of no other way of adorning his ſtile, and making what he thought fine writing, except by epithets, antitheſes, and coining new words. Now, if he had been ſcholar enough to have read Thucydides, the great ſtandard for what I

call the *made* ſtile, he would have ſeen that it could be made without either epithet or antitheſis: And as to new coined words, if Thucydides had attempted that, the people of Athens had ſuch regard for the purity and chaſtity of their language, that they would not have born it, any more than I think the people of England ſhould have born the words that Dr Johnſon has made, and the reflections that he has thrown out upon an author, who does ſo much honour to modern times and to the Engliſh nation in particular. The commendation of the *Paradiſe Loſt*, with which he concludes his life of Milton, is I think more abſurd than his cenſures of him, and ſo ridiculous that, if I had had a better opinion of the Doctor's critical talents, I ſhould have imagined that he ſaid it by way of irony and ridicule of Milton. He ſays that 'the *Paradiſe Loſt* is not the greateſt of heroic poems, only becauſe it is not the firſt.' Now, as the chief merit of a poem, a picture, or indeed of every work of art, is the choice of the ſubject, if Dr Johnſon had been but the twentieth part the tythe of a critic, (to uſe an expreſſion of Shake-

ſpear), he would have known that, by the nature of things, it was impoſſible, of ſuch a ſubject as that of the *Paradiſe Loſt*, to make ſo fine a poem as the Iliad of Homer. For an epic poem as well as a tragedy is, as Ariſtotle tells us, the imitation of a human action. Now the ſubject of the *Paradiſe Loſt*, as I have obſerved elſewhere,* is divine and ſupernatural; and there is hardly any thing human in it, except the ſpeeches in the council of the Devils, which are the beſt of the rhetorical kind to be found in Engliſh, the ſeduction of Eve by the flattery of the Devil, and the quarrel betwixt the Man and Wife after the Fall: For, as to his battles of Angels fighting in *Cubic Phalanx*, they are altogether out of nature, at leaſt human nature. The characters likewiſe are either too good or too bad, not mixed, as characters in poetry ought to be. The ſubject therefore of the Paradiſe Loſt is much too high for poetical imitation; whereas the ſtory of Homer's Iliad is the beſt ſubject for an epic poem that ever was invented, or to ſpeak more properly, that ever was choſen; for though the genius

* Preface to vol. 3. of Ant. Metaph. p. xliii

of the poet might adorn and embelliſh ſuch a ſubject, by adding or taking away circumſtances, I hold it to be beyond the power of man to have invented altogether ſuch a ſtory. All therefore he could ſay, with any ſhow of reaſon, in praiſe of Milton above Homer, is, that, if Homer had had the ſame ſubject, he could not have made ſo much of it as Milton has done.

The Doctor has been pleaſed not only to cenſure the Engliſh of Milton, in the ſtrong terms above mentioned, but to attack his Latin in that noble work which gained him ſo much reputation all over Europe, I mean his *Defenſio pro Populo Anglicano*, in which he encountered a man who was reputed the greateſt ſcholar of the age, and with ſuch ſucceſs, that it is ſaid to have proved the cauſe of his death. In this work Milton has ſhown that Salmaſius did not write good Latin; and, in return, the Doctor has endeavoured to ſhow that Milton's Latin is as bad; but in this he has not ſucceeded *.

* The Latin which the Doctor finds fault with, is in the beginning of his Preface to his *Defence*;

Before I read this criticiſm, though I knew the Doctor was no Greek ſcholar,

where, after expoſing a French Idiom which Salmaſius has uſed, where he ſpeaks of the *Perſona Regis*, he adds, *Cæterum ob hujuſmodi noxas Gallico-Latinas, quibus paſſim ſcates, non tam mihi, neque enim eſt otium, quam ipſis tuis Grammatiſtis pœnas dabis; quibus ego te deridendum et vapulandum propino.* Upon which the Doctor's Remark is, That 'Milton has inforced the charge of 'a Soleciſm againſt Salmaſius, by an expreſſion in it-'ſelf *groſsly ſoleciſtical*, when, for one of theſe ſuppoſed 'blunders, he ſays, as Ker, and, I think, ſome one be-'fore him, has remarked, *propino te tuis Grammatiſtis 'Vapulandum.* From *Vapulo*, which has a paſſive 'ſenſe, *Vapulandus* can never be derived. No man 'forgets his original trade: the rights of nations and of 'Kings ſink into queſtions of Grammar, if Gramma-'rians diſcuſs them.' Here the Doctor has uſed a liberty, not uncommon with him, to coin a new word *viz. Soleciſtical*, to expreſs this groſs blunder of Milton; but a word, formed not according to the analogy of the Language, and, what is worſe, confounding a diſtinction which the Grammatical Art makes betwixt a Barbariſm and a Soleciſm; the firſt relating to ſingle words, the other to the compoſition and conſtruction of them. This diſtinction is laid down in the Philoſophical Greek Grammar of the learned Greek of modern times, Theodorus Gaza, but which I would have excuſed the Doctor for not knowing, as that Grammar is not tranſlated. But the ſame de-

I believed that he had underſtood Latin as much at leaſt as any man can underſtand a

ſtinction is laid down in the common Grammars and Dictionaries. Now Milton's error, if it be one, is a Barbariſm and not a Soleciſm; and one ſhould have thought that the real name for the thing would have pleaſed the Doctor more than the wrong name he has given it: ſo that here it appears that the Doctor has forgotten his original trade as, he ſays, Milton has done. The expreſſion is ſuch, that, as it ſtands in Milton, it is impoſſible to miſtake the meaning of it; and it is only the *obſcure diligence* (to uſe an expreſſion of Terence) of a Pedantic Schoolmaſter that would have obſerved it, tho' the Doctor has not even the glory of having firſt diſcovered it. This Blunder, ſo groſs, that it could not be expreſſed in the common words of the Language, comes only to this, that Milton has uſed a Participle of the word *Vapulo*, derived from the paſſive voice of the Verb, which, the Doctor ſays, it has not: And he may be in the right, at leaſt I do not remember to have read any Tenſe or Participle of the Verb derived from *Vapulor*. But ſo far Milton is in the right, that he uſes the Verb only in a paſſive ſenſe; for if he had given it an active ſignification in any of its Voices or Tenſes, I ſhould have thought it an error. But all he has done is to borrow from the paſſive voice a future Participle, and which I think was of neceſſity, if he was to uſe the word at all; for if he had uſed the future active Participle, I ſhould not, for my part, have underſtood him; nor do I believe there

learned language, who underſtood not the ſcience of language nor any other ſci-

is an example of *Vapulaturus* being uſed in that ſenſe. Now he could have uſed no word ſo proper as *Vapulandus*; for *Verberandus* would not have been ſo proper, becauſe Milton certainly did not mean that he was to be *whipt* by his Scholars, but only *derided* and *railed at*, as pretending to underſtand what he did not underſtand. Now in this ſenſe of *being railed at*, the word is uſed by Cicero; for he ſays *ſermone vapulo*, that is *I am abuſed and railed at*. Another thing to be obſerved is that the gerund *vapulandum* of this verb is in common uſe. Now the Gerund is nothing elſe but the neuter of the paſſive participle future. All therefore that Milton has done is to uſe the paſſive participle *Vapulandus*, not in the neuter Gender only and as a ſubſtantive, but as an adjective. But farther, if the transferring a Participle from one voice to another, was without example in the Latin Language, there might be ſome truth in the Doctor's Criticiſm: But there is a well known Example in the word *ſequor* which is a verb in the paſſive voice with an active ſignification; and yet it has the preſent participle of the active voice *viz. ſequens*, as well as the future paſſive participle *ſequendus*; and it likewiſe borrows from the active voice a future participle *ſecuturus*; and the ſame is the caſe of *loquor*, and ſeveral other *deponent verbs*. Now, if a verb of a paſſive form with an active ſignification can borrow two participles from the active form of the ſame verb, why may not a verb of an active form with a paſſive ſigni-

ence *. But I am now in doubt, whether he was even a complete Latin ſcholar in the

fication, ſuch as *vapulo*, borrow one participle from the paſſive form of the ſame verb? I therefore ſay that the uſe of the paſſive participle *vapulandus* by Milton is according to the analogy of the Language. But further ſtill I ſay that if the expreſſion could not be juſtified by the common analogy of the Language, there are other Expreſſions in the beſt authors more contrary to that analogy; for in Virgil we read *Ventoſa per æquora vectis*, where the defect of the Latin Language, in not having a preſent participle paſſive, is ſupplied by the uſe of the paſt participle paſſive: And by Cicero it is ſupplied in a more extraordinary manner by uſing the preſent participle active; for he has ſaid *Marinis invehens belluis*. (See what further I have ſaid upon this ſubject p. 85. of vol. 4th. of this work.) Now I think Milton in this inſtance has done no more than ſupply a defect in the Latin Language; for certainly the Language was defective, if it afforded no word to expreſs the futurity of *Vapulo* in a paſſive ſenſe.

* My reaſon for ſaying that the Doctor underſtood no ſcience, is that he was ignorant of what I call the ABC of ſcience, I mean the principles of Geometry: for in his Dictionary he has defined a Theorem to be *a Poſition laid down as an acknowleged truth*, plainly confounding it with an Axiom or ſelf-evident Propoſition. (See what I have further ſaid of *Geometry* in vol. 4. Book 2. p 194.) And

common ſenſe of the word, though he had not only learned it as other men do, but taught it.

What I have ſaid here of Dr Johnſon will, I know, be very unpopular, as the Doctor was very much admired during his life, and has been wonderfully celebrated ſince his death. But I write neither for profit nor fame; or, if I were deſirous of fame, I think, I could ſay with Milton 'that I am not ſo deſtitute of other hopes,

here I cannot help obſerving, that it were to be wiſhed, that the Engliſh Scholars in their long Courſe of Education at School and College, of no leſs than twelve years, applied themſelves more to ſcience, and did not employ their time wholly upon Greek and Latin. I have been told that the firſt Lord Lyttleton, whom I had the honour to know, and who was a man of a great deal of genius and an excellent ſcholar, had not the uſe of the *Rule of three* when he was Chancellor of Exchequer; and in Letters publiſhed under the name of his ſon, it is ſaid that he could not ſum up an account of pounds, ſhillings and pence. Now, tho' Arithmetic, as a ſcience, is for the greater part loſt in modern times, we certainly ought to learn the practice of it, as an Art not only uſeful but neceſſary in human life.

'and means more certain to attain it,'* as to become the panegyriſt of Dr Johnſon; or, if I had deſired that reputation, I could not have exceeded, nor even have come up to what Dr Beattie has ſaid in his praiſe; for in two words he has celebrated him more than all his other encomiaſts put together, who in my opinion would have praiſed him much better if they had not uſed ſo many words, and had related fewer particulars concerning him; for Dr Beattie has called him *the great and the good Dr Johnſon.* Now ſome men have been *great* that were not *good*, and others have been *good* that were not *great*; but to be both *good* and *great* makes a character abſolutely compleat.

But though I were able to praiſe Dr Johnſon as ably as Dr Beattie has done, I am not at all diſpoſed to diſplay my panegyrical talents in that way: So far from that, I hold that the praiſe and admiration, which ſo many of the Engliſh nation (not the whole, nor the men of learning and taſte among them), have be-

* Introduction to the *Iconoclaſtes.*

ſtowed upon Dr Johnſon, both alive and dead, is one of the greateſt diſgraces that ever befel them, conſidered as a nation of learning and taſte, and the moſt adverſe to their national character: for Dr Johnſon was the moſt invidious and malignant man I have ever known, who praiſed no author or book that other people praiſed, and in private converſation was ready to cavil at and contradict every thing that was ſaid, and could not with any patience hear any other perſon draw the attention of the company for ever ſo ſhort a time. Now the character of the Engliſh nation is to praiſe and admire whatever they think worthy of admiration; and which is ſo well known abroad, that every man, who thinks he has any thing curious to ſhow or to publiſh, comes to England. Of this ſo amiable diſpoſition of the Engliſh nation, I myſelf have had experience. When I publiſhed the firſt volume of this work, the Scotch reviewers, who were not then my friends, any more than the Engliſh reviewers now are, and for the ſame reaſon, did all they could to cry down the work, and which no doubt in Scotland had ſome

effect: But in England the work was moſt favourably received, though the author at that time had no particular connections in England, being hardly known there; and the firſt edition was immediately ſold off, and a new edition publiſhed. This provoked the Scotch reviewers ſo much, that when the ſecond and third volumes were publiſhed, they became quite ſcurrilous, not only abuſing the work but the author, which raiſed the indignation of the people of Scotland ſo much againſt them, that there was no more ſale for their review; and we have had no reviewers here in Scotland ſince the review of my third volume. Although therefore I never ſought any patronage for my works, nor indeed very much deſired it, (for I am ſo ſelfiſh, as I have acknowledged elſewhere, that I write more for myſelf than for the public), yet I think that I am much obliged to the Engliſh nation, for the protection they have given me, againſt the abuſes both of the Scotch reviewers and their own; and if I could repay that obligation by putting an end at laſt to the panegyrics upon Dr. Johnſon, which do ſo

little credit to the nation, and of which the public appears now to be quite ſick, I ſhould be very much pleaſed.

I ſhould be thought to do injuſtice to Dr Johnſon, if, before I took leave of him, I did not beſtow ſome commendation upon his Engliſh Dictionary. It is certainly a moſt laborious, and, I think, an uſeful work. But there are many works uſeful, and even neceſſary, which require no genius at all; and dictionary-making is one of theſe. Julius Caeſar Scaliger called the labourers of this kind, *les portefaix de la republique de lettres*, the porters of the republic of letters; and yet theſe in his time were compoſers of Greek and Latin dictionaries. Such dictionary-makers I reckon among the reſtorers of antient learning, by whoſe induſtry we are enabled to live in the antient world, one of the greateſt bleſſings, in my opinion, which we enjoy in this. Of theſe, Henry Stephen is the moſt eminent, who has, with infinite labour, compiled a Greek dictionary, which he very properly entitles *Theſaurus Linguæ*

Græcæ; out of which have been made all the Greek dictionaries of any value ſince his time. He was not only a man of the greateſt learning of his time, but a man of genius, even a genius for philoſophy, as he has ſhown by his edition of Plato: And therefore, I think, the learned world has infinite obligations to him, for ſtooping to the labour of compiling a dictionary even of ſo noble a language as the Greek. But to compile a dictionary of a barbarous language, ſuch as all the modern are, compared with the learned, is a work which requires neither genius nor learning, and which, a man of real genius, rather than undertake, would chooſe to die of hunger, the moſt cruel, it is ſaid, of all deaths.

I ſhould, however, have praiſed this labour of the Doctor's more, though of the meaneſt kind, if, in the account he has given us of words, he had diſtinguiſhed between the proper and original ſignification of the words, and the figurative and metaphorical; as it is impoſſible that we can uſe any word fitly in its metaphorical ſenſe, without knowing its proper meaning. Now

the Doctor, though he gives us many different meanings of the ſame word, diſtinguiſhes them no other way than by the numbers, *one*, *two*, *three*, *&c.* To be convinced how defective his dictionary is in this reſpect as well as in ſome others, we need only compare it with the dictionary of the French language compiled by the French Academy, where we have the proper ſignification of every word carefully diſtinguiſhed from the figurative; and, when any word is of low or vulgar uſe, and therefore unfit for grave and ſerious compoſition, we are likewiſe informed of that.—In ſhort, it is the beſt dictionary I have ever ſeen, except the Greek dictionary of Henry Stephen above mentioned.

I will conclude this book with ſome obſervations upon ſtile in general; and I will begin with an obſervation which I have elſewhere made, but which, I think, it is not improper to repeat here, That there is nothing offends a judicious reader ſo much as when he perceives that an author labours to write ill. Now, this muſt be the caſe, if a writer has formed a bad taſte of

ſtile. It is the ſame as in dreſs, in behaviour, or in any thing elſe of ornament; for, if your taſte of dreſs is bad, the more you labour to adorn your perſon, the worſe you will be dreſſed; and nothing offends men of good taſte more than ſtudied and affected graces of behaviour; and it is the ſame with reſpect to the *arts*, which have been all at different times ſpoiled more or leſs by a bad taſte of ornament, and no art more than the writing art. The ſtile overlaboured, and in bad taſte, is what is called by the antients the ſophiſtical ſtile, upon which I have beſtowed a whole chapter, viz. the 23. chapter of lib. 4. of vol. 3. of this work. The writer of hiſtory, therefore, or of any thing elſe, ought to be ſure before he begin, that he has formed a good taſte of writing; for, if his taſte be bad, he may be aſſured, that the more he labours his compoſition, the worſe it will be, and the more diſguſting to men of good taſte.

The moſt laboured ſtile of hiſtory that we have ſeen in our time, is the faſhionable hiſtory above mentioned, I mean Mr

Gibbon's Roman Hiſtory, in which the author appears to have ſtudied to give us all kinds of ſtiles, the hiſtorical, the poetical, the rhetorical, and the didactic. This makes ſuch a jumble and heterogeneous mixture, that I do not know what name to give to his ſtile, unleſs it be the name which Mr Gay gives to a Farce of his writing, viz. the *What d' ye call it.* You have epithets, periphraſes, and minute deſcriptions tending to pleaſe the fancy or move the paſſions. By epithets, I mean not every adjective which is joined to a noun, but ſuch as tend to excite ſurpriſe, admiration, abhorrence, or any other paſſion, not ſuch adjectives as are neceſſary either for narrative or argument. Now, as to epithets, in the ſenſe I uſe the word, there is nothing that diſtinguiſhes poetry more from proſe than the frequent uſe of them. Take from Homer his epithets, and his language, ſetting aſide his verſification, is, I am perſuaded, nothing but the common language of the times in which he wrote. Now, Mr Gibbon abounds ſo much in epithets, that, to quote examples from him, would be to quote almoſt every page of his hiſtory. As

to periphraſes, I ſhall only mention two, one of them for a very common thing, namely, *fiſhing in the ſea*, which he calls, '*caſting nets in the waves of the ocean* *:' The other is a thing alſo very well known, *excommunication*, which he deſcribes to be, '*devoting a man to the abhorrence of Earth* '*and Heaven* †.' As to minute and circumſtantial deſcriptions, which are ſo proper in poetry, but for the greater part exceedingly improper in hiſtory, there is one remarkable example in his deſcription of the mad pranks of Commodus the Emperor, particularly his ridiculous imitation of Hercules, upon which Mr Gibbon has thought proper to beſtow all the flowers of his wit and eloquence ‡; but which a grave and ſober hiſtorian would hardly have deigned to relate circumſtantially, even in the plaineſt manner. And not only in this poetical way has he deſcribed extraordinary things, ſuch as the follies of Commodus,

* Vol. 2. p. 527.

† Ibid. p. 225.

‡ Vol. 1. p. 96.

but even the moſt ordinary things, ſuch as the ſituation of Conſtantinople, which he has deſcribed in this manner: '*The figure* '*of the city*,' (upon which, according to his uſual cuſtom, he beſtows the epithet of *imperial*), '*may be repreſented under that* '*of an unequal triangle. The obtuſe point*, '*which advances towards the eaſt and the* '*ſhores of Aſia, meets and repels the waves* '*of the Thracian Boſphorus**.' Here he has enriched the language of geometry by applying the word *unequal* to a ſingle triangle; and he may be ſaid to have made a great diſcovery in philoſophy, by finding out that a ſingle thing might be *equal* or *unequal*, without compariſon to any thing elſe. But, paſſing over this, and ſuppoſing that he meant to ſay, that the angles of the triangle were unequal to one another, what ſhall we ſay of his deſcribing 'the obtuſe point of this triangle 'as meeting and repelling the waves of 'the Boſphorus?' Was it not ſufficient to have told us, that '*this point run into* '*the Boſphorus*?' or, if he had a mind to

* Vol. 2. p. 3.

make his ſtile ſomewhat poetical, he might have ſaid, that '*the Boſphorus waſhed this* '*point.*' But to tell us, that '*it met and* '*repelled the waves of the Boſphorus,*' is a high poetical figure, giving life and animation to this blunt angle, ſuch as Homer gives to his darts, but, when ſtrip'd of its poetical dreſs, and reduced to plain Engliſh, is telling us no more than what every body knows, *that the city was not overflowed by the Boſphorus.* So common a thought, ſo dreſſed and adorned, makes what Mr Bayes calls *a ſtile that elevates and ſurpriſes.*

As to the ornaments of rhetoric in Mr Gibbon's ſtile, I think there ſhould be more of them than there is; becauſe I hold, that, in every hiſtory well compoſed, there ought to be *ſpeeches* *, without which, I think, a hiſtory hardly deſerves that name, but ſhould be called a *chronicle*, or *annals:* Or, if we are to give it the name of hiſtory, it ſhould be called an *abridgement* of hiſtory, ſuch as Milton's hiſtory of England. But, in

* See p. 241. of this volume.

the narrative of hiſtory, whether it have ſpeeches or not, rhetoric is very improper. And, though it were to be adorned in that way, epithets, in which Mr Gibbon abounds ſo much, do not belong to the rhetorical ſtile, unleſs the ſubject of the oration be either invective or panegyric; and I can produce whole orations of Demoſthenes in which there is not a ſingle epithet. *Antitheſis* is one of the principal figures of rhetoric. Now of this figure there is a great deal more in Mr Gibbon than in the beſt orations of antiquity, ſuch as thoſe of Demoſthenes, though it certainly belongs more to reaſoning and argument than to narrative. But what chiefly diſtinguiſhes the ſtile of rhetoric from any other ſtile, is compoſition in periods, whereby is made what is called by the antients the *numerus oratorius*, and of which we cannot perceive the beauty, not having our ears formed to their rhythms of long and ſhort ſyllables; yet it muſt be acknowledged, that a well compoſed period in Greek or Latin, or even in Engliſh, though pronounced, as we pronounce, by accent, and not by quantity,

both fills and pleaſes our ears *. Mr Gibbon has attempted this beauty of the rhetorical ſtile, but, I think, not fortunately; for I hardly obſerve in him any thing like a period, except a ſentence, which is frequently to be found in him, terminated with two nouns, and each its attendant epithet. The reſt of his compoſition is either in ſhort ſentences, or, if longer, of two members only, connected together inartificially by the conjunctive particle, and of the ſame form and ſtructure of the words. How different this is from Milton's periods, is evident from the examples I have given both in this volume, and in other volumes of this work. Even in his hiſtorical compoſition, ſuch as his hiſtory of England before the Conqueſt, Milton has periods, but not ſo many of them, and very different, as they ought to be, from his rhetorical periods.

A ſtile, ſo over laboured as Mr Gibbon's, and in ſuch a manner, offends me much more

* See what I have ſaid of compoſition in periods, vol. 3. lib. 4. cap. 5.; alſo vol. 2. p. 355. and following. But, beſides rhythms, the Greeks had melody in their language, which made a material part in their compoſition.—See vol. 2. lib. 3. cap. 7.

than the moſt negligent and artleſs compoſition. His preface to his firſt volume, which, I am perſuaded, coſt him very little trouble, pleaſes me much more than the ſtile of the hiſtory itſelf; and it was the reading of it, which encouraged me to dip into the body of the work. But with it I became very ſoon diſguſted; for I am like a painter or ſculptor, who has formed his taſte upon the antient monuments of art to be ſeen at Rome and Florence, and who, therefore, can hardly bear to look at ſign-poſt painting, or any thing of the kind, that is not formed upon the antient model; ſo I, having formed my taſte of writing upon ſuch authors as Herodotus, Xenophon, Demoſthenes, and Dionyſius the Halicarnaſſian, or Julius Caeſar in Latin, not only by reading them very diligently, but by tranſlating and imitating them, cannot read with any pleaſure what is compoſed in a ſtile ſo different as that of Mr Gibbon; but rather chooſe to go to the original authors, if I deſire to be informed of the crimes and vices, the follies and extravagances of thoſe degenerate days, of which Mr Gibbon writes. And the reader would

not have been troubled with theſe animadverſions upon his ſtile, if, in looking through that great collection of papers, which I have lying by me, and which I value as much as any miſer does his hoards of money, I had not found a letter from a friend of mine, who is no more, Mr Chamberlayne, an excellent ſcholar, and a man who had as good a taſte in ſtile as any man I ever knew. In this letter he gives me the greateſt part of thoſe obſervations which I have here publiſhed.

After all the faults I have found with Mr Gibbon's ſtile, it may be true, that he has a genius, taſte, and learning ſuperior to the age in which he lives. But, though he knew what was moſt perfect in ſtile and compoſition, he may have thought it proper to write, *accommodate ad ſenſus hominum*, as Cicero ſays an orator ſhould ſpeak: And accordingly he himſelf ſuited his oratory altogether to the taſte of his audience; but which, I am perſuaded, would have been ſo diſagreeable to the people of Athens, that he would not have been heard there with any patience. Fol-

lowing ſo great an example, Mr Gibbon perhaps has choſen to write in a ſtile very well ſuited to the taſte of his age, and which has therefore given him much greater reputation, as well as profit, than if he had imitated thoſe authors I have mentioned. For example, if he had taken Julius Caeſar's Commentaries for his model, the moſt of his readers, I believe, would have formed the ſame judgment of his ſtile, which the Frenchman I have mentioned formed of the ſtile of Caeſar *.

A book has lately fallen into my hands, in which, I think, the author has outdone even Mr Gibbon in the florid, poetical, and epithetical ſtile; and indeed has exceeded every thing of the kind that I have ſeen, except the advertiſements of Dr Graham, which I hold to be the perfection

* P. 82. of this vol.—See what I have ſaid of the ſtile of Caeſar's Commentaries, p. 83; where, I think, I have beſtowed upon them the greateſt praiſe which can be beſtowed upon any ſtile, that of drawing your attention to the matter more than to the words. The very reverſe of this is a diſtinguiſhing mark of the ſtile of Tacitus.—See vol. 3. lib. 4. cap. 12. p. 213.

of this faſhionable ſtile. It is a book of *Travels of Eyles Irvine through the Red Sea and the Coaſt of Arabia and Egypt;* a book in which one ſhould expect nothing but a plain narrative of facts. But to ſhow how much he has raiſed his ſtile above that, I will only quote one paſſage, page 52. where he gives us a compariſon betwixt two things that one ſhould think exceedingly different, a camel and a ſhip; but betwixt which he has found a wonderful likeneſs, expreſſed in the following words: 'While the wooden bark,' ſays he, 'ploughs the deep, and wafts from 'ſhore to ſhore the produce of each cli-'mate, this living veſſel traverſes the path-'leſs waſte, fraught with the precious 'treaſures of the Eaſt.' So he goes on for ſeveral lines, and then concludes: 'His mighty ſtrength, his dauntleſs heart, 'ſink beneath the whirlwind's rage; and, 'like the towering ſhip, which winds and 'waves aſſail with ceaſeleſs fury, he yields 'at length to inevitable fate.' In this way he goes on in a ſtile neither verſe nor proſe; or, if you will call it proſe, it is what Mr Pope calls *proſe run mad*, till at laſt, in the

end, he gives us pure poetry, in two odes, one on the *Deſart*, and another on the *Nile*; both which I think very much better than his proſe; for the author does not appear to me to want a lively imagination, and he has a ſufficient command of words; but he is entirely defective in that, without which no work of art can be perfect, I mean a ſenſe of what is decent, proper, becoming, and ſuitable to the ſubject, which I have uſed many words to expreſs, but which by the Greek critics is expreſſed in one, viz. the το πρεπον; a thing ſo various, and ſo different in different ſubjects, that it never has been defined, nor, I believe, ever can be defined: But we are ſure that it depends upon a natural ſenſe of what is beautiful, graceful, and becoming; which, if it be wanting, cannot be given by any art or teaching, but may be greatly improved by the ſtudy of the beſt models *.

I will make one obſervation more upon this faſhionable ſtile of Mr Gibbon and Mr Irvine; and it is this:

* See what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, vol. 4. p. 290. and following.

An hiſtorian, or narrator of any kind ought to make his narrative ſuch, that the reader may believe it to be true. Even if he writes a romance, like the travels of Gulliver, it is one of the greateſt praiſes of ſuch a work, that it has at leaſt the appearance of truth and probability, which the Dean, by imitating the ſimplicity of ſtile of the antient hiſtorians, has given to his moſt extravagant fictions more than is to be found in many of our modern hiſtories*. Now, in this moſt important point, the hiſtory of Mr Gibbon, and the travels of Eyles Irvine, are remarkably deficient: For whoever reads them will be diſpoſed to believe, that they are written to ſhow the wit of the authors, and to amuſe and pleaſe the fancy of the reader, not to inſtruct him, or inform him of facts. To be convinced of this, I deſire any man to read Mr Gibbon's deſcription above mentioned of the ridiculous exhibitions of Commodus in the amphitheatre at Rome. There he tells us, 'That the dens of the 'amphitheatre diſgorged at once 100 lions;

* Vol. 3. lib. 4. cap. 10. *in fine*.

'100 darts from the unerring hand of 'Commodus' (whom he dignifies with the name of *imperial performer*) 'laid them 'dead, as they ran raging round the are-'na.' And again: 'A panther was let 'loose; and the archer waited till he had 'leaped on a trembling malefactor: In 'the same instant the shaft flew, the beast 'dropt dead, and the man remained un-'hurt,' &c. Now, let this be compared with the account given by Herodian of this matter *, and he will clearly perceive the difference betwixt the plain historical stile, and the stile of wit and fancy. For my part, if I had not read the narrative of Herodian, I should have believed Mr Gibbon's narrative to have been, for the greater part, mere fiction. But, besides the air of romance that Mr Gibbon has given to this part of his history, he has omitted one circumstance in the narrative of Herodian, which shows more than any other how unlike the Emperor was to the character he assumed. Herodian

* Herodian. lib. 1. cap. 17.

tells us, that there was made for Commodus a gallery round the amphitheatre, for the purpose that he might not come to close engagement with the wild beasts, but might shoot them from above with perfect safety. But he adds, that, as to deers and hinds, and other horned beasts, except bulls, he ran along with them in the arena, and shot them as they ran; whereas lions and panthers, and other fierce animals, he killed with his darts from above. This circumstance, which I think the most important of all, as it best characterises the Emperor, Mr Gibbon has omitted, and has only told us in general, 'That the secu-'rest precautions were used to protect the 'person of the Roman Hercules from the 'desperate spring of any *savage*,' (an unknown use of the word to denote a wild beast) 'who might possibly disregard the 'dignity of the Emperor and the sanctity 'of the God *.' Here is a little stroke of the ridiculous, which, though the lowest character of stile, he has thought proper, in this and many other passages, to mix with his historical stile.

* Gibbon, vol. 1. p. 96.

By what I have ſaid of the taſte for ſuch writings as thoſe I have mentioned being faſhionable, I would not be underſtood to mean, that it is the taſte of the whole Engliſh nation, any more than other taſtes that are faſhionable. There are men at this day of as good a taſte in writing as Mr Chamberlayne; and ſome of them men of great eminence and diſtinction, whom I have the honour to know, by whoſe example and authority, a ſober ſenſible ſtile of proſe writing, may, it is hoped, be introduced.

If any of my readers deſire further information about the hiſtorical ſtile, they may read what I have written, vol. 3. lib. 3. cap. 19. towards the end, where they will find the general rules for that ſtile laid down, which I have here explained at more length, and illuſtrated by examples.

BOOK II.

Of the Didactic Stile.

CHAP. I.

The Didactic Stile *plain and ſimple,—the moſt neceſſary of all ſtiles, being that by which all arts and ſciences are taught. —It is of two kinds:—That by which a man is taught to know that he does not know; and that by which he is made to know, or is inſtructed.—The firſt method extremely offenſive.—Socrates put to death, and Epictetus beaten, for practiſing it.—The Socratic dialogue a good way*

of inſtructing;—practiſed both by Xenophon and Plato.—An account of Xenophon's dialogues in the Memorabilia.—*In that work we have the genuine philoſophy of Socrates pure and unmixed.—Socrates a moſt extraordinary man.—In the* Memorabilia *both methods of inſtruction practiſed.—Difference in that reſpect betwixt Xenophon and Plato.—One remarkable converſation of Socrates with Euthydemus, recorded by Xenophon, which ended in Euthydemus being inſtructed, and becoming a follower of Socrates.—Socrates in Xenophon not only aſks, but anſwers queſtions,—A converſation of that kind with Hippias.—Though the philoſophy of the* Memorabilia *be not perfect, it is a moſt uſeful work.—Of the* Œconomics *of Xenophon.—The difference betwixt it and the* Memorabilia;—*more a piece than the* Memorabilia.—*Socrates, inſtead of inſtructing, as in other converſations, is himſelf inſtructed.—Oeconomy of two kinds, within doors and without.—Of each in its order.—The firſt depends moſt upon the wife;—the inſtructions proper to be given to a wife.—Of the oeco-*

nomy without doors,—which in this caſe was the management of a farm.—This depends upon the right choice of an overſeer.—Of the operations of farming.—An eulogium upon that art.—The leſſons which Socrates receives in this art, the beſt example of the Socratic method of teaching by aſking queſtions.—An account given of that method of teaching in this dialogue;—the concluſion of it very fine.—It is a piece invented by the author, not a real converſation like thoſe in the Memorabilia.—*Of the third and laſt dialogue of Xenophon, the* Hieron,—*more poetical than any of them, having a kind of* peripeteia *in it.—The concluſion of this piece tranſlated from the Greek.—Obſervations upon the ſtile of Xenophon's* dialogue-writing.—*A perfect model of the ſtile of Attick converſation.—When he departs from that ſtile in one inſtance, the writing not good.*

THE *didactic ſtile*, as it is the moſt neceſſary of all ſtiles, being that by which all arts and ſciences are learned, ſo it is the plaineſt and eaſieſt, requiring no

ornament, nor any thing but propriety of words, and a perfect knowledge of the ſubject. This is the caſe, when the perſon to be taught does not think that he knows the thing already; for, if he think ſo, he muſt be firſt taught that he does not know, becauſe we learn nothing that we think we know already. It is recorded as a modeſt ſaying of Socrates, *that the only thing he profeſſed to know, was that he knew nothing*. But, whatever may have been the caſe among the Greeks at the time when he lived, it is, according to my obſervation, a kind of knowledge ſo rare among us, that a man who poſſeſſes it may very juſtly boaſt of it. It is the want of this knowledge, that makes it ſo difficult to teach ſome men any thing; for, if a man is only ignorant, it will not be a difficult matter to inſtruct him. But, if he has formed an opinion, and at the ſame time thinks well of his own judgment, which is a very common caſe, it will be difficult to convince him of his error, eſpecially if he is to be convinced by any man whom he knows, and to whom he may think himſelf equal, if not ſuperior, in genius and

learning, or perhaps in rank and fortune. And this is the reaſon why ſo few people profit by converſation (the beſt way of learning every thing); which proceeds not ſo much from their incapacity to learn, as from vanity, which makes them diſdain to be taught by any man living, or, if their vanity be very great, by any dead author; for there are people, who think it a poor mean ſpirited confeſſion of Cicero, *That, diſtruſting his own genius, he had ſought the aſſiſtance of learning* *.

With people of ſuch a character there muſt be a method of teaching practiſed very different from the plain and ſimple method above mentioned; for, before they can learn in that way, they muſt be convinced that they are both ignorant and vain: A man being only ignorant, when he does not know a thing; but, if he imagine he knows it, he is vain, as well as ignorant. Here, therefore, is a very difficult and very unpleaſant leſſon, and, with

* Pro *Lucio Muraena*, cap. 30.

ſome people, not practicable; and, therefore, a man who knows the world, will not undertake it, if he have not a particular regard for the perſon, and think himſelf bound in duty to inſtruct him.

But, if this method is to be practiſed, the queſtion is, In what way is it beſt practiſed? And I ſay, it is in the way of Socratic dialogue, ſuch as we have in Plato and Xenophon, where a man, by proper interrogatories, is made to convict himſelf of ignorance and vanity. But, though it be the moſt effectual of all methods of conviction when it is at all practicable, it is the moſt unpleaſant; and the very attempting it, if we ſhould not ſucceed, gives the greateſt offence. Nor do I wonder, that Socrates, by practiſing it, drew ſuch an odium upon himſelf from the Athenians, as, I am perſuaded, was the cauſe of his death, not the accuſation of impiety, and corrupting the youth*; for neither of

* Theſe were the two charges againſt him, upon which he was tried and condemned.—See Xenophon in the beginning of the Απομνημονευτα, and Plato in the Απολογια.

which, it does not appear, that there was the leaſt ground. And accordingly Plato, in his Apology for Socrates, tells us, that this charge againſt him by Melitus was nothing but a mere form of words; and that the real charge againſt him, upon which he was condemned, was, that he went about convicting every body, who entered into converſation with him, out of their own mouths, that they knew nothing; which, he ſaid, he did, in order to juſtify what the oracle had ſaid, that he was wiſer than other men. For, ſays he, I diſcovered that they thought they knew when they did not know; whereas I knew that I did not know. How much offence he muſt have given by this method of inſtruction, however neceſſary, is evident: And, I think, the wonder is not, that they put him to death at laſt, but that, in a ſtate where the people were the governours, they let him live ſo long. Epictetus, who attempted this method among the Romans, was not put to death, as the Roman government was not then democratical; but he was beaten by thoſe with whom he converſed.

That Dialogue is an excellent method of inſtruction, in either of the ways above mentioned, is evident; for what a man learns in that way, he thinks he has diſcovered himſelf, and therefore remembers it better than if it had been ſimply told him. The moſt famous dialogiſts of antiquity are the two I have mentioned, Plato and Xenophon, very different in their manner. Of theſe I propoſe to give ſome account beginning with Xenophon. He has written three pieces in dialogue, his *Memorabilia* in four books, his *Oeconomics*, and his *Hieron*, or *Tyrannus*, each in one book; for, as to his *Sympoſium*, it is not ſo much a dialogue as an account of the converſation and of other things that paſſed at a table where Socrates was. Beſides theſe dialogues, he was a great writer of hiſtory, and, I think, I may ſay of romance; for his *Education of Cyrus* I conſider as no better than a romance, but the fineſt of the kind that ever was written.

His greateſt work of dialogue-writing, is the one I firſt mentioned, namely, the *Memorabilia*, which I hold to be one of

the moſt valuable works that has come down to us from antiquity; for we have there the genuine philoſophy of Socrates, without any mixture of that philoſophy which came from Egypt and the ſchool of Pythagoras, whereof we have ſo much in Plato. His philoſophy was entirely of the moral and practical kind: Nor does he appear to have aſcended to that firſt philoſophy, which teaches us the principles of all arts and ſciences. It was this philoſophy, which Pythagoras and Plato learned in Egypt; and it was the *wiſdom*, or *philoſophy* (as the word ought to be tranſlated) of the Egyptians in which Moſes was learned *. But even of the only philoſophy he taught, namely, moral philoſophy, it appears, that he did not know the principles †. But, when we conſider, that his philoſo-

* Acts of the Apoſtles, chap. 7. v. 22. Where the word *wiſdom*, in our tranſlation, is in the original σοφια, which in the Greek language denotes *philoſophy*, and *philoſophy of the higheſt kind*; but is quite different from what is denoted by the Greek word φρονησις, which in Engliſh is *wiſdom*, or *prudence*.

† See what I have ſaid upon this ſubject in the preface to vol. 3. of Metaph. p. 27. and following.

phy, defective as it was, was the discovery of a single man, it must appear a most extraordinary discovery, and he himself one of the most extraordinary men that ever lived.

In the *Memorabilia* Socrates is the only teacher. And he teaches in both the ways above mentioned, that is, both by refutation, and convincing men that they did not know what they thought they knew, and by instructing them when they did not profess to know and were only ignorant. Besides the dialogue we have in this work, Xenophon has given us a great deal of the doctrine of Socrates upon different subjects, without any dialogue, or mention of any particular person whom he meant to instruct. Of this kind there is a great deal in the third book about the middle of it, and in the fourth towards the end of it.

There is one difference, among many others, which I observe betwixt the dialogues of Plato and of Xenophon, that, in many of Plato's dialogues, there is nothing else but refutation; and a man is only convinced that he does not know, but is not instructed: Whereas, in Xenophon, the two al-

ways go together; and a man, after being convinced that he is ignorant, is taught what he did not know before. A remarkable example of this we have in his converſation with one Euthydemus, in the beginning of the fourth book. This Euthydemus had collected a great many books, and thought himſelf very learned, ſo learned, that he could not be inſtructed by the converſation of Socrates, which, therefore, he ſhunned, avoiding even the appearances of admiring Socrates, or receiving inſtruction from him or any body elſe;—a character, which, I have obſerved, is not uncommon in this age; and indeed it is a natural conſequence of a high conceit of one's ſelf, and the affectation of ſuperior wiſdom. Socrates, however, contrived to draw the attention of this young man, by going to a bridle-maker's ſhop, which he frequented very much, and there holding converſation with his own followers, in which he contrived to make mention of Euthydemus in his hearing, as a man who intended to be a great ſpeaker and a leading man in the ſtate, but who diſdained to be inſtructed by any body. Having thus excited the attention of Euthydemus, and

being desirous to do all the good he could to the young man, he took an occasion to converse with him alone in the same place; and, having praised him for his love of learning, which had made him collect so many books, and having by that compliment pleased him and engaged his attention, he went on in a series of interrogatories, by which he made Euthydemus contradict himself so often, that, at last, he was convinced that he knew nothing of what a wise and good man ought to know; upon which, says Xenophon, he went away much mortified, and despising himself. But the consequence was, that he became an assiduous follower of Socrates, listening attentively to whatever he said; which when Socrates observed, he was at pains to instruct him in the plainest and simplest manner, without embarrassing and confounding him as he had done at first. And accordingly, immediately subjoined to this first conversation with Euthydemus, there is another with him upon the subject of piety, in which Socrates sets before him, at great length, and in the plainest manner, all the obligations that men owe to

the Gods. And here our author obſerves, that many who had been made by Socrates to convict themſelves of ignorance and vanity, like Euthydemus, never came back again to Socrates; and he might have added, that they hated him mortally. And I have no doubt, as I have ſaid, but that the hatred of ſuch men was the chief, I may ſay the only, cauſe of his condemnation.

And not only did Socrates, in this manner, inſtruct his followers by aſking queſtions, but he could alſo anſwer queſtions, when they were aſked at him. Of this kind, a converſation is reported by Xenophon, in the middle of the ſame fourth book, betwixt him and Hippias the Elean, who appears to have been a kind of travelling ſophiſt. This Hippias, after obſerving that Socrates was in uſe to laugh at, and make fools of people by aſking them queſtions, and then laying hold of their anſwers to confute and perplex them, while he himſelf anſwered no queſtion, nor declared his own opinion upon any ſubject, told Socrates, that he would aſk one que-

ſtion at him, which was, *What juſtice was?* To this Socrates made an anſwer. To which anſwer Hippias made ſundry objections; and ſo they went on debating, till, at laſt, Hippias is convinced that Socrates had anſwered him right, and defined *juſtice* well.

To conclude what I have to obſerve upon this part of Xenophon's work;—I think he has ſhown very clearly in theſe four books, that Socrates was as learned in the philoſophy of morals as it was poſſible that any man could be, of the beſt underſtanding, the moſt accurate obſervation, and, at the ſame time, the moſt virtuous diſpoſition, but who was not taught by any body, nor inſtructed in the *wiſdom* of the Egyptians, which his followers, Plato and Ariſtotle, were, who, in that ſchool, learned to know the firſt principles of all philoſophy, and of all arts and ſciences: Whereas, from what I have obſerved elſewhere, it appears, that Socrates did not know the principles even of morals, when he maintained that *virtue* was *ſcience*; and I doubt whether, if there had been an Hippias to

interrogate him What ſcience was, he could have given a ſatisfactory anſwer. At leaſt, I am ſure, that nobody in this age can anſwer that queſtion properly, without having ſtudied the logical works of Ariſtotle. But, though the theory of morals is certainly not perfect in this work of Xenophon, it is the beſt practical piece of morality, and the moſt uſeful in the conduct of life that ever was written; and therefore every man who has a mind to apply to antient philoſophy, or to be a wiſe and good man, ſhould begin with the diligent ſtudy of this work.—And ſo much for the Memorabilia of Xenophon.

The next work of his I mentiond is his Oeconomics, which is much more a piece, or a whole, than his Memorabilia, and a very artificial piece; for it is a dialogue within a dialogue, after the manner of ſeveral of Plato's dialogues, and yet the integrity of the piece is perfectly preſerved; whereas the Memorabilia is a collection of ſcattered and detached converſations, and ſometimes not converſations, but obſervations upon different ſubjects. And there is

another ſingularity in this work, that here Socrates, inſtead of inſtructing others, is himſelf inſtructed, and in the moſt ſimple way, not needing to be firſt convinced that he did not know, but, on the contrary, profeſſing his ignorance, and not aſking queſtions, as he commonly did, for the inſtruction of others, but in the natural way, for his own inſtruction.

The ſubject of this work is Oeconomy, which is of two kinds, either within doors, that is, in the houſe, or without doors. The dialogue begins with a converſation betwixt Socrates and Critobulus, in which, Socrates, by queſtioning Critobulus in his ordinary way, proves to him, that oeconomy was a ſcience, and a ſcience which Critobulus had need to practiſe, though a rich man. For it appears, that he was like many rich men of this age, whoſe expences exceed their income. Critobulus being convinced of this, and being afraid of becoming poor, deſires that Socrates would teach him oeconomy. Socrates excuſes himſelf, by telling him, that it was impoſſible he could underſtand oeconomy, never ha-

ving had any thing of his own to manage. But, upon Critobulus ſtill urging him, he ſaid he would relate to him a converſation he had upon the ſubject with one Iſchomachus, a man who had univerſally the character of a Καλοσκαγαθος, a word which we cannot expreſs but by ſeveral words in Engliſh; for it denotes a man of worth and goodneſs and beauty of character. And here comes in the dialogue, which, as I ſaid, was inſerted into the dialogue with which the piece begins, and made the principal part of it. And here it is that Socrates learns, and is himſelf inſtructed, inſtead of inſtructing others; and indeed this was neceſſary, as he had profeſſed that he was entirely ignorant of oeconomy, having had no practice or experience of it. This converſation with Iſchomachus is divided into two parts: The firſt concerning oeconomy within doors, or the management of a family; the ſecond concerning the management of a farm; for that was the occupation of Iſchomachus. The firſt part is almoſt a continued diſcourſe of Iſchomachus, with very little interruption by queſtions from Socrates. In this diſcourſe he

relates how he inſtructed his young wife when he firſt married her; how ſhe was to put every thing in order in the houſe, ſo that ſhe could readily lay her hand to whatever was wanted; and how ſhe was to treat the ſervants, and behave in every reſpect like the miſtreſs of a family. To ſay of this part of the work, that it is the beſt thing that has been written upon the ſubject, would be but a poor eulogium, as I do not know of any thing antient or modern relating to oeconomy worth mentioning. But, I think, it is the beſt thing that can be written upon the ſubject. Iſchomachus here relates certain curious facts concerning the Queen of the Bees, whom he propoſes as a pattern to his wife for the government of her family, which I ſhould be glad to know, whether they were verified by modern obſervations. He relates alſo ſeveral particular facts concerning his wife, ſhewing how much ſhe had improved by his leſſons. Theſe Socrates was delighted to hear; and, I think, every reader of any taſte muſt be very much pleaſed with them.

In the beginning of the ſecond part of this converſation, Iſchomachus goes on as he did in the firſt, in a continued diſcourſe relating to Socrates by what exerciſe and manner of living he preſerved his health and ſtrength, and made himſelf fit for the diſcharge of all the duties of a citizen, both in peace and war. For this, both he and Socrates agreed, belonged to the oeconomy without doors, and was ſo eſſential a part of it, that, without it, no man could deſerve the fine epithet with which Iſchomachus was dignified. Then he proceeds to give an account of his farming, which was properly what we would call his occupation, beginning, as was natural, with the choice of an overſeer; for a man who is not ſucceſsful in that choice, cannot ſucceed in farming, if his farm is of any conſiderable extent, and if he has other buſineſs beſides, which was the caſe of Iſchomachus. Here we have all the qualities of a good overſeer carefully enumerated, and the method by which ſuch an overſeer was to be educated and formed; and here there is more of dialogue, than in the preceding converſation with Iſchoma-

chus, Socrates aſking a great many queſtions concerning a thing of ſuch importance as the education of a governing man, which the overſeer of a farm muſt be.

Socrates being thus inſtructed concerning the qualities of a good overſeer, proceeds very naturally to inquire about the operations which this overſeer is to direct. And here Socrates is taught the art of farming by Iſchomachus, who very properly introduces his leſſons by an eulogium upon farming, which, I think, is as juſt as it is well expreſſed. He ſays, it is the moſt uſeful of all arts, the moſt pleaſant in the practice, the moſt liberal too; for it has no ſecrets or myſteries, ſuch as ſome other arts have; but the farmer moſt readily communicates, and with the greateſt pleaſure, what he knows, to any body who deſires it; and, laſt of all, it is moſt eaſily learned; for you learn it only by ſeeing and hearing what farmers do: Whereas other arts are not to be learned without much time, ſtudy, and practice; and indeed what follows ſhows it to be ſo; for Iſchomachus does no more than aſk queſtions at

Socrates; but theſe ſo proper, that Socrates not only anſwers them right, but gives reaſons why the thing is ſo and not otherwiſe; which makes Iſchomachus ſay, that Socrates deſired to be inſtructed by him in an art which he knew as well as he. Nor do I know any ſo fine an example of the Socratic method of teaching, by aſking queſtions at the perſon taught, unleſs, perhaps, it be the making a ſlave demonſtrate in that way a propoſition of geometry in the *Meno* of Plato, which Socrates makes uſe of as an example to prove his doctrine, that all our knowledge in this life is reminiſcence; and, I think, the leſſons which Iſchomachus gives to Socrates in agriculture prove the ſame doctrine.

Socrates having here diſcovered, by the queſtions which Iſchomachus put to him, that he knew what he believed himſelf to be quite ignorant of, gives this account how *queſtioning* ſhould be *teaching*. 'You lead 'me,' ſays he to Iſchomachus, 'through 'things that I underſtand, to things that I 'thought I had not underſtood; but, diſ-

'covering that they have a reſemblance to 'what I formerly underſtood, I think that 'I formerly underſtood them alſo.' Here you have the whole ſecret of the Socratic reaſoning diſcovered, and the greateſt beauty of the Dialogue explained.

The Dialogue concludes with an admirable obſervation of Iſchomachus, That what is moſt excellent in agriculture and war and all the great arts of life, and enſures more than any thing elſe the ſucceſs of theſe arts, is a genius fit to govern, and to which thoſe who are commanded willingly ſubmitting, obey with chearfulneſs and emulation who ſhall beſt do his duty. This genius, ſays he, may be improved by teaching and ſtudy; but it muſt be given originally by the Gods. As a proof of the truth of this obſervation, and that this diſtinction of men is truly from God and Nature, and not the effect of teaching and inſtitution only, I will add, that there is no deſignation of character more viſibly marked in the human countenance, the voice, the air, the manner, the look, and the action both of the features of the face in ſpeaking, and

of the body in moving, than that of a man deſtined by Providence to govern his fellow creatures *.

I have only further to obſerve upon this dialogue, that, as it is more a *piece* than any thing of the kind that Xenophon has written, ſo I am perſuaded it is for the greater part, if not altogether, an invention of the author, and in that reſpect reſembling the dialogues of Plato more than any thing he has written; for, as to the converſations in the Memorabilia, I believe them all to have been real converſations, with little or no addition from the author.

To conclude my obſervations upon this dialogue, I think it the beſt thing of the kind that Xenophon has written, and a moſt perfect model of the Socratic method of teaching. It has not the defect which I have obſerved in the Memorabilia, I mean the want of philoſophy; for there is e-

* There is juſt in the end of this dialogue a moſt admirable correction of the text by Henry Stephen, which is as ingenious as it is neceſſary, the paſſage being abſolutely unintelligible without it.

nough of philoſophy in it, and more would have been ſuperfluous and even ridiculous.

I come now to ſpeak of the laſt work of Xenophon I mentioned, the *Hieron*, or *Tyrannus*. It is undoubtedly a work of invention, as I believe the Oeconomics to be, but of more ſimple compoſition than the Oeconomics; for there is in it no dialogue within a dialogue: Yet it is a moſt poetical piece; for it has a *Peripeteia*, a change from one *contrary* to another, which both ſurpriſes and pleaſes. The ſubject of it is the compariſon of the life of a private man, and of a tyrant; by which name the Greeks deſigned any man, who governed a free people without their conſent, whether he governed well or ill. The interlocutors are Hieron the tyrant of Syracuſe, and Simonides the poet, who aſks at Hieron, what the difference was betwixt the private and tyrannical life, in point of happineſs or miſery? Which difference, ſays he, nobody ſhould know better than you, who have had the experience of both. In anſwer to this queſtion, Hieron deſires Simonides to enumerate to him all the different plea-

ſures ranged under their ſeveral heads, which a man in private life enjoys. This diviſion of pleaſures was what Simonides was, no doubt, more capable of making accurately than Hieron, being a greater philoſopher than he. Upon this Simonides enumerates all the pleaſures both of body and of mind: And Hieron ſhows, that in every one of theſe the tyrant was inferior to the private man. This he does in almoſt a continued diſcourſe, with but few interruptions by queſtions from Simonides, putting him in mind of the particular pleaſures he had enumerated. Then he proceeds to ſhow what a miſerable life of fear, ſuſpicion, and diſtruſt of every body a tyrant led; and how much that band of foreign mercenaries, which he was obliged to maintain at the expence of the people for the defence of his perſon and government, muſt make him hated by the people. Then he goes on to ſhow how much happier he was as a private man: But, ſays he, what is worſt of all, I cannot now make the exchange, and return to my former life; for then I muſt ſuffer all the puniſhment which the hatred of the people

makes them think I deſerve. He concludes, therefore, that the beſt thing he can do, is to hang himſelf.

Here then we have the Fable, as it may be called, wrought up to a criſis, and the knot fairly tied, which Simonides unties in the diſcourſe that follows; wherein he proves, that, if a tyrant be a good man, and govern as he ought to do, he will enjoy every pleaſure, whether of mind or body, in much greater perfection than a private man can do, and particularly the pleaſure of being loved, admired, and praiſed: And even his body-guard of foreigners, Simonides proves, that, if he employed them properly, he might make them the inſtruments of procuring ſtill more the love of his people. 'Governing in this way,' ſays he, 'you ſhall not only be loved, admired, 'and praiſed by your ſubjects, but by all 'thoſe who hear of you. All your peo- 'ple ſhall rejoice in the good things you 'enjoy, and ſhall defend you and fight for 'you, as they would do for themſelves; 'and the wealth of your friends ſhall be 'as much yours as theirs. Take courage,

'therefore, Hiero; enrich your friends; 'for, in doing ſo, you will enrich your- 'ſelf. Add to the wealth and power of 'the ſtate, which will be adding to your 'own. Procure allies to it. Think that 'your country is your houſe, your citi- 'zens your companions, your friends your 'children, your children your very life 'and ſoul. All theſe endeavour to over- 'come in good offices; and, if in that 'way you overcome your friends, your e- 'nemies never can ſtand before you. All 'this if you do, be aſſured, that you ſhall 'attain to the nobleſt and happieſt ſtate 'among men. You ſhall be happy, and 'not be envied.' With this fine epilogue the piece concludes.

Theſe are my obſervations upon the didactic works of Xenophon, which, I think, ought to be moſt carefully ſtudied, both for their matter and their ſtile. As to the matter, beſides the excellent practical philoſophy that is contained in it, we have more of the manners and private life of the Athenians, than is any where elſe to be found. And the ſtile is exactly the ſtile

of Attic converſation, which I hold to be as perfect of the kind as their hiſtorical, oratorial, or poetical ſtile: And I would deſire thoſe, who chooſe to be critics, and to be able to diſtinguiſh accurately different ſtiles from one another, to compare the ſtile of thoſe converſations, which Xenophon has given us, with the hiſtorical ſtile of Thucydides, and the oratorial ſtile of Demoſthenes, not to mention the ſtile of their tragic poets, which is ſo different from that of Xenophon, that no man can be ſo unlearned in criticiſm, or ſo void of natural taſte, as not to perceive the difference in the diction, as well as in the numbers. I will only add upon this ſubject, that, when Xenophon departs from the ſtile of converſation, which he does in the ſtory from Prodicus, *of the Judgment of Hercules*, and affects a higher ſtile, he does not at all pleaſe me. For the ſpeech of Virtue there is too full of *antitheſes*, and of παρισωσεις, and παρομοιωσεις, that is, ſentences of the ſame length, and the ſame conſtruction and arrangement of the words, and has not that variety in the compoſition, which I hold to be eſſential to all fine writing.

CHAP. II.

Plato the greateſt dialogiſt of antient or modern times.—His dialogues reckoned by Ariſtotle Pieces of poetry.—He has imitated Homer in two things, of never appearing himſelf in his works, and in mixing the narrative with the dramatic.—His dialogues therefore very properly divided into dramatic, narrative, and mixed.—Great variety in his narrative dialogues.—Some of his dialogues have only the form of dialogues, but not the nature; ſuch as the ten books de Republica, *and the twelve* de Legibus.—*The* Protagoras, *the fineſt of all Plato's dialogues, conſidered as a poetical compoſition.—A particular account of it.—The ſcenery in it, and the various turns and incidents in it, particularly fine.—It concludes with a change of the opinions maintained by the two diſputants, which*

may be called the cataſtrophe of the piece.—The next moſt beautiful dialogue in Plato, is the Gorgias.*—Not neceſſary to give ſo particular an account of it.—Of the* manner *of teaching of Plato in his dialogues.—It is for the greateſt part only refutation.—This more agreeable to the character of Socrates than plain teaching.—Of the* matter *of the dialogues of Plato.—It is chiefly moral and political, but with a great mixture of the doctrines of the Eleatic and Pythagorean philoſophy, and of the philoſophy of ideas, which he brought from Egypt, as well as the doctrine of the Trinity.—The two laſt mentioned, the moſt valuable part of the philoſophy of Plato.—His philoſophy of morals defective, in not knowing that the principle of morals was the* το καλον, *and in not defining what the* το καλον *is, though he has mentioned it ſo often.—His logic and dialectic, too imperfect, compared with thoſe of Ariſtotle.—His philoſophy of Nature likewiſe not ſo good as the Pythagorean work from which he has copied it.—His ſyſtem of government not ſo good neither as that which the Je-*

ſuits actually put in practice in Paraguay.—The Theology therefore of Plato, the beſt part of his philoſophy.—This exalts the mind above human affairs and all things on earth.—This philoſophy ſhould be moſt cultivated in a degenerate ſtate of a nation:—This practiſed by the the Alexandrine ſchool.—Of the ſtile *of Plato.—This immoderately praiſed by Cicero, but with a proper diſtinction by the Halicarnaſſian.—His chief beauty of ſtile is in the numbers of his compoſition, of which we have no perception.—His works upon the whole are very valuable and ought to be carefully ſtudied.—They are the beſt preparation for the philoſophy of Ariſtotle, and particularly for his logic.*

I COME now to ſpeak of Plato's manner of teaching. He is the greateſt of all dialogiſts that have come down to us from antient times, or, I believe, that ever was; for he has written a very great number of dialogues, and nothing but in dialogue, except ſome epiſtles. His dialogues, as I have

obſerved, are very different in every reſpect from thoſe of Xenophon, whoſe dialogues are real converſations, at leaſt, in the *Memorabilia*, of which, I am perſuaded, Xenophon took notes or memorandums, and from thence the name in Greek by which they are called απομνημονευτα: Whereas the dialogues of Plato are pieces of poetry, where you have fables, manners, characters, and incidents, and ſometimes changes which ſurpriſe us, and therefore may be called περιπετειαι. It is for this reaſon that Ariſtotle very properly, I think, reckons the Σωκρατικοι λογοι, by which he certainly means the Socratic philoſophy in Plato's dialogues, as a ſpecies of poetry *. We are informed by Diogenes Laertius, that Plato in his early youth ſhowed an inclination towards poetry, and actually wrote ſome poetical pieces: And, I think, it is evident, both from the form he has given to theſe dialogues and their ſtile, that he had a genius for poetry; and if ſo, it was very natural that he ſhould give a poetical form to his philoſophy.

* Ariſtotle in the beginning of his *Poetics*.

And here I cannot help obſerving, that it is a moſt abſurd charge which a French author, the Marquis De L'Argent, makes againſt Plato, of pretending to impoſe upon the public fictitious converſations for real. A man muſt indeed be a wretched critic, who cannot diſcover that Plato's dialogues are poetical pieces, not intended to paſs for hiſtorical facts.

There is one thing in which Plato has imitated Homer, the great maſter of all poetry, dramatic as well as epic, and that is, he never appears himſelf, neither as an interlocutor, nor as a narrator: And in another thing he has alſo imitated him, that he has mixed together narrative and dialogue in many of his pieces, in which he has introduced ſome perſon narrating the converſation. Of this kind are the *Alcibiades firſt* and *ſecond*, the *Sophiſta*, the *Politicus*, the whole twelve *Books of Laws*, and indeed the greater part of his dialogues. But he has varied a good deal the form in theſe narrative dialogues: For ſometimes Socrates himſelf, and who is commonly the principal figure in every piece, is made

the narrator, as in the *Protagoras*, the books *de Republica*, and many others. At other times the converſation is narrated by one who was not preſent, but had it from Socrates, as in the *Theaetetes*, where the time of the action is after the death of Socrates. Sometimes the converſation is repeated only from memory: At other times it is read from notes, which the narrator took of it, as in the laſt mentioned dialogue of the *Theaetetes*. Sometimes the perſon, to whom the narrative is addreſſed, is not mentioned; ſo that the narration is to nobody, ſo far as appears, as in the Ἐρασται, the books *de Republica*, and many others. At other times, a perſon is mentioned, to whom the narration is made, but without any character or name other than that of Ἑταιρος, or *companion*, as in the caſe of the *Protagoras*; but at other times he has a name and character, as in *Theaetetes*. Some of the dialogues are altogether dramatical, without any narrative either in the introduction or intermixed with the converſation. Such is the *Eutyphron*, the firſt dialogue in the way they are commonly arranged, and many others. Theſe perfect-

ly reſemble the ſcenes of a comedy, where you get no information from any narrative, but only from what the perſons of the drama ſay to one another. That diviſion, therefore, of the dialogues of Plato, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his life, I think a very proper diviſion of them, as far as relates to their form and compoſition, into dramatical, narrative, and mixed.

All this variety in the form of the compoſition, together with the variety of ſubject and ſtile, of characters and manners, makes theſe dialogues of Plato the moſt agreeable of all writing to a man who has a taſte both for poetry and philoſophy. And, ſuppoſing that the reader had no taſte for the admirable philoſophy contained in them, but only for the poetry, I think, as a critic and a man of taſte, he ought to be much entertained: For there is in ſome of them a fable and ſtory, which is ſometimes highly wrought up, and finely diverſified by incidents, particularly in ſuch of them as are narrated; for in ſome of theſe there are ſcenes admirably painted, and a variety of action introduced, as well

as of converſation. This is particularly the caſe of the *Protagoras*, where the ſcene is ſo well deſcribed, that we could not have a more lively idea of it, if we were to ſee it repreſented on the ſtage.

At the ſame time it is proper to obſerve, that his two greateſt works, though they be called dialogues, have nothing more but the form; for they are truly ſyſtems of ſcience, in which queſtions are aſked by the perſon who delivers the ſyſtem, but to which the interlocutors anſwer only *Yes* or *No*. The two works I mean, are his ten books *de Republica*, and his twelve *de Legibus*. Both of theſe have a *place*, which is indeed eſſential to a drama; but *time* is as neceſſary. Now, neither of theſe is circumſcribed by *time*: And, as I have obſerved elſewhere *, the dialogues are ſo long, that it is impoſſible they could have been finiſhed in any *time* that we can ſuppoſe men to be kept together, without interruption of one kind or another. In the beginning of the books *de Republica*, there is

* Vol. 4. p. 345. of this work.

what may be properly called a dialogue, which continues till about the middle of the ſecond book; and we are informed upon what occaſion the company met, and how Socrates was led on to give a ſyſtem of what he underſtood to be a perfect government. In the books *de Legibus*, though there be more dialogue, there is no introduction at all to it; for it begins directly with one of four travellers upon the road in Crete, aſking a queſtion at the others, Whether it was a God or a Man who firſt gave laws to men? To this one of them, who was a Cretan, anſwers. And ſo the converſation goes on for four books; after which, the Athenian ſtranger gives them a ſyſtem of laws in the other eight books, with little interruption of queſtions.

The *Protagoras*, which I mentioned above, is the fineſt of all the dialogues of Plato, conſidered as a poetical compoſition; for there is more ſcenery and action in it, a greater variety of turns and incidents, and more imitation of characters and manners, than are to be found in any other of

his dialogues. I think it, therefore, not improper to give a more particular account of it than of any other.

In this dialogue Socrates relates to a companion of his, who is not named, that one Hippocrates, an acquaintance of Socrates, a young man of a keen violent ſpirit, came to him very early in the morning before it was day, to let him know that the great ſophiſt Protagoras was come to town, and lodged in the houſe of one Callias;—informing Socrates at the ſame time of his moſt earneſt deſire to be the ſcholar of Protagoras, and, as he took money for teaching, to give him all that he had of his own, and all that he could procure from his friends. This naturally led Socrates to inquire what he was to learn of Protagoras, for which he was to pay ſo high a price. Hippocrates was much puzzled to anſwer this queſtion, and plainly ſhowed he did not well know what he would be at. In this converſation they paſſed the time till the day broke; and it ended in their reſolving to go to Protagoras, and aſk him, what he pretended to teach, and then to adviſe with his friends

whether he ſhould go to ſchool to him. After this follows a ſcene with the porter of Callias's houſe, who having been much troubled with the great reſort to the houſe, of ſophiſts, and others, who wanted to ſee Protagoras, refuſed at firſt to give them admittance. After they got in, they found there not only Protagoras, but two other famous ſophiſts, Hippias and Prodicus, each of them in different attitudes and ſituations, which are all very finely painted. Protagoras, the chief figure in the piece, was walking in the portico;—he in the middle, and ſo many, whom Socrates names, on each ſide of him. Behind them was a train of followers, whom Protagoras had collected from the different cities of Greece where he had been. This chorus, as Socrates calls them, followed moſt obſequiouſly, liſtening to what Protagoras ſaid, and carefully turning when he turned, ſo that they might never be before him, or interfere with him, nor any ways diſturb the order of the proceſſion. Socrates, after having ſpent ſome time in ſeeing all this, addreſſed himſelf to Protagoras, and told him upon what buſineſs they were come, deſiring to know, whether he choſe to converſe with them in

private or before all the company. Protagoras choſe the laſt, being deſirous to ſhow himſelf as much as poſſible. He then gave an account of himſelf and his art, which ended by anſwering to Socrates's queſtion, 'What he profeſſed to teach?' That he profeſſed to teach Virtue, and to make men good citizens and good maſters of families. Upon this Socrates ſtated a doubt, whether Virtue was a thing that could be taught. In anſwer to which, Protagoras firſt told a ſtory, or fable, concerning the origin of the human race and of the political life; and then he anſwered more particularly Socrates's arguments. When he had done, Socrates was ſo charmed with what he had heard, that he ſtood for ſome time like one enchanted, ſtill in the poſture of liſtening. This deſcription our Milton has almoſt tranſlated, at leaſt more cloſely copied than he is in uſe to do. The paſſage I allude to, is in the beginning of Book Eighth of Paradiſe Loſt, where Milton deſcribes the effect of the Angel's voice upon Adam, in theſe words:

'The Angel ended, and in Adam's ear
'So charming left his voice, that he a while
'Thought him ſtill ſpeaking, ſtill ſtood fixt to hear.'

After this Socrates began to queſtion Protagoras about what he had ſaid, of the Virtues being different from one another. This led to a cloſe diſpute in the dialectic manner of queſtion and anſwer, in which Protagoras being puzzled and confounded, betook himſelf to the haranguing method, and, inſtead of making a ſhort and direct anſwer to Socrates's queſtions, ran out into a long diſſertation. This Socrates complained of, and ſaid, that, having a ſhort memory, he could not diſpute in that way; and therefore, if Protagoras would not go on with him as he had begun, there muſt be an end of the converſation. Upon which he roſe to go away; but all the company interpoſed, earneſtly deſiring that the converſation might be continued. Upon this occaſion, Hippias and Prodicus, each of them, made a ſpeech, in which Plato has imitated the manner of thoſe two ſophiſts. Hippias's ſtile is pompous, panegyrical, and full of metaphors and figures, ſuch as he was accuſtomed to uſe in the great aſſemblies at the games. But Prodicus's ſtile was accurate and critical, affecting to uſe words in their moſt proper ſignification, and di-

ſtinguiſhing nicely betwixt words ſeemingly of the ſame ſignification. One of the company propoſed that Protagoras ſhould be allowed to anſwer in what manner he pleaſed, and that Socrates ſhould have the ſame liberty. But here Alcibiades, who by this time was come in, interpoſed, and ſaid, it was not fair, that, as Socrates had ſaid he could only diſpute in the one way, while Protagoras profeſſed to diſpute both ways, Socrates ſhould not have his choice of the only way in which he could keep up the argument. At laſt it ended in this, that Protagoras might have his choice, whether he would aſk or anſwer, or, as it is expreſſed in Greek, *give or receive a reaſon*, but that the argument muſt go on in the way of queſtion and anſwer. Protagoras choſe the part of queſtioning, and began with a paſſage of Simonides, concerning the meaning of which he interrogated Socrates, who at firſt was a good deal puzzled; but at laſt having given an anſwer, which ſeemed ſatisfactory to the company, and Protagoras having no more to aſk, Socrates began again where he had left off, concerning the difference of the

Virtues, and aſked Protagoras, whether he ſtill maintained that the Virtues were all different from one another. To which Protagoras anſwered, that at leaſt Fortitude was different from the reſt. The argument being thus confined, the debate went on, Socrates maintaining that Fortitude, as well as the other virtues, was nothing but Knowledge or Science. And ſo far we are ſure, that Plato has not miſrepreſented the philoſophy of Socrates; for we are told by Xenophon, that it was one of the peculiar tenets of Socrates, *that all virtue was ſcience.* The debate ended in Protagoras being at laſt ſilenced; and, when preſſed by Socrates to bring the argument to a concluſion, anſwered only by a nod. But through the whole argument Socrates behaves with the greateſt politeneſs, abſtaining from every thing that looked like inſult, or even raillery, upon the advantages he had obtained, and at laſt concludes with putting them both upon the ſame footing, by ſhowing, that they had both loſt ſight of the argument with which they ſet out, and had fairly changed ſides in the diſpute. 'For I,' ſays Socrates, 'began with main-

'taining that Virtue could not be taught; 'whereas you, Protagoras, maintained that 'it could: But, as the diſpute went on, I 'maintained that all Virtue was Science, in 'which caſe it certainly might be taught; 'whereas you maintained that it was not 'Science, the conſequence of which was, 'that it could not be taught.' This dialogue, therefore, may be ſaid, without exaggeration, to be the moſt elegant and polite philoſophical comedy that ever was written.

The moſt beautiful dialogue in Plato, conſidered as a poetical piece, next to the *Protagoras*, is the *Gorgias*. But, after having given ſo full an analyſis of the Protagoras, I will ſay no more of the Gorgias, except that there are in it various turns and incidents, and changes of perſon as well as of ſubject, which make it a very beautiful compoſition.

Of the two manners of teaching I have mentioned, refutation is that which Plato uſes; by which Socrates convinces thoſe with whom he converſes, that they did not know what they thought they knew, and

conſequently were both ignorant and vain; and there is very little plain teaching in Plato, except in the books of Polity and of Laws. And indeed, as Socrates profeſſed to know nothing, and was directed by the oracle, as Plato has informed us in the *Apology*, and likewiſe by Dreams, and in every other way by which the Gods ſignified their will to men, to go about and convince his citizens that they were as ignorant as he, and ſo far more ignorant, that they did not know they were ignorant *, whatever is delivered by Socrates in the way of ſyſtem or ſcience may be conſidered as out of character.

And thus much for the *manner* of Plato in his dialogues. As to the *matter*, the ſubject of by far the greater part of them is Morals and Government. It was only upon theſe ſubjects that Socrates philoſophiſed. Whatever, therefore, we have in Plato upon other ſubjects, is taken from other ſchools. Thus, what we have on the

* See more upon this ſubject, p. 299.

ſubject of dialectic in the *Sophiſta* and *Politicus*, is from the Eleatic ſchool: What is in the *Timaeus*, upon the ſubject of natural philoſophy, is from the Italic ſchool; and his Doctrine of Ideas, which was thought to be peculiar to him, I am perſuaded, he brought with him from Egypt, as well as the Doctrine of the Trinity, which he has not publiſhed in his Dialogues, but kept as a ſecret to be communicated only to the few initiated in the myſteries of his philoſophy *; or, perhaps, he

* This appears from a letter of his to Dionyſius, the tyrant of Sicily, the ſecond epiſtle in the order in which they are printed. He mentions the myſtery of the Trinity very ſhortly and enigmatically; that, as he tells him, if the letter met with any accident, and fell into other hands, it might not be underſtood. He mentions alſo in the ſame letter another myſtery of philoſophy, viz. the Origin of Evil. This he ſpeaks of as a very great myſtery, which very few of his followers had been able to learn. He ſays that he never had written upon the ſubject, and never would; becauſe ſuch things were not fit to be communicated to the vulgar. He therefore deſires Dionyſius, if he wiſhes to be informed about them, to correſpond with him by the means of one Archidemus, who was to go betwixt them; and he adviſes Dionyſius to write nothing upon the ſubject himſelf, and to burn this letter after reading it over and over again. His doctrine of the

found this myſtical philoſophy in the books of the Pythagoreans of Italy, ſome of which Laertius tells us he purchaſed at a great

Trinity, however, came to be pretty well known among his followers of later times, one of whom, by name *Amelius*, wonders how ſo ſublime a Theology ſhould be found in the works of a barbarian; (ſo he calls St John the Evangeliſt *). But I thought it had been known only to the Platonic philoſophers and thoſe of the Alexandrine ſchool, till a learned and worthy gentleman of my acquaintance in London, Dr Heberden, ſhowed me a paſſage in Seneca's *Conſolatio ad Helviam*, from which it appears, that it was known to the Stoics. His words are, ſpeaking of the misfortune that had befallen this woman: 'Id actum eſt, mihi crede, ab illo, 'quiſquis formator univerſi fuit, ſive ille Deus eſt po-'tens omnium, ſive incorporalis ratio, ingentium ope-'rum artifex, ſive divinus ſpiritus, per omnia maxima 'ac minima, aequali intentione diffuſus, ſive fatum et 'immutabilis cauſarum inter ſe cohaerentium ſeries.' Senecae *Conſol. ad Helviam*, cap. 8. edit. Lipſii, p. 77. This Theology with other ſciences came from Egypt to India, where at this day the doctrine of the three perſons of the Deity in one Subſtance, is an eſſential part of the Creed of the Bramins; and they call thoſe perſons by the ſame names that we do, *the Father*, *the*

* See *Euſebii Praepar. Evangel.* lib. 2. cap. 14. & 20. See alſo what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, vol. 1. of this work, p. 8. of ſecond edition.

price. But the Pythagorean philoſophy, as is well known, came likewiſe from that country.

This philoſophy is what Xenophon, in his letter to Eſchines, calls the τερατωδης σοφια, or *monſtrous philoſophy*, (as, I think, it may be tranſlated), of Egypt and of Pythagoras. Theſe two, he very fitly joins together; as, I think, there is no doubt, that Pythagoras learned that philoſophy in Egypt. But, for my part, I hold, that this ſame philoſophy is the beſt that is to be found in the writings of Plato; for, though Morals, as I have obſerved, are the chief ſubject of his dialogues, yet his philoſophy in them is ſo defective, that he has not told us that the true princi-

Son, and *the Holy Ghoſt*. The firſt in their language is *Rama*, the ſecond *Viſnou*, and the third *Criſna*. This fact is told in a French book written by one LA CROZE, entitled *Hiſtoire du Chriſtianiſme des Indes*, vol 2. book 4. p. 48. And he relates it upon the credit of one Manuel Godinho, a Portugueſe, who was in India in the year 1663. And I have heard the fact atteſted by an acquaintance of mine who had been many years in India.

ple of every virtuous action is the το καλον, or *beautiful;* which is the more ſurpriſing, that, in almoſt every page of his writings upon the ſubject of morals, he ſpeaks of the το καλον. That this was well known in the Pythagorean ſchool, I have ſhown elſewhere *: And Ariſtotle, who appears to have got more of the Pythagorean books than Plato, or to have peruſed them more diligently, has laid it down expreſsly, that there can be no virtue without a ſenſe of the το καλον, or the *pulchrum* and *honeſtum;* and that for the ſake of it, virtue is practiſed †. Inſtead of this, Plato has been at great pains to prove in the *Protagoras*, that Virtue is no more than a ſcience, like geometry or arithmetic; and that, therefore, he, who underſtands what

* Preface to Antient Metaphyſics, p. 33.

† Beſides the paſſages I have quoted from Ariſtotle in the preface above mentioned, there is one in his *Magna Moralia*, (Lib. 2. cap. 7. *v. finem*,) where he ſays, that the ὁρμη προς το καλον is more the principle of virtue than λογος, or *reaſon:* For, ſays he, in the practice of virtue, the ὁρμη muſt begin and carry on the practice, while reaſon only directs and approves. The ὁρμη therefore is the leading principle.

virtue is, is virtuous, as a man, who is learned in geometry or arithmetic, is a geometer or arithmetician. And another fault I find with Plato's philoſophy, that, though he ſpeaks ſo much of the το καλον, he has never ſo much as attempted to define it; whereas Ariſtotle has given us two popular definitions of it, and, if his treatiſe upon the ſubject had been preſerved, we ſhould no doubt have had a preciſe philoſophical definition of it *.

As to his books *de Republica*, the ſyſtem of government there contained is altogether romantic, and ſuch as was never ſo much as attempted to be executed; and in theory I think, it is not ſo good a ſyſtem, as that which was actually put in practice by the Jeſuits in Paraguay. This was a government by religion and philoſophy, which made the people happier than, I believe, any people ever were; and it is, perhaps, the moſt extraordinary fact in the hiſtory of mankind, that ſuch a govern-

* See what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, Metaphyſ. vol. 2. p. 105. where I have endeavoured to ſupply the defect of Plato's philoſophy, and the loſs of Ariſtotle's work.

ment ſhould have been eſtabliſhed among ſavages, and in the middle of ſavage nations inhabiting a great Continent, by men come from ſuch a diſtance, and who were born and bred in what may be called another world. It is a fact not much known, but of which I have had an opportunity of being pretty well informed both by books and converſation *.

This is Plato's philoſophy of morals and government. What he has given us by way of *logic* or *dialectic*, as he calls it, is certainly not comparable to what Ariſtotle has left us in his books of Analytics and Topics, in which he has properly diſtinguiſhed betwixt Logic and Dialectic. And, as to his Philoſophy of Nature, if there be any merit in it, it certainly does not belong to him; but to Timaeus the Pythagorean: And, as his original work is preſerved to us, I muſt own, that I prefer it to the diffuſe commentary, which Plato has given us in his dialogue inſcribed *Timæus*.

* There is a book upon the ſubject in Italian by one MURATORI, and tranſlated into Engliſh, entitled, *A Relation of the Miſſions of Paraguay*. I would recommend it to the reader, if he deſire to be informed of ſo extraordinary an event.

The Theology, therefore, of Plato, and which was afterwards cultivated in the Alexandrine ſchool, is undoubtedly a more ſublime philoſophy than that of Socrates in Xenophon, allowing the Socratic philoſophy to be a perfect ſyſtem of morals: For it is the wiſdom of the Egyptians, into which Moſes was initiated *, and it is the knowledge of divine things which are ſo connected with human, that, without the knowledge of the one, we cannot perfectly underſtand the other; for which reaſon the antients very properly defined philoſophy to be the *knowledge of things divine and human.* It therefore elevates the mind more than any other philoſophy known in Greece, raiſing it much above human affairs and all things of this earth, and thereby preparing it for that higher ſtate to which we are to be exalted, if we live here as we ought to do.

It was this ſublime Theology of Plato which made the Fathers of the Chriſtian Church ſtudy and admire his philoſophy

* See p. 301.

ſo much. St Auguſtine ſays, that there is no great difference betwixt his Theology and the Chriſtian *. And in another paſſage he ſays, that thoſe, who have ſtudied Plato's philoſophy, are ſo diſpoſed, *ut, paucis verbis et ſententiis mutatis, Chriſtiani fierent, ſicut plerique recentiorum noſtrorumque temporum Platonici fecerunt* †. And Origin, in his work againſt Celſus, tells us, that Celſus thought the conformity was ſo great, that he believed Jeſus Chriſt had ſtudied the works of Plato: And, with reſpect to its conformity with the Old Teſtament, there is one Eumelius, a Pythagorean philoſopher, who calls Plato the Attic Moſes.

So ſublime a philoſophy, as that of Plato, ought certainly to be the ſtudy of every man who applies to philoſophy, if it be his misfortune to live in an age and nation of which the morals are ſo corrupted, that no man of ſenſe and pru-

* *Sti.* Auguſt. opera, tom. 1. p. 748.; tom. 2. p. 337. of the Benedictine edition.

† Ibid. tom. 1. p. 750.

dence (not to ſpeak of a philoſopher) will chooſe to take any concern in their public affairs. The greateſt admirers of modern times will not, I hope, be affronted, if I ſuppoſe it poſſible, that, even in the happy age in which we live, there may be a nation ſuch as the Athenians were in the days of Socrates. Now at that time Socrates, in the Apology that Plato has made for him, ſays, that he was forbid, by the genius which attended him, to meddle with public affairs; and he adds, that, if he had not taken the warning, he could not then have been alive, perſevering, as he was always reſolved to do, in what was juſt and right; and of this he gives a very ſtrong proof from fact and experience. Now, if it was ſo in Athens, I think, we may ſuppoſe, that there are nations in Europe in which a man of ſenſe, experience, and obſervation, though no philoſopher, would, without any warning from heaven, be extremely averſe to engage in public affairs, from a conviction that he could be of no real ſervice to his country: And, if he were a philoſopher, he would know that it was impoſſible he could do any good, for which

it would be worth his while to ſacrifice his time and philoſophic eaſe. And, I am afraid, his opinion of the riſing generation would be ſuch, that, if the deſperate remedy were to be uſed, propoſed by Heraclitus, the philoſopher, to his countrymen the Epheſians for the reformation of their manners, of hanging all thoſe above the age of *ten*, it would be fruitleſs, as there would not be in their children neither minds nor bodies, of which by any education good men could be made. Nothing, therefore, will be left for ſuch a man, if he had a mind to be of any uſe to the public, except to go about, as Socrates did in Athens, convincing every man with whom he converſed, that he had neither virtue nor wiſdom, though he believed he had both; and that therefore he ought to beſtow his whole time and attention to acquire them. The conſequence of this might not be, that he ſhould be put to death as Socrates was, but he would certainly make almoſt every body his enemy, and would, I am perſuaded, have many fewer followers and admirers than Socrates, if he had any at all; ſo that in reality he would do

no good, at the ſame time that he made his own life very troubleſome and diſagreeable.

What then is a man of a philoſophical turn to do in ſuch a nation as I have deſcribed? And I think the beſt thing he can do is, what the philoſophers of the Alexandrine ſchool, Plotinus, Porphyry, and the reſt of them, did; which was to apply to that ſublime philoſophy above mentioned, which raiſed them above all the cares of this world; and, joined with that cathartic diet (as they called it) which they practiſed, not only prepared them for a better life after this, but exalted them to a communication with ſuperior intelligences even during this life. In this manner were Plotinus and his ſcholar Porphyry exalted, as I have elſewhere obſerved *.

As to the *ſtile* of Plato, it is very highly praiſed by Cicero, who ſays, that Jupiter, if he were to ſpeak Greek, would ſpeak like Plato †. And I don't wonder, that an

* Vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphyſ. p. 140.

† Quis enim liberior in dicendo Platone? Jovem ſic, ut aiunt philoſophi, ſi Graece loquatur, loqui. Cicer. de Clar. Orat.

author, who is ſo copious and diffuſe himſelf, ſhould praiſe the ſtile of an author who is more ſo than any I know in Greek. But the Halicarnaſſian, whom I hold to be a much better critic than Cicero, diſtinguiſhes, I think, very properly betwixt the ſtile of the Socratic dialect in Plato, which he allows to be admirable, and his dithyrambic ſtile in the Phædrus, or his oratorial in the Menexenus; and he goes ſo far as to ſay, that, in the long periphraſes, with which he ſtudies to amplify and adorn his ſtile, he does not even write Greek, κακως ἑλληνιζει. What he commends moſt in the ſtile of Plato, is a beauty, which, I am afraid, we have not *ears to hear*; I mean the *numbers* of his compoſition, in which, he ſays, he equals Demoſthenes, though far inferior to him in the choice of words.

But whatever fault I find with the ſtile of Plato, and though I do not approve much of any part of his philoſophy, except his Theology, yet I am clearly of opinion that he ſhould be read before the philoſophy of Ariſtotle, as the beſt intro-

duction to that philoſophy: For it prepares us for being taught by Ariſtotle, as it convinces us that we do not know;—a preparation which, as I have obſerved, is abſolutely neceſſary for learning any thing; and it ſtarts ſo many doubts, difficulties, and puzzling queſtions, that, if we have any thing of the philoſophical genius in us, our curioſity and deſire of learning muſt be excited; and, if we can find a ſatisfying anſwer to thoſe queſtions in Ariſtotle, or any other philoſopher, we are wonderfully pleaſed. For example, whoever has ſtudied the Theaetetes of Plato, wherein a moſt important queſtion of philoſophy, and indeed the foundation of all philoſophy, and of all ſcience of every kind, is treated, viz. What ſcience is, and where ſo many opinions upon that ſubject are propoſed, and all refuted, muſt feel the greateſt ſatisfaction in finding it ſo fully anſwered in the logical works of Ariſtotle. Nor will he be ſurpriſed that Ariſtotle has written ſo much to anſwer a queſtion of ſuch importance, about which Plato has diſputed ſo much but taught nothing, (according to the diſtinction made by the

ſchoolmen betwixt theſe two philoſophers), and a queſtion which Pilate, the Roman Governour, thought proper to aſk at our Saviour, and which ſhows that Pilate was ſo far advanced in philoſophy as to have doubts and difficulties upon a point that very few of this age ever think of.

And here I conclude what I have to ſay upon the Socratic method of teaching as practiſed by Xenophon and Plato. In my next chapter I am to ſpeak of a didactic ſtile quite different; I mean the ſtile of Ariſtotle.

CHAP. III.

The philoſophy of Ariſtotle quite complete;—the ſeveral parts of it enumerated.—Obſervations upon the matter *of it, beginning with* Logic.—*The ſubject of Logic is to let us know what ſcience is.—The neceſſity of this.—No man can truly underſtand any ſcience without knowing what ſcience is.—Mr Locke's account of ſcience, compared with Ariſtotle's.—It is altogether imperfect and deficient.—Mr Locke ſays, that the diviſion of things into* genus *and* ſpecies *is artificial, and has no foundation in nature;—the conſequence of this, that* truth *has no foundation in nature.—It ſubverts alſo the fundamental doctrine of Theology.—Of the* Dialectic *of Ariſtotle,—firſt reduced by him to an art;—not demonſtrative reaſoning, ſuch as that taught by his Logic;—neither is it an art of ſophiſtry, but a way of reaſoning that is very uſeful.—Of the* Mo-

rals *of Ariſtotle;—he is very full upon that ſubject;—has written four ſeveral treatiſes upon it.—His ſyſtem of Morals, much better than that of Plato, in two reſpects,* —firſt, *that he has given us the true principle of moral actions;—and,* ſecondly, *that he makes the proper diſtinction betwixt our intellectual and animal natures. —This diſtinction ſerves to explain a fundamental doctrine of Chriſtianity, viz. the* Incarnation.—*It ſerves alſo to explain that paradox of the Stoics, that the* pulchrum *and the* honeſtum *is the only good of men.—Every thing relating to the happineſs of human life is treated of in theſe Morals of Ariſtotle.—He is particularly full upon the ſubject of Friendſhip. —A new edition of theſe books ſhould be given.—Of the* political *works of Ariſtotle. —Morals and Politics among the antients, branches of the ſame ſcience.—Ariſtotle's* political *ſyſtem not founded upon viſionary ſyſtems like that of Plato, but upon fact and experience.—Ariſtotle wrote alſo two books upon* Oeconomy.—*The hiſtory of theſe books very ſingular.*

—*Of the* Phyſics *of Ariſtotle.—The philoſophy of Nature is there to be found.—No philoſophy of Nature among the moderns;—nothing but facts of natural hiſtory, calculation, and computation.—Our attempts to philoſophiſe upon nature have led to very groſs errors.—Great and important truths eſtabliſhed by Ariſtotle in his books of Phyſics;—very juſtly, therefore, celebrated by the ſchoolmen on account of his natural philoſophy—Of the* Metaphyſics *of Ariſtotle.—The nature of this ſcience.—It is the Science of ſciences, as it demonſtrates the principles of all ſciences.—Without Metaphyſics we cannot be perfectly learned in any ſcience.—Example of this in Geometry and Arithmetic.—Another example in the caſe of Logic,—alſo of natural philoſophy.*—Theology, *the higheſt part of Metaphyſics.—The Theology of Plato more ſublime than that of Ariſtotle.—The Theology of Ariſtotle, ſo far as it goes, a pure ſyſtem of Theiſm, but defective in two great points;—firſt, the Providence of God over all his works not aſſerted:—He is repreſented as paſſing his whole time in contemplation.—This a*

kind of Epicurean God.—Rejects the popular religion of his country.—The other reſpect in which his Theology is deficient, is, that he does mot make God the Author of the material world, but only the Mover of it,—does not derive from him even the minds that animate this world.

THE ſyſtem of philoſophy, which Ariſtotle has given us, is full and complete. He begins with *logic*, which he has not confounded with Dialectic and Metaphyſics, as Plato has done, but has given us a ſyſtem of Dialectic, as well as of Metaphyſics, quite diſtinct from Logic. *2dly*, He has given us the philoſophy of Morals; then he proceeds to the philoſophy of Nature, and concludes with his moſt valuable work upon the *firſt Philoſophy*, or *Metaphyſics*, as it is commonly called, which contains the principles of all the other branches of philoſophy he had treated of, and indeed of all ſciences. Before I come to ſpeak of the *ſtile* of his philoſophy, I will make ſome obſervations upon the *matter* of each of the branches of it, beginning, as Ariſtotle be-

gins, with Logic, the ſubject of which, as Ariſtotle tells us in the beginning of the *Analytics*, is to let us know what ſcience or demonſtration is. How imperfect any man's knowledge of philoſophy, or of any ſcience, muſt be, who does not ſo much as know what ſcience is, muſt be evident to every man: And indeed it appears to be abſolutely ridiculous to ſeek after ſcience upon any ſubject without knowing what ſcience is. It was therefore very proper that Ariſtotle ſhould begin his philoſophy by explaining what ſcience is. This he has done in four books, viz. the *Categories*, his book of *Interpretation*, and his *firſt* and *ſecond Analytics*: And I will venture to ſay, that, without the ſtudy of theſe books, no man living can tell what ſcience or demonſtration is. He may indeed be convinced by a demonſtrative argument; but he cannot render a reaſon for his conviction. And he is like a child, or any other perſon who has not learned the grammatical art, yet underſtands that words put together in ſuch and ſuch a manner expreſs ſuch and ſuch a thing; but by what rules

they are put together, ſo as to have that meaning and no other, he cannot explain.

To be convinced how great and difficult a work this of Ariſtotle is, we need only compare what he has ſaid upon the ſubject, with the account which is given of it by Mr Locke in his book upon the Human Underſtanding, eſteemed by many a ſtandard book of philoſophy. All that he has taken the trouble to let us know upon the ſubject is, that *ſcience*, or what is the ſame thing, *truth*, is the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our ideas. But he has not told us in what manner our ideas agree or diſagree: Neither has he taken the trouble, as Ariſtotle has done, to analyſe reaſoning into *ſimple terms*, *propoſitions*, and *ſyllogiſms*, to which all reaſoning of every kind is reducible, not knowing, as I ſuppoſe, that there can be no ſcience of any kind, without *analyſis*. He has not even accurately diſtinguiſhed in Propoſitions the Predicate from the Subject, without which there can be no knowledge either of propoſitions or ſyllogiſms *. Nay he goes

* Of the imperfections and defects of Mr Locke's

ſo far as to ſay, that the diviſion into genus and ſpecies is an artificial arrangement of things, which we make for our more eaſy comprehenſion of them *, and that therefore all *generals* are creatures of our own making, having no foundation in the nature of things †. According to his doctrine, therefore, ſcience or truth has no foundation in the nature of things: For, if there be no general ideas, nor any diſtinction of genus and ſpecies, there is no ſyllogiſm or demonſtration; becauſe all ſyllogiſm is founded upon this propoſition, that the genus contains the ſpecies, and the more general idea the leſs general. For the truth of the ſyllogiſm hangs upon this propoſition, That, if one idea contains the whole of another idea, it contains every part of that other i-

logic, ſee what I have ſaid, vol. 1. Metaphyſ. lib. 5. cap. 2. p. 382. and following.

* Eſſay on Human Underſtanding, book 3. cap. 5. ſect. 8.

† Ibid. book 3. cap. 3. ſect. 11. See what I have further ſaid of Mr Locke's philoſophy in vol. 2. p. 183. of Ant. Metaphyſ.

dea, which the ſchoolmen expreſs in this way: *Quod verum eſt de toto, verum eſt de omni.* Without knowing this, however much a man may be convinced of the truth of a ſyllogiſm, he can give no reaſon for his conviction. To prove this at more length, and to illuſtrate it by examples, would be to go too far from my ſubject. I will therefore only add, that, to deny that there is a progreſs in Nature from generals to particulars, and from what is more general to what is leſs general, till at laſt we come down to individuals where human knowledge begins, and that by a contrary progreſs proceeding from individual things to generals, and from what is leſs general to what is more general, we at laſt aſcend to that univerſal Being, in himſelf comprehending whatever exiſts in the univerſe, is to deny that fundamental principle of Theology—*That all things are in God*,—not actually indeed, (for that cannot be), but virtually, in the ſame manner that the ſpecies is in the genus*, which is contained in the ge-

* See what I have ſaid further upon this ſubject, vol. 1. Metaphyſ. lib. 5. cap. 11. p. 480. See alſo cap.

nus, and cannot be conceived to exiſt without it. And thus it appears that the principles of Logic lead directly to Theology, and that, if we deny that *generals* have an exiſtence in the nature of things, we muſt deny alſo that *Deity* exiſts.

The next work of Ariſtotle that I ſhall mention is his Dialectic, which, as I have obſerved, he firſt diſtinguiſhed from Logic, with which Plato had confounded it. It was much practiſed by the ſophiſts before his time, and likewiſe both by Plato and Ariſtotle; but Ariſtotle made an art of it, reducing it to certain heads or *Topics*, as he calls them, of which he has treated in eight books. It is a ſpecies of reaſoning that is not ſcientific, ſuch as the reaſoning which is the ſubject of his books of Logic, not being from axioms or propoſitions demonſtrated, but from propoſitions generally believed to be true, or admitted to be true by thoſe with whom you

4. of the ſame book. Who would deſire to know more of the ſyllogiſm may read what I have written in the preface to vol. 3. of Metaphyſ. p. 45. *et ſeq.* where he will alſo find it proved that Ariſtotle is not the inventor of ſo wonderful an art.

argue. It is a very uſeful art, both in common converſation, when thoſe with whom you converſe are not learned or inſtructed in the principles of any art or ſcience, and in ſpeaking to a popular aſſembly. It is therefore neceſſarily connected with rhetoric, which muſt argue not from principles of ſcience, which the hearers cannot be ſuppoſed to underſtand, but from Topics, ſuch as thoſe that Ariſtotle has treated of. I will ſay no more upon this ſubject, as I have ſpoken of it pretty fully in the firſt volume of my Metaphyſics *. I will only add, that Ariſtotle did certainly not mean in his books of Dialectic to teach an art of ſophiſtry, a thing which would have been altogether unworthy of a philoſopher, but only to enable us to convince thoſe who do not underſtand any art or ſcience, but whom, on many occaſions, it may be uſeful and even neceſſary to convince. To ſhow that he did not mean to teach ſophiſtry, he has added to his work upon dialectic a book *de Sophiſticis Elen-*

* P. 405. and following.

chis, in which he has taught us to refute the captious arguments of the ſophiſts.—And thus much for the Logic and Dialectic of Ariſtotle.

As to the philoſophy of morals, Ariſtotle has beſtowed upon it four treatiſes; the Nicomacheia, conſiſting of ten books; 2*do*, What is called the Magna Moralia, of two books; 3*tio*, The Eudemia, of ſeven books; and, *laſtly*, a ſhort treatiſe, entitled *de Virtutibus et Vitiis*, which contains nothing more than definitions of the ſeveral virtues and the oppoſite vices. It is, however, well worth reading, as it is an abridgement, very ſhort indeed, of what had been explained at great length in the preceding books. Of theſe, the firſt mentioned is the fulleſt and moſt complete, the others containing little more than explanations, in a ſtile more popular and diffuſe, of what had been ſhortly ſaid in the Nicomacheia.

The philoſophy of Ariſtotle is, I think, as complete in Morals as it is in Logic and Dialectic;—ſo complete, that nothing has

been added to it in modern times, though much has been written upon the ſubject, but what is either falſe or trifling, compared with what we have in Ariſtotle. What differences his ſyſtem from that of Plato, is, not only that he lays down diſtinctly the leading principle of morals, viz. the το καλον, which is only guided and directed by underſtanding and ſcience, whereas Plato, following Socrates, has made Virtue to be altogether ſcience; but that he has diſtinguiſhed, much better than Plato has done, betwixt our animal and intellectual nature;—a diſtinction, upon which the whole philoſophy of man depends. Plato has taken the whole compound together, and conſidered it as making only one Nature and one Subſtance, conſiſting of different parts, of which one is the Intellectual, another the Iraſcible, and a third the Concupiſcent; whereas we are truly compoſed of two Natures or Subſtances, perfectly diſtinct from one another, though intimately connected at leaſt in this life, viz. the *Intellectual* nature and the *Animal*, to which laſt, and to it only, belong the Iraſcible and the Concupiſcent; but, according to Plato, they are parts

of the whole man, without diſtinction of the two different ſubſtances of which we are compoſed. Now, Ariſtotle has made this ſo neceſſary diſtinction: He has told us, that it is the Νους, or intellectual principle in us, that makes us men; that, to live according to it, is to live the life of a man, and our own life, as he expreſſes it, not the life of another animal *.

And here I cannot help obſerving, that this ſyſtem of morals enables us to conceive that great myſtery of the Chriſtian Faith, the doctrine of the Incarnation; for, if we believe, as I think we muſt do, that the *intellectual nature* may be united, and actually is united in us, to the *animal*, what ſhould hinder us to believe that a third nature may be united to the other two? namely, the *divine*, and that it was actually ſo in the perſon of Jeſus Chriſt. And we will be the more eaſily diſpoſed to believe this, if we agree with Ariſtotle, that the human intellect has ſomething divine in it, θειοτερον τι, as he has told us in more

* *Nicomach.* lib. 9. cap. 4. et 8.; lib. 10. cap. 7.

than one place *; and it is only with reſpect to this part of our compoſition that we are ſaid in Scripture to be made *after the image of God*. And here we may obſerve, that not only the myſtery of the Trinity is to be found in the books of antient philoſophy, as I before obſerved †, but alſo that the doctrine of the Incarnation is clearly to be deduced from the principles of that philoſophy. This ſhows us how much the ſtudy of it muſt contribute to explain the language of Scripture and the doctrines of the Chriſtian Theology.

It is from Ariſtotle's ſyſtem of Morals that I have learned that the only *good* of the intellectual ſubſtance in us, and which only entitles us to the appellation of *men*, is *beauty*. So that what is commonly thought to be a violent paradox, that the *pulchrum* and *honeſtum* is the only *good* of man, is nothing but a plain truth, neceſſarily re-

* See one paſſage in lib. *De Anima*, cap. 5. See alſo what I have further ſaid upon this ſubject, vol. 1. Metaphyſ. p. 139. *et ſeq.*

† P. 338. of this vol.

ſulting from the right underſtanding of the compoſition of man *.

Theſe works of Ariſtotle upon Morals are ſo compleat, that we have in them not only every thing relating to the Virtues, but every thing relating to human felicity. And particularly upon Friendſhip, without which, he thinks, there can be no compleat happineſs in human life, he beſtows two entire books in his Nicomacheia, beſides ſeveral chapters in his other moral works; and, what muſt appear very ſtrange at firſt ſight, he makes the principle of it to be ſelf-love. But this naturally reſults from the diviſion above mentioned of our compound into the intellectual and animal life. For every man, who has worth and goodneſs in himſelf, muſt of neceſſity love himſelf, that is, he muſt love his intellectual part, which is the ſeat of worth and goodneſs; and, as his intellect is truly himſelf, he muſt therefore love himſelf: And conſequently, as worth and goodneſs are the objects of love, he muſt alſo love

* Vol. 4. p. 378.

them in other men, and that is *Friendſhip*. But, on the contrary, if he has no worth and goodneſs at home, where all our feelings and affections muſt begin, he cannot have ſo much as an idea of what worth and goodneſs are, and therefore can love or eſteem nobody, not even himſelf. It is for this reaſon, as he obſerves, that ſuch men are conſtantly flying from themſelves, and ſome of them, he ſays, go out of life to get free of themſelves *. And this reaſoning of Ariſtotle is perfectly agreeable to the common obſervation, That thoſe, who have no worth or goodneſs in their nature, are incapable of friendſhip; ſo that Ariſtotle has done no more than give the reaſon for it.

Theſe books upon Morals appear to me ſo valuable, and ſo neceſſary to be ſtudied by every man who would deſire to be inſtructed, if in no other philoſophy, at leaſt in the philoſophy of human life, that, I think, a new edition ought to be publiſhed

* See all this explained at great length, *Nicom.* lib. 8. cap. 4. et 8.

of them, and in a form which a man may carry about with him. This, I hope, will be done by the gentlemen of Oxford, to whom Greek learning is ſo much obliged; and in this edition many errors in the text will no doubt be corrected. Some of theſe, I find, I have corrected myſelf upon the margin of the edition I uſe; and ſeveral of theſe corrections I think ſo certain, that they are worthy to be received into the text, like thoſe of Harry Stephen and Sylburgius upon Dionyſius the Halicarnaſſian *. To theſe any gentleman, who will take the trouble of the edition, ſhall be welcome.

As man was deſtined by God and Nature to live in ſociety, and as no man can be perfectly happy, who does not live in a well conſtituted ſociety, the antients thought that Morals and Politics were branches of the ſame ſcience, to which they gave the general name of πολιτειαι, diſtinguiſhing the other branch of it by the name of ἠθικη, which is what we call mo-

* P. 149. and 150. of this vol.

rals; and therefore all the antient philoſophers, who have written upon Morals, have alſo treated of Politics. Plato, as we have ſeen, has written at great length upon the ſubject; and Ariſtotle has begun, but not finiſhed, a moſt valuable work upon the ſubject. As Ariſtotle was not a practical politician or ſtateſman, any more than Plato, he has ſupplied that defect, as he tells us himſelf in the end of his *Nicomacheia*, by collecting together examples of different Polities; ſo that the firſt part of his books *de Republica* contains a great deal of valuable antient hiſtory: And, had he lived to finiſh the work, I am perſuaded, we ſhould have had from him a ſyſtem of Polity as valuable as his ſyſtem of Morals. From what we have of it, we are ſure that it would not have been romantic and viſionary like that of Plato, being formed, not merely from notions of his own, but from the practice and experience of other ſtates, which Plato does not appear to have attended to.

That Ariſtotle might leave nothing concerning human life unexamined, we have

from him two books on *Oeconomy*. The fate of theſe books is ſingular enough; they were tranſlated into Latin by an Italian of the name of *Aretine*; but the original was loſt after it was tranſlated, which has happened, if I am not miſtaken, to other Greek books. But what was very ſingular in this caſe, the tranſlation of Aretine was re-tranſlated by one *Tuſcanus*, likewiſe an Italian, as I ſuppoſe, into Greek, and very good Greek, as good as the Greek of Strozza, who has given us a ſupplement in that language to Ariſtotle's books of Polity*;—ſo well was the Greek language not only underſtood, but written, at that time in Italy. In Rome, they ſay, it was ſpoken even by the ladies, ſo much it was then in faſhion. This tranſlation, Tuſcanus ſays, he made, that ſo valuable a work might not be loſt to Greece. Of this he informs us in the advertiſement which he has prefixed to his tranſlation.—And thus much for the Moral and Political works of Ariſtotle.

I come now to ſpeak of Ariſtotle's Natural Philoſophy, in which it is commonly

* See what I have ſaid of this work of Strozza, in the preface to the 3d vol. of Ant. Metaphyſ. p. 45.

thought that we moderns excel him out of all degree of compariſon. But, for my part, I am ſo dull, that I cannot find in any modern book upon the ſubject of Nature any thing that I call Philoſophy. I find, indeed, a great collection of facts of Natural Hiſtory;—more, certainly, than were known to Ariſtotle or any antient philoſopher; which is the neceſſary conſequence of the world being ſo much older, and of ſo much more being diſcovered, both of the heavens and the earth, than was known two thouſand years ago. I find alſo a great deal of geometry and mechanics, meaſuring, computing, and calculating. But that is not what I call philoſophy, which, according to my ſenſe of the word, is the ſcience of the cauſes and principles of things; for the explanation of which, it defines, divides, and ſubdivides, performing what Cicero calls *Rem univerſam tribuere in partes, latentem explicare definiendo.* Now, I cannot ſo much as learn from our books of Natural Philoſophy what *Nature* is, which I ſhould never have known if I had not ſtudied Ariſtotle: Nor ſhould I, without him, have been able to make the diſtinction betwixt God and Nature; ſo that I could not have underſtood

theſe words which are in every body's mouth; neither ſhould I have known how to diſtinguiſh Nature from Man *. It is by Ariſtotle that I have been taught the difference betwixt *things divine* and *ſublunary things*:—That theſe are conſtantly changing, but not without rule or certain determination; for the change is always from one certain ſtate to another:—That things exiſt both *in capacity* and *actuality*; and that the progreſs from the one to the other, is what we call *motion*, which, therefore, is ſomething more than *capacity* and leſs than *actuality* †. On the other hand, things divine are eternal and unchangeable, and all the productions of the firſt Cauſe are from all eternity as well as their Author; whereas on this earth the cauſes

* Vol. 2. of Ant. Metaphyſ. p. 360. in the note.

† See what I have ſaid upon the ſubject of *Motion* in vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphyſ. cap. 3. where I have ſhown that Ariſtotle's definition is taken from a moſt comprehenſive view of the nature of things, and far from deſerving the cenſure of Mr Locke, who calls it *an exquiſite piece of jargon*, knowing no more of it than what is to be learned from a barbarous Latin tranſlation.

producing are always prior in order of time. And here again we have explained to us a fundamental doctrine of Chriſtianity, 'that the Son was begotten from all eternity of the Father;—a doctrine not to be conceived, and conſequently not to be believed, by a man who has not raiſed his thoughts, by the aſſiſtance of antient philoſophy, from generation and production of beings temporary here on earth, to the production of cauſes divine and eternal. Such a production cannot be conceived in things corporeal, which are in a conſtant viciſſitude of generation and corruption, and therefore have no permanent exiſtence. But in things intellectual, ſuch as the Theorems of ſcience, it is eaſily conceived; for there what proceeds from the cauſe is coeval with the cauſe, and both are eternal. Thus the corrollary of any propoſition, though derived from the propoſition as its cauſe, is as much an eternal truth as the propoſition. *Laſtly*, From Ariſtotle we learn, that, as Nature does nothing in vain, ſo ſhe leaves nothing undone that is proper to be done. Thus we are taught to look for the final cauſes of every thing, which

are rejected by our modern Naturaliſts as improper to be inquired into, but, without the knowledge of which, we cannot have that idea we ought to have of the wiſdom and goodneſs of God; which to know, is the chief end of philoſophy.

And not only have we no philoſophy of Nature, but, as often as we have attempted to philoſophiſe upon the ſubject, we have fallen into groſs errors, tending directly to Materialiſm and Atheiſm. This, I think, I have ſhown to be the caſe of Sir Iſaac Newton's philoſophy (not to mention any other) concerning *motion*, the grand agent in all the operations of Nature, and which if we ſuppoſe to go on without mind, by a *vis inſita*, or power eſſential to *matter*, there is an end of Theiſm *.

Thus, therefore, it appears that we have no philoſophy of Nature; ſo that, if we

* See a diſſertation on the Newtonian Philoſophy, annexed to vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphyſ.; alſo the five laſt chapters of vol. 2. of that work, and the firſt appendix to vol. 3.

have a mind to be natural philoſophers, we muſt ſtudy Ariſtotle's eight books of ἀκροασεις φυσικαι, or, as they are called in Latin, *auſcultationes phyſicae*, in which all the general principles of phyſics are laid down and all the proper definitions and diviſions are given. We learn there what *body* is, which is the ſubject of natural philoſophy; that it conſiſts of *matter* and *form*, *matter* being that which is not apprehended by the ſenſe, as *body* is, but into which all bodies are ultimately reſolvable, not into the four elements only, beyond which our philoſophy does not go. He has alſo informed us in theſe books what *motion* is, the grand agent in all natural operations, and without the knowledge of which no man can be ſaid to be a natural philoſopher. And yet it is ſurpriſing, that, in the many volumes that have been written in modern times, there is not ſo much as a definition given of *motion*: And all, that our philoſophers at preſent ſeem to know of it, is, that it is *change of place*. But this is only telling us the effect of motion, not what Motion is, which produces that effect; and beſides it is only the ef-

fect of one kind of Motion. This appears to me the more ſurpriſing, that the only thing, we have like ſcience in our natural philoſophy, is meaſuring and computing Motion, and demonſtrating the laws by which it is carried on. Now it muſt appear very ſtrange that we ſhould not know what this ſubject of ſo much ſcience is. In theſe books, too, Ariſtotle examines ſeveral curious queſtions, as, Whether Motion be eternal? or, in other words, Whether the material world is not the eternal production of an eternal cauſe; alſo, Whether there be not of neceſſity a firſt mover? What time is? Whether there be ſuch a thing as a *vacuum?* and ſeveral other queſtions of great importance and curioſity: And his Phyſics conclude with ſome obſervations upon the nature of the firſt Mover, which are a proper concluſion of his Phyſics, and likewiſe a proper tranſition to his Metaphyſics, which in the order of teaching follow his Phyſics, and from thence have their name.

All theſe are queſtions which cannot be determined by facts or experiments, by

computation and calculation, which make the whole of our preſent philoſophy of nature; and yet, I think, no man will deny, that they are neceſſary to be known by every man who pretends to be a natural philoſopher.

As to facts of Natural Hiſtory, neither are theſe wanting in Ariſtotle; for, beſides the facts mentioned in different parts of his works upon Nature, which are by far the greater part of his writings, there is a great work of his entirely upon the ſubject of natural hiſtory; I mean his hiſtory of Animals, which, I think, is the moſt valuable part of natural hiſtory, far more valuable than the hiſtory of minerals or vegetables, and tending more than any thing here on earth, to ſhow the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, in directing animals, of ſo many different ſpecies, by that principle in them we call inſtinct, to do unerringly what tends to the preſervation of the individual and the continuation of the ſpecies. This hiſtory he was enabled by his pupil, Alexander, to make very compleat; and I

doubt whether we have yet, with all our boaſted diſcoveries, any thing of the kind more compleat; and I am ſure we have nothing of the kind better arranged and digeſted. But he has not, like the moderns, confounded the hiſtory of Nature with the philoſophy of Nature, but treated of them in different works;—of the Hiſtory, in the work juſt mentioned, and of the Philoſophy, in his ακροασεις φυσικαι, where we have only facts mentioned that were neceſſary for the argument. I think, therefore, that the ſchoolmen were not miſtaken, when they ſaid, that, in natural philoſophy, Ariſtotle was δαιμονιος, that is, *ſomething more than man.* Plato, they ſaid, was θειος, or *divine*, on account, no doubt, of the Theology which he brought from Egypt with him, and which, as it contains the doctrine of the Trinity, is the reaſon why St Auguſtine ſays, as I have obſerved, p. 345. that his philoſophy is very little different from the Chriſtian Theology, and why Celſus, the antagoniſt of Origen, maintains that Jeſus Chriſt muſt have read the works of Plato*. And the doctrine of Ideas, which, I am

* St Auguſt. tom. 1. p. 748. et 750.; tom. 2.

perſuaded, came from the ſame country, and appears to have been the doctrine alſo of the Pythagoreans, I hold to be alſo a part of the Theology of Plato, and very much connected with the doctrine of the Trinity, as, I think, I ſhall be able to ſhow in the proper place.

I come now to ſpeak of the laſt of Ariſtotle's philoſophical works, that with which he concludes his philoſophy,—his *Metaphyſics*; upon which I ſhall be very ſhort here, as I have treated of them ſo fully in no leſs than three volumes in quarto.

The ſcience of Metaphyſics is the ſcience of Principles, which explains and demonſtrates, not only its own principles, but the

p. 58. et 337.; tom. 3. p. 36. of the Benedictine edition; and Origen *contra* Celſum lib. 6. See concerning the Platonic doctrine of the Trinity, preface to the third volume of Metaphyſics, p. 2. where it is ſhown, that it was not only the belief of the philoſophers of Egypt, but of all the Greek philoſophers of later times, and of the Stoics in more antient times, as appears from a paſſage of Seneca, quoted in p. 339. of this volume, where I have ſhown that it is at this day a doctrine of the Bramins in India.

principles of all other ſciences. It is therefore very properly called the *firſt philoſophy*, and is dignified by Ariſtotle with the name of σοφια; whereas to the other branches of philoſophy he gives only the common name of *Philoſophy*.

Every particular ſcience has certain bounds and limits, beyond which it does not go. It can demonſtrate every thing belonging to the ſcience from the principles of the ſcience itſelf: But to demonſtrate theſe principles would be to go out of the ſcience; and all ſciences by that means would be run up to a ſcience more general and perfectly different from the particular ſcience. It was therefore very proper that a ſcience ſhould be ſet apart for demonſtrating the principles of all ſciences; and that ſcience is *Metaphyſics*, which, therefore, may be called *the ſcience of ſciences*.

The ſtrongeſt example of this, geometry affords; which I inſiſt the more upon, that, I think, it is the only thing deſerving the name of ſcience now left among us ſince we have loſt the antient philoſophy. We have, of the elements of geometry, an ex-

cellent ſyſtem by an ancient geometer, Euclid. In theſe elements we ſhould expect to find the very firſt principles of the ſcience; but ſo far from that, we do not ſo much as learn from Euclid what the ſubject of Geometry is; for he has not told us that it is *magnitude*, neither has he let us know what the higher *genus* is, viz. *quantity:* So that for any thing we learn from him, we are not able to diſtinguiſh the ſubject of geometry, which is *quantity continuous*, or *magnitude* from the ſubject of Number, which is *quantity deſcrete*; and, conſequently, we are not able to diſtinguiſh accurately and ſcientifically from one another the two ſciences of geometry and arithmetic, of both which Euclid has treated. Even where he has defined things, his definitions are not intelligible without the knowledge of the firſt philoſophy; ſuch are his definitions of a Point, a Line, and a Superficies: And ſome things he has not at all defined, though he ſpeaks of them ſo much, ſuch as Length, Breadth, and Depth. All this I have explained at more length in the firſt volume of Antient Metaphyſics, book 5. chap. 8. to which I refer. Nor do I blame Euclid for not ex-

plaining theſe things philoſophically, but referring us to common ſenſe and obſervation. On the contrary, I praiſe him for not running his ſcience up to Metaphyſics, and ſo confounding it with another ſcience quite different.

The ſame is the caſe of the firſt ſcience which Ariſtotle treats of, and which may be ſaid to be the foundation of all ſcience, namely, *Logic*, or the Science of what ſcience and demonſtration is. That there can be no demonſtration or ſcience of any kind without definition, every man, who has learned any ſcience, though it be nothing more than the elements of geometry, muſt know. Now it is certain, that there can be no compleat definition, unleſs we can go up to the higheſt genus, that is, to the Category. As in the example I have given from geometry, though I know that the ſubject of geometry is *magnitude*, unleſs I can aſcend to the category of *quantity*, and can diſcover that *magnitude* is a ſpecies of *quantity*, I cannot perfectly know what *magnitude* is. The ſame is the caſe of the definition of Man; if I know only that he is an animal, and cannot aſ-

cend from animal to the category of *ſubſtance*, I do not know perfectly what Man is. But theſe higher genera are not the ſubject of any particular ſcience; and therefore Ariſtotle, though he has thought it a neceſſary preliminary to his Logic, in which he was to treat of Demonſtration, to give a ſhort account of the Catagories, he has thought proper to explain them more fully in his Metaphyſics.

The ſame is the caſe of Natural Philoſophy. Body is the ſubject of natural philoſophy. But the natural philoſopher does not think it neceſſary to explain to us what body is, any more than Euclid thinks it neceſſary to tell us what the ſubject of geometry is, viz. magnitude. Both the philoſopher and geometer refer us to common ſenſe and obſervation for the knowledge of ſuch things. The natural philoſopher indeed tells us, that all bodies are compoſed of matter and form, which are therefore the elements of that ſcience. But we are not much the wiſer for that, unleſs he had informed us what matter and what form was; but for this we are referred to the firſt philoſophy, which, as it follows,

in Ariſtotle's order of teaching, immediately after Phyſics, is called Metaphyſics, and is very properly placed after all the ſciences of which Ariſtotle treats, and made the concluſion of his whole philoſophy.

Of Metaphyſics Theology is a part, and the ſublimeſt part, being the ſummit of all philoſophy, which exalts us above all things on this earth and all things viſible, and brings us as near, as we can come in this ſtate of our exiſtence, to that Being who is above all Beings, and even Being itſelf*, and of whom we can have no conception but by his attributes of *all-wiſe* and *all-powerful*, and particularly *all-good*, by which epithet Plato deſigns him, calling him the το αγαθον, or the *Good*. From him have proceeded all things that exiſt, and from all eternity; for with him there is no order of time, or firſt and laſt; but there is an order of dignity and preference, which muſt be according to the nature of things, unleſs we could ſuppoſe all things to proceed from the Divinity, indiſcriminately

* This is the meaning of ὑπερουσιος, the epithet which Plato gives to the Supreme Being.

and promiſcuouſly, without rank or ſubordination. There is therefore a regular proceſſion from the Supreme Deity; *firſt*, of Intelligence, by which all things are made, and without which, as our Scripture tells us, nothing, that is made, was made; *next*, Of the Spirit of Life and Animation, without which Creation would have been altogether an inanimate maſs.—From theſe two principles proceed all the Intelligence, and all the life and action in the univerſe.

This is the Theology of Plato, ſo conformable, as I have obſerved, to the Chriſtian Theology. That Plato learned it in Egypt, I have little doubt; but, whether it was revealed there, as it certainly was to the Apoſtles, or whether the prieſts did not diſcover it as a truth of philoſophy, which I think it is, it would be improper here to inquire.

But, though the Theology of Ariſtotle be not ſo ſublime or ſo comprehenſive as that of Plato, yet, as far as it goes, it is a pure ſyſtem of Theiſm; for he has demon-

ſtrated, that there muſt be a firſt *mover*, who is the Author of *motion*, by which all the buſineſs of Nature and the material world is carried on. This Being is eternal, immaterial, indiviſible, immoveable himſelf, though the cauſe of all the motion in the univerſe;

Stabiliſque manens, dat cuncta moveri,

as Boethius, *De Conſolatione Philoſophica*, has well expreſſed it. He proves alſo that this Being is one, and not many; ſo that we have in Ariſtotle that moſt important article of our faith eſtabliſhed, that there is but *one God*. This Being he deſcribes as moſt perfectly happy in himſelf, and perpetually ſo, without change, or ſhadow of change; for he is pure intelligence, energizing upon objects of intelligence, which are all within himſelf: Whereas the objects upon which our intelligence, and that of inferior minds, operate, are all from without, and brought into the human mind by a tedious and difficult proceſs, well known to thoſe who have ſtudied the philoſophy of the human mind *. In ſhort,

* See *Ariſtot. Metaph.* lib. 14. cap. 7.; and the

according to Ariſtotle, the happineſs of the Supreme Being conſiſts in the contemplation of that intellectual world which is within himſelf. And what, according to this philoſophy, makes man the happieſt, and brings him the neareſt, that is poſſible in this life, to the Deity, is a life of theory and contemplation, by which he enjoys as much of the contemplation of that intellectual world as his faculties can attain to in this life; and when in another life his faculties are enlarged, ſo as to be able to comprehend more of that world, then he is ſaid to enjoy the beatific viſion *.

Nicomacheia, lib. 10. cap. 8. See alſo the laſt chapters of his *Phyſics*.

* Ariſtotle, in deſcribing this contemplative or theoretical life, as he calls it, makes a diſtinction betwixt the Νους, or *Intelligence*, the Νοητον, or *the ſubject upon which Intelligence operates*, and the Νοησις, or *the actual operation or energy of the* Νους *upon theſe ſubjects*. (See the laſt chapter of his Metaphyſics.) All theſe three are at once in the Divine mind; for there is there no δυναμις; but all is ενεργεια. And the ſubjects of that ενεργεια are, as I have ſaid, all within the Divine mind; whereas in the human mind they are all three diſtinct; for, in the firſt place, there is

So far, therefore, I think the Theology of Ariſtotle is irreprehenſible; but it appears to me to be deficient in ſeveral capital points: The firſt is, that I do not find in any of the genuine works of Ariſtotle (for I hold the treatiſe *de Mundo* not to be his) the Providence of God, extending both over the natural world and the actions of men, aſſerted: And all, I can learn

our Νους, which is no more than Intelligence εν δυναμει, or *potentially*. But this power is not, nor cannot be in our preſent ſtate always actually exerted. The Νοησις, therefore, which is the energy of Νους, we cannot always enjoy; and the objects of the Νους we have to ſeek, as I have obſerved, from abroad; and when in that way we have brought them into our minds, they are not always preſent there; and ſometimes cannot be brought to us by recollection, being loſt by oblivion. And even when we have them in our minds, we muſt compare them together by that operation of our mind which is called Διανοια, without which operation we can have no ſcience nor knowledge of any value. It is in this way, and by ſuch diſtinctions, which to many of my readers will, I know, appear very frivolous, that Ariſtotle has enabled us to riſe as much as our faculties will permit, to the contemplation of the firſt Being, and to diſtinguiſh betwixt his Intelligence and our own, and conſequently betwixt the happineſs which he enjoys and that which the greateſt philoſopher, and moſt perfect man among us, can enjoy.

concerning the Supreme Being, from Ariſtotle, is, that he has ſet this machine of the Univerſe a-going, and continues to move it; for I do not underſtand that he maintains, as Sir Iſaac Newton does, that body once ſet in motion goes on of itſelf by a *vis inſita*. But I cannot find in Ariſtotle that he does any thing elſe beſides moving the firſt ſphere, or ſphere of the fixed ſtars, upon which all the other movements in the material world, according to Ariſtotle, depend. The God, therefore, of Ariſtotle, as he has deſcribed him in the 8th chapter of the 10th book of the *Nicomacheia*, is little better than a theoretic philoſopher of the moſt exalted kind: For he has there ſaid, towards the end of the chapter, in expreſs words, that the Deity does not at all act or operate, ſo that his whole life conſiſts of Theory and Contemplation *. And there is á paſſage in his Me-

* After enumerating the ſeveral active virtues of men, ſuch as Juſtice, Bravery, and Temperance, and ſhowing that it is impoſſible that God can practiſe any of theſe, and yet that he does not ſleep like Endymeon, he adds: Τῳ δὶ ζωντι του πραττειν ἀφῃρημενῳ, ἐτι δὲ

taphyſics, lib. 14. cap. 7. where he makes the only difference betwixt the Supreme Being and ſuch a Philoſopher to be, that the Deity always enjoys ſuch a contemplative life; whereas the Philoſopher can only enjoy it at times. He adds, indeed, further in the ſame chapter, that his enjoyment of this contemplative life is not only more conſtant than ours, but greater; becauſe, no doubt, the ſubjects of his contemplation are much higher. The God, therefore, of Ariſtotle, if we except the buſineſs of moving, may be conſidered as an Epicurean God, who is wrapt up in the enjoyment of himſelf, without taking any concern about human affairs; for ſo Lucretius has deſcribed the nature of the Deity:

Ipſa ſuis pollens opibus, nihil indiga noſtri,

And again,

Semota a rebus noſtris, ſejunctaque longe.

μαλλον του ποιειν, τι λειπεται πλην θεωριας, ωστε ἡ της θεου ενεργεια, μακαριοτητι διαφερουσα, θεωρητικη αν ειη.

If Ariſtotle had ſuppoſed, that from the firſt Being there had proceeded other Beings, who had the care of the natural and moral world, I ſhould have thought his Theiſm in this reſpect, as well as in others, an excellent ſyſtem. But I cannot diſcover in his writings, that he thought there was any other intelligence in the univerſe, except the Supreme Intelligence, our Intelligence, and thoſe Intelligences, which he ſuppoſes animate the Celeſtial Bodies, but which do not appear, from any thing he ſays, to take any concern in the affairs of men, nor indeed in the material world, farther than to communicate Motion to it. And, in the end of the 8th chapter of the 14th book of Metaphyſics, he ſays very plainly, more plainly than I ſhould have ſuppoſed, that all the popular Gods, who, appearing in different ſhapes, were ſuppoſed to ſuperintend the operations of Nature and the affairs of men, were no better than mere fictions invented for political purpoſes *, and that all

* This makes me not wonder, that it was intended to indict him for impiety; which made him leave A-

that has come down to us from antient times upon this ſubject is, that the firſt Subſtances, by which he means the Supreme Being and the Minds inhabiting the ſtars, are Gods. But theſe later fictions of Deities he ſeems to think not even uſeful for the purpoſe intended by them; and accordingly in his books of *Polity* he has ſaid very little of religion, only mentioning it twice, as I remember, but without ſaying any thing more of it than that there ſhould be prieſts in a ſtate, and that a tyrant, in order to preſerve his authority, ought to appear to be religious. How different in this reſpect the Polity of

thens, and retire to *Chalcis*, becauſe he ſaid he would not give an opportunity to the Athenians of ſinning twice againſt philoſophy, referring to their condemnation of Socrates. But Socrates never profeſſed to diſbelieve the popular religion: He, on the contrary, practiſed all the duties of it, and recommended it to all his followers; nor do I think that any philoſopher, whatever his private opinion may be, is entitled to ſay any thing againſt the religion of his country, and particularly againſt that fundamental article of the religion of all countries,—the Providence of God over all his works, and particularly the actions of men.

Plato is from that of Ariſtotle, is needleſs to obſerve.

Another great defect, I find in the Theology of Ariſtotle, is, that, though he accounts for the movements of the material world, he gives no account of its production. This it was the more neceſſary he ſhould have done, that he makes the material world, ſuch as we ſee it, to be eternal; ſo that according to his philoſophy, it is coeternal with the firſt Being. That this may be conſiſtently with the principles of genuine Theiſm, I think, is evident, if we ſuppoſe that the material world has an exiſtence dependent upon the firſt Cauſe, and is a production from all eternity of that cauſe, in the ſame manner as we ſay that the ſecond perſon of the Trinity is a Production of the firſt *. But Ariſtotle does not ſay any where, as far as I know, that it has ſuch an exiſtence; and if ſo, we muſt conſider the Sovereign Artiſt to be like a

* See what more I have ſaid of this kind of production, p. 384. and 385.

human artiſt, who is the author of the works he makes, but not of the materials of theſe works, which are furniſhed him by Nature: Whereas genuine Theology teaches us, that all things are originally from God, and the Matter as well as the Form of this Univerſe; ſo that he is not only the firſt Mover, but in every reſpect the firſt Cauſe of all things in the Univerſe. And what ſurpriſes me very much is, that Ariſtotle not only does not derive Body from this firſt Cauſe, but not even Mind, neither the Intellectual Mind, nor the Animal, nor the Vegetable, not even that Mind, which, according to his philoſophy, animates the ſubſtances commonly called inanimate, and is what he calls *Nature*, producing all the movements of thoſe bodies. Now, though there may be difficulty in conceiving how from an incorporeal ſubſtance a corporeal ſhould be produced; yet there can be none, I think, in conceiving the emanation or proceſſion of one mind from another; a thing which, I am perſuaded, happens daily in the common generation of animals.

Another great defect, I obſerve in the Theology of Ariſtotle, is, that, though he

makes God the firſt Mover, and conſequently the Source of all order and beauty in the Univerſe, yet he gives no account at all, how it is poſſible to conceive that an immaterial Being ſhould move Matter or Body without mixing with it. The way that Body moves Body is by Pulſion, Truſion, or Drawing. Now it is impoſſible to conceive that Mind ſhould move Body in that way, nor in any other way, except by animating it, that is, mixing and being incorporated with it; and accordingly it is in that way that we ourſelves and all other animals are moved by Mind. Now, if the material world is to be moved by the Supreme Being in that way, he muſt of neceſſity mix with it, and be moved along with it, as Ariſtotle confeſſes that our Minds are moved along with our Bodies: Whereas he maintains in expreſs terms, that the Supreme Being is entirely ſeparated from all matter. This is a difficulty of which, as Simplicius informs us in his Commentary on the Phyſics, p. 320. Eudemus, a Peripatetic Philoſopher of later times, who is very often quoted by Simplicius with great applauſe,

was ſenſible; for he ſtates it very clearly, but gives no anſwer to it, except that the firſt Cauſe moves, not as Body moves Body, being firſt moved itſelf, but is perfectly at reſt. But this is no more than repeating the doubt and difficulty without ſolving it; for the queſtion recurs, how it is poſſible to conceive Mind, ſupreme or ſubordinate, moving Body, without animating it and being moved along with it. Now Ariſtotle maintains, that the Supreme Mind is not only immaterial, but immoveable and unchangeable in every reſpect. The only ſolution, therefore, of the difficulty is, that the Supreme Mind moves Bodies, not immediately, but by the intervention of other Minds, ſuch as the Animal, the Vegetable, and that which I call the *Elemental Mind*, and which Ariſtotle calls *Nature*.

The laſt defect I obſerve in Ariſtotle's Theology, is, that he makes the Supreme Being to move only the grand ſphere of the fixed ſtars, which, according to Ariſtotle's philoſophy, was the boundary of the Univerſe, and incloſed every thing

therein contained. Now this ſphere, according to Ariſtotle, is only moved immediately by the firſt Mover; and all the other bodies in this Univerſe, and particularly the planets, have motion communicated to them from this great circle, which by its conſtant rotation moves them. Now, how is it poſſible to conceive that this motion ſhould produce all the other motions of Bodies in the Univerſe, ſo various and different from one another? And particularly, how can he from thence account for the motion of the planets in different orbits and different times.

The Theology of Plato and of our Sacred Books is liable to no ſuch objections. According to Plato, the Supreme Being is above all things, even Intelligence and Being itſelf; for he is ὑπερουσιος, as he expreſſes it; and we can conceive nothing of him, but that he is ſupremely Good. Plato is therefore very far from degrading him to a mechanic, by employing him to move any Body, even that which Ariſtotle ſuppoſes to incloſe the Univerſe. But from this great and incomprehenſible Being, he

derives other Beings which we can comprehend, and particularly the two grand principles; *firſt*, Intelligence, by which all things are made and arranged in the way we ſee them; and, *ſecondly*, Life or Animation, by which every thing in Nature is moved: And this is not only the doctrine of Plato, but that of our Sacred Books. Theſe two great principles are not only immaterial, but entirely ſeparated from all matter, as well as the Supreme Being from whom they proceed. But from them are derived all the ſeveral Intelligences in the Univerſe, and all thoſe various minds which give animation and motion to the animals and vegetables, and to all ſubſtances of every kind which we ſee in motion, and by which the buſineſs of Nature is carried on.

It is, I think, the more ſurpriſing, that Ariſtotle ſhould not have adopted this philoſophy of his maſter Plato, as he every where, in his Phyſics, acknowledges that there is a principle of life and animation not only in animals and vegetables, but in all natural ſubſtances, and which he holds

to be ſo eſſential to the conſtitution of every natural body, that he calls it, as I have obſerved*, *Nature itſelf*, and makes it to be the principle of the motion of all bodies here below. By theſe principles in the ſeveral bodies, guided and conducted by the Supreme Deity, (or rather by the two Divine Beings above mentioned, which I conſider as a portion of the Divinity, being of the ſame nature and ſubſtance), is all the buſineſs of Nature carried on with that order and regularity, which even to a common obſerver muſt appear moſt wonderful. This order and regularity, by which every thing is conducted in the beſt manner poſſible, is every where acknowledged by Ariſtotle, and particularly in the 7th and 9th chapters of his Metaphyſics. And it is a maxim of his, that Nature does nothing in vain, nor omits any thing that is neceſſary to be done: And he ſays, that, if we can diſcover what is neceſſary or proper to be done in any inſtance, we are ſure that Nature has done it. Ariſtotle, therefore, in this, as well as in other reſpects, is a

* Page 394.

genuine Theiſt. And the only fault we can find with his Theology, with regard to the natural world, is, that he does not ſufficiently explain how it is produced; and, as to the moral world, I think his philoſophy is alſo defective in this reſpect, that he does not ſuppoſe that the affairs of men are ſuperintended by Intelligences ſuperior to man, but ſubordinate to the grand principle of Intelligence, who has committed to them the care of particular nations, and even families and individuals, and which therefore were worſhipped by the antients as Gods; but in theſe Gods, it is evident, from the paſſage above quoted, that Ariſtotle did not believe. And yet, if the Supreme Being be ſuch a God as Ariſtotle has deſcribed him to be, wholly employed in the contemplation and enjoyment of himſelf, it is evident that there can be no ſuch thing as Providence with reſpect to the moral world, but the affairs of men muſt go on without any ſuperintendence or direction of ſuperior powers.

Theſe are my objections to the Theology of Ariſtotle, to which I ſhould be

glad to ſee a good anſwer by any man more learned in his philoſophy than I am, as I have the higheſt opinion of him as a philoſopher, and indeed it is from him chiefly that I have learned what I know of philoſophy. I have read a book very rare, and known to very few, written by one who calls himſelf Fortunius Licetus, a Genoeſe, printed in the year 1645, entitled, *De Pietate Ariſtotelis erga Deum et Homines.* But, though he has ſatisfied me perfectly as to many objections made to the Piety of Ariſtotle, yet he has not anſwered, at leaſt to my ſatisfaction, thoſe I have ſtated. The reſt of the Metaphyſics, in which he explains the principles of all things and of all ſciences, I approve of extremely; and I maintain that no man can perfectly underſtand the principles of any ſcience without ſtudying the Metaphyſics of Ariſtotle. His ſyſtem of Logic is the greateſt work of ſcience that ever was performed by one man, if it be the work of one man, and not rather, as I think it is, the work of a ſucceſſion of men for many ages in the parent country of ſcience,

I mean Egypt. As we cannot, without the ſtudy of the Metaphyſics, underſtand the principles of any one ſcience, ſo we cannot otherwiſe, than by the ſtudy of his Logic, know even what ſcience is. His ſyſtem of Morals is the beſt in theory, and at the ſame time the moſt practicable that ever was written, and, I think, I may venture to add, that ever will be written. In his books upon Phyſics, and no where elſe, as far as I know, are contained the general principles of natural philoſophy, which is there made a ſcience of, but not in any modern books upon the ſubject. And, as to facts of natural hiſtory, as far as they were known in his time, they are very fully and accurately recorded, particularly in his hiſtory of animals. His writings, too, upon the popular arts of poetry and rhetoric, are as excellent of the kind as what he has written upon philoſophy. For my own part, I am not aſhamed to acknowledge, that, if I had not read the Poetics of Ariſtotle, though it be little better than a mutilated fragment, I ſhould not have known what poetry was, but ſhould have confounded it, as moſt people do, with

verſification, ſplendid diction, and fine ſentiments: And, notwithſtanding all that has been written upon Rhetoric, both in antient and modern times, I heſitate not to pronounce that Ariſtotle's three books upon the ſubject are the beſt ſyſtem of the art extant. Whatever defect, therefore, or errors there may be in his Theology, in which he had not an opportunity to be ſo well informed as Plato was, who, by his travels into Egypt, or by ſome Pythagorean books that may have fallen into his hands, but which Ariſtotle never ſaw, did certainly learn the Chriſtian Theology, I think we may eaſily pardon, in conſideration of the very great merit of the reſt of his philoſophy, and of his writings upon the Arts. And I am perſuaded that he would have been more full and accurate in his Theology, if he had not ſpent ſo much time and thought upon his diſputations with Plato concerning Ideas, which he ſays Plato made the principles of Nature, and of all things in this Univerſe;—with the Pythagoreans concerning Numbers, which, he ſays, they made the principles of all things;—and with Empedocles, who, he ſays, made Friendſhip

and Strife, or in other words, *contraries*, the cauſes of all things. Ariſtotle is accuſed by his own Commentators, as I have elſewhere obſerved *, of having miſrepreſented the opinions of the philoſophers before him, in order that he might have the pleaſure of refuting them. And, indeed, however much I may admire him in other reſpects, I cannot praiſe his candour, as there is clear evidence that he made uſe of a work of Archytas, the Pythagorean, upon the Categories, and did little more than tranſlate it from Doric into Attic, without ſo much as ever mentioning his name in any part of his works, as far as I remember. As to the opinions he mentions of Plato, Pythagoras, and Empedocles, concerning the principles of things, if they were truly ſuch as he has repreſented them, they were not worth refuting; for to make ſuch things the principles and firſt cauſes of all things, is glaringly abſurd. Plato, no doubt, maintained the doctrine of Ideas, which, he ſaid, were incorporeal ſubſtances, from whence he derived all the ſeve-

* Page 45. of the preface to vol. 3. of Ant. Metaph.

ral corporeal ſubſtances upon the earth. But he certainly believed that there was a higher principle in Nature, and firſt Cauſe, of which all theſe Ideas were a proceſſion or emanation, as the ſeveral individuals were from them. Now it is impoſſible to imagine that he conceived the firſt Cauſe, or the two grand principles which he derived from that Cauſe, to be mere ideas. As to Pythagoras's doctrine of Numbers, it is well known that he ſpoke in parables, as our Saviour choſe to do, or *ſymbols*, as they were called, which were underſtood only by the few initiated in his philoſophy, but by the many were thought abſurd and ridiculous. Number, however, is one of the ſymbols that I think eaſily to be underſtood by thoſe who have ſtudied arithmetic as a ſcience, the firſt ſcience taught in Pythagoras's ſchool, and who, therefore, muſt have known the power of Numbers. Now it is impoſſible that Pythagoras could believe that Numbers were the efficient cauſe of the Univerſe; far leſs could he believe that they were the material. But they are truly the formal cauſe, as they are of every thing that is framed and conducted by

order and method: And I think Horace very properly applies Numbers to a virtuous and regular life, where he ſays,

Et verae numeroſque modoſque ediſcere vitae.

And they may be ſaid alſo to be the final cauſe of the whole ſyſtem of the Univerſe, as it was no doubt the intention of Deity, that the whole of the ſyſtem ſhould be framed, and conducted by Number and Meaſure. It was therefore not without reaſon that the Pythagoreans ſaid,

——— Ἀριθμῷ τι πάντ' ἐπιοικε.

and that they uſed Numbers for the ſymbols of all things divine; as they are the Ideas the moſt abſtract of any that we uſe, denoting nothing more than exiſtence and order; ſo that nothing could typify more properly the τα ὀντως ὀντα. And as to the opinion of Empedocles, that all things were compoſed of contrary qualities, there is nothing more certain than that things are compounded in that way, and that the wiſdom of the Contriver of this wonderful ſyſtem appears in nothing more than in joining together oppoſite qualities of

things, ſo as to make them all contribute to that wonderful *rerum concordia diſcors*, which conſtitutes the ſyſtem. Nor are theſe oppoſite qualities unfitly expreſſed by the words, Love, and Averſion or Strife; for, beſides the common phenomenon of the loadſtone and iron, Chemiſtry exhibits to us many bodies which approach to one another, by what they call Elective Attraction, and others that repel one another. But I cannot ſuppoſe that he believed thoſe qualities of ſubſtances to be the firſt cauſes, or the cauſe of cauſes, as Ariſtotle expreſſes it, by which every thing in the Univerſe was produced. They are cauſes to be ſure; but they are only the formal cauſes, not the efficient, any more than many other formal cauſes of things.

As to the ſtile of Ariſtotle's didactic writings, it muſt, I think, be evident to every body, that it would have been improper, if not ridiculous, to have put into dialogue his ſyſtems of Logic, Morals, Phyſics, and Metaphyſics. The Polity of Plato and his Laws were not, as I have obſerved, proper ſubjects for dialogue, though

he has given to each of them a fable, without which dialogue is no better than a catechiſm. Even what Ariſtotle has written upon the popular arts of Poetry and Rhetoric is better, I think, as it is, in the plain didactic ſtile; which, in my opinion, is only proper for treating ſome particular points of art or ſcience, but not for a ſyſtem of either.

But, though Ariſtotle has not, like Plato, joined the poet with the philoſopher, yet he has done what, I think, anſwers all the purpoſe of teaching, without introducing converſation, and ſpeakers of different characters and opinions; for he has ſtated almoſt upon every ſubject the opinions of the philoſophers that lived before him: And his method is, as he profeſſes, to ſtate what others have ſaid upon the ſeveral ſubjects before him, and then to try what he can do better. Theſe opinions, as I have ſaid, he is ſuſpected not to have ſtated fairly. But, be that as it will, he refutes them; then he delivers his own opinion; and, laſtly, he ſtates and anſwers the objections to that opinion.

All this he does in a ſtile very different in his different works. What he has written upon Poetry is in a ſtile very plain and clear, except where the text is defective or corrupted, which it is in ſo many places, that I hold it to be little better than a mutilated fragment. The three books upon Rhetoric are in the ſame ſtile; and they have come down to us correct and entire: And both they and the Poetics, I think, are perfect models of the didactic ſtile. I ſay the ſame of his treatiſes upon Morals, and of his books upon Polity. His books upon Logic are, I think, as clear as they could well be upon a ſubject altogether new, and unknown to his countrymen; and they are written in ſuch a ſtile, that, I am perſuaded, he intended that they ſhould be underſtood by thoſe who did not attend the Lycaeum, nor had not heard his lectures. But his books of Phyſics and Metaphyſics are in a ſtile perfectly different; and, I think, his letter to his pupil, Alexander, in which he ſays he has publiſhed, and not publiſhed them, (for, ſays he, they will not be underſtood, except

by thoſe that have heard my lectures), will apply equally to both, though Plutarch, in his life of Alexander, applies it only to the Metaphyſics. And, indeed, the ſtile is ſuch, that, if there had not come down to the philoſophers of the Alexandrine ſchool, who have laboured ſo much, and with ſuch ſucceſs in commenting upon theſe writings, ſome traditional knowledge of his philoſophy, and, beſides that, ſome books, now loſt, of the ſucceſſors in his ſchool, ſuch as Theophraſtus, whoſe book upon Phyſics is often quoted by one of theſe Commentators, Simplicius, I do not think they could have made them intelligible to us.

The words he uſes are all the common words of the language, except terms of art, which he defines; and I cannot recollect any metaphorical expreſſion he uſes in his philoſophical writings, unleſs, perhaps, it be ſome metaphor which is commonly uſed in the language in place of the proper word. The compoſition, too, is altogether without figure, unleſs we will give that name to thoſe ellipſes which are ſo com-

mon in the Attick dialect. But the difficulty in his ſtile is to find out the ſenſe; for it all conſiſts of propoſitions, which, beſides being obſcurely expreſſed, are not ſyllogiſed ſo that one can readily form an argument from them. And I obſerve, that the great buſineſs of his commentators, ſuch as Simplicius and Philoponus, is to compleat the ſyllogiſms which he has left imperfect. Thus, in the very beginning of his Phyſics, Philoponus has obſerved a ſyllogiſm, which is not only imperfect by the want of the minor propoſition, (a thing very common in all reaſonings, being what they call an enthymema), but it wants alſo the concluſion, in place of which it has only a propoſition following from the concluſion. And this being the caſe, I dont much wonder, that a Theologian, who calls himſelf *Cornelius a Lapide*, quoted by an author I mentioned before, *Fortunius Licetus*, calls Ariſtotle *carnifex ingeniorum, ob affectatam obſcuritatem.* And indeed there is nothing but the moſt diligent ſtudy, with the aſſiſtance of his commentators of the Alexandrine ſchool, that can make him intelligible even to men

of the beſt underſtanding. I do not therefore wonder, that men, who value themſelves upon being good Greek and Latin ſcholars, and, having read ſome books of modern philoſophy, are vain enough to think themſelves philoſophers, ſhould not apply to the ſtudy of his philoſophy, concluding that what they do not underſtand is unintelligible nonſenſe.

With regard to the ſtile of his commentators, as the intention of their writings is to explain what is obſcure in Ariſtotle, their ſtile ought to be very plain, and, I think, it is ſo, unleſs where either the MS. is faulty, or the printed edition, which is the only one that ever was publiſhed of thoſe commentators; for, ſince they were printed, there has not been ſuch a curioſity about antient philoſophy as to make any demand for a ſecond edition. The punctuation in this edition is generally very bad, and ſuch as will ſtop the beſt Greek ſcholar, and oblige him to read the paſſage over and over again. And there are ſometimes ſuch errors in the words, as make a

riddle of the ſenſe that requires an Œdipus to ſolve, or a critic, ſuch as a countryman of mine was, of the name of Scrymgeour, who aſſiſted Harry Stephen in collating Greek MSS. and who, he ſays, ſhowed a ſagacity in that buſineſs, which looked like divination. But, with all theſe imperfections, thoſe commentaries muſt be carefully ſtudied; and out of them, and of the text of Ariſtotle, this moſt valuable philoſophy muſt be dug like diamonds out of a mine.

For this work not only a perfect knowledge of the common Greek language is neceſſary, but we muſt know alſo the language of this philoſophy. We muſt therefore begin with the very elements of it, and learn the meaning of the terms which it uſes. Upon this ſubject there is an admirable work of Porphyry, who was, I think, the greateſt philoſopher of the age in which he lived, and which he entitles very properly εισαγωγη, or *introduction*: And indeed it is the beſt introduction to philoſophy that ever was written, though the ſubject of it may appear very contemptible to thoſe who call themſelves philoſo-

phers in this age, and even to thoſe who profeſs only to be ſcholars; for it is the explanation of five words, viz. *genus*, *ſpecies*, *difference*, *proper* or *peculiar*, and *accidental*. But theſe words expreſs all the ſeveral relations which the things in this univerſe have to one another. For there is nothing that has not to one or more things the relation of *Genus* or of *Species*. Now, there can be no *genus* and *ſpecies*, without a *Difference* which diſtinguiſhes the *ſpecies* from the *genus*. Further, things belonging to different *genuſes* and *ſpecieſes* have certain qualities which are *Peculiar* to them, and diſtinguiſh them from other things of the ſame *genus* and *ſpecies*. And, laſtly, they have qualities which they may have or not have, and yet continue of the ſame *genus* and *ſpecies*, and which therefore are common to things of other genuſes and ſpecieſes; and theſe are very properly called *Accidents*, as being appropriated to no particular claſs of things. Theſe diviſions comprehend all the ſeveral relations, either of conformity or diſtinction, in which the things of this univerſe ſtand to one another; and, as we think of

nothing but in ſyſtem, every idea we form being, as I have ſhown *, a ſyſtem, there cannot be a more proper introduction to philoſophy than a work that exhibits to us, in a ſhort and comprehenſive view, all the different relations which the infinite variety of things in the ſyſtem of the univerſe have to one another. And it was the more proper for another reaſon, that, though Ariſtotle has very accurately defined the terms peculiar to his own philoſophy, yet he has no where, as I remember, defined theſe terms common to all philoſophy.

Ammonius Hermeias, a great philoſopher of the Alexandrine ſchool, who has written an excellent commentary upon Ariſtotle's book of Categories, has thought it worth his while to write alſo a commentary upon this *Introduction* of Porphyry, which is undoubtedly very much connected with the doctrine of the Categories: For, as the explanation of the *five words*

* Vol. 2. of Ant. Metaph. p. 107. and following. —See alſo p. 85. of the ſame volume.

informs us of the ſeveral relations in which the things of this univerſe ſtand to one another, ſo the Categories let us know what they are abſolutely in themſelves. Of this work I have ſpoken at ſome length elſewhere *, and have ſhown that, without the knowledge of it, there can be no perfect ſcience, becauſe there can be no perfect definition. It was originally the work of Archytas, a Pythagorean philoſopher, from whom Ariſtotle took it, only changing the title of it, and, I think, not for the better. For Archytas entitled it, περι του παντος, or, *Of the whole of things*; and, I think, very properly, as it takes in the whole things of the univerſe, and is the beſt introduction that can be imagined to ſo comprehenſive a ſyſtem of philoſophy as that of the Pythagoreans, and which was truly an univerſal philoſophy, becauſe it was the philoſophy of the univerſe; whereas Ariſtotle has made it only an introduction to his Logic, which by many is thought not to be philoſophy at all, but only an organic art, ſubſervient

* Vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphyſ. p. 319.

indeed to philoſophy, and which muſt be acknowledged to be highly uſeful.

If this Introduction of Porphyry, with the commentary of Ammonius, and the Categories of Ariſtotle, with the commentary both of Ammonius and Simplicius, in which laſt is preſerved to us the original work of Archytas, be diligently ſtudied, they will not only make us maſters of the language of antient philoſophy, but they will give us an idea of its comprehenſion and univerſality, which is not to be got in any modern book, and will prepare us properly for the ſtudy of any particular branch of it, to which we may think proper to apply. And what ſhould encourage every young ſtudent, who has ſpirit and reſolution enough to venture to philoſophiſe in this unfaſhionable way, is, that the Introduction of Porphyry, and Ammonius's commentary upon it, are the beſt printed books, and from the moſt correct manuſcripts, of all that has been written upon Ariſtotle in Greek; and the text of the Categories is the leaſt obſcure of all Ari-

ſtotle's philoſophical writings; and what obſcurity may be in it is fully removed by the two commentaries upon it, which are alſo very correctly printed. A man, therefore, who is qualified for the ſtudy of the Greek philoſophy, by the knowledge of the Greek language, will have no difficulty to make himſelf maſter of the elements of this philoſophy, by the diligent ſtudy of theſe works.

As I have it much at heart to revive this antient philoſophy in Britain, which would do us ſo much honour as a learned nation, and in that reſpect diſtinguiſh us from all the other nations of Europe, among whom this philoſophy is loſt, I have ſubjoined to what I have here ſaid of it, a chapter of Queries, tending to ſhow, that, without it, we cannot underſtand the principles of any one art or ſcience, nor comprehend the fundamental doctrines of our holy religion.

CHAP. IV.

Queries concerning Philoſophy.

1. AS philoſophy is the ſcience of Cauſes, it is, I think, of the greateſt importance to know, Whether Ariſtotle's Doctrine of Cauſes*, upon which he valued himſelf ſo much, be true? for, if it can be ſhown not to be true, I think it will go near to put down his whole philoſophy.

2. As motion is the great agent in all the operations of nature, if it can be ſhown that his definition of motion is ſuch as Mr Locke has repreſented it, viz. *the moſt exquiſite piece of jargon that ever was invented by man*, it will, I think, at once

* See upon the doctrine of *Cauſes*, vol. 2. book 4. chap. 4. of Ant. Metaphyſ.

put an end to his whole Philoſophy of Nature * ?

3. Whether there be not three things concerning motion to be inquired about; 1*mo*, What motion is, conſidered in itſelf? 2*do*, What is the cauſe of it? 3*tio*, What is the effect of it; and whether thoſe, who define motion by change of place, tell us only what the *effect* of motion is, not what *motion itſelf* is?

4. Is it not proper to inquire, whether that great principle of Ariſtotle, that all natural bodies are compoſed of *matter* and *form*, be well founded? For, if it can be ſhown that there is no truth in that propoſition, the antient philoſophy of Nature has no foundation upon which it can ſtand; but, on the contrary, if it be true, it is evident that the antients have laid down the firſt principles of all natural knowledge †.

*, On the ſubject of Motion, ſee vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphyſ. lib. 1.cap. 3.

† On the ſubject of *matter* and *form*, ſee ib. book 2, chap. 2.

5. This naturally leads to inquire, whether there be any truth in the Peripatetic notion of *ſubſtantial forms?* and whether there be not in every Natural Body a certain principle, which makes that Body what it is, diſtinguiſhes it from every other Body, and produces all its movements and qualities of every kind? and next to inquire, what that thing is, whether Mind or Body, whether Material or Immaterial *?

6. As it is impoſſible that any man can be a Natural philoſopher, without knowing what Nature is, I think it is worth while to inquire whether Ariſtotle's definition of Nature be a juſt one, viz. that it is a Principle of Motion, or a kind of Life, in all Natural Bodies †?

7. Whether there be any difference betwixt God and Nature? What that diffe-

* Vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphyſ. book 2. chap. 2.

† See on the ſubject of this Principle, Ib. p. 207. 231. and 232.; and vol. 3. of Ant. Metaphyſ. p. 324.

rence is? And how man differs from both *?

8. Whether Sir Iſaac Newton, when he wrote his Principia, had any idea at all of Body being moved by Mind; as he has no where mentioned Mind as the Motive Principle of Body? Whether this be not evident from the different accounts he gives of the cauſe of Attraction or Gravitation †? Whether we can ſuppoſe, that the only two Motive powers, which he mentions in the beginning of his *Principia*, viz. the *vis inſita* and the *vis impreſſa*, are, either of them, Mind? or, whether it be not evident, that, by the one, he meant a power inherent in Matter, and eſſential to it; and, by the other, a force external applied to Matter by Bodily impulſe?

9. Whether we be not more certain of the Motion of our own Bodies by Mind,

* Vol. 2. of Ant. Metaphyſ. p. 360.

† See vol. 2. of Ant. Metaphyſ. p. 324.—where one of the cauſes he aſſigns for Gravitation is a *medium*, whether corporeal or incorporeal, impelling the Bodies ſwimming in it towards one another.

than we can be of the Motion of any Body by Body, as we know the one by the moſt certain of all knowledge, Conſciouſneſs, and the other only by the evidence of ſenſe, which is often fallacious? Whether Sir Iſaac, by maintaining that his own Motion, and the Motion of other animals, is produced by a moſt Subtile Spirit, which pervades groſs Bodies, and is latent in them *, does not reject altogether the Motion by Mind, and maintain that all the Bodies in this our Syſtem, the terreſtrial as well as the celeſtial, are moved by Æthers, Fluids, or Subtile Spirits, or that they move themſelves?

10. Whether it be not a moſt extraordinary *Pneumatophobia*, (to uſe an expreſſion of Cudworth †), reſembling the diſeaſe called *Hydrophobia*, which makes a man deny that his own Body is moved by his Mind?

11. Whether, as all our Ideas, in this ſtate of our exiſtence, ariſe from Senſa-

* Ant. Metaphyſ. vol. 1. p. 275.

† Ib. vol. 2. p. 40.

tions, and, as Sir Iſaac ſays, that our Senſations, as well as our Voluntary Motions, are produced by Subtile Spirits *, would it not be compleating the Syſtem of Materialiſm to maintain, that our Ideas are produced by a more Subtile Spirit ſtill; and then there will be in us neither Animal nor Intellectual Mind?

12. Whether Sir Iſaac's firſt Law of Motion, by which Body once ſet in Motion is made to go on in a ſtraight line, is not true only of Motion by Bodily impulſe? And whether Motion by Mind may not change its direction in every inſtant, which Motion by Bodily impulſe cannot do?

13. Whether, to ſuppoſe that Body can of itſelf, and by a power inherent in it, and eſſential to it, go on in a certain direction, and with an uniform velocity, be not abſolute Materialiſm?

14. Whether we cannot readily conceive all the Bodies of the univerſe to be moved by Mind, without having recourſe to a *vis inſita* in the Bodies, a *vis centripeta*, a *vis*

* Ant. Metaphyſ. vol. 2. p. 324.

centrifuga, or Æthers and Subtile Fluids, which, ſuppoſing them to exiſt, muſt be firſt moved themſelves before they can move any other bodies; ſo that the queſtion ſtill remains, What moves them?

15. Whether it be poſſible to ſuppoſe, that either Mind or Body can act where they are not? and whether, when Body moves Body, it muſt not be in contact with the Body it moves, either immediately, or by the intervention of other Bodies?

16. Whether it be poſſible that a man of common ſenſe, not to ſpeak of a philoſopher, can believe that it is the Moon which produces the Motion of the Tides? And whether it might not be ſaid, with as much reaſon, that it is the Motion of the Tides that produces the Motion of the Moon? Whether this way of ſpeaking, ſo unworthy of a philoſopher, does not proceed from confounding two things quite different, viz. one Body moving another, and two Bodies being moved together with a certain ſympathy or conformity of

their motions to one another? Of this laſt kind is the Motion of the Tides with reſpect to the Motion of the Moon; and of this kind there are many Motions to be ſeen on earth, ſuch as the Motion of the Loadſtone and Iron, and the various attractions and repulſions of ſmall Bodies which Chemiſtry exhibits *.

17. Whether, as Almighty Wiſdom does nothing ſuperfluous or in vain, a man can believe in God, and believe at the ſame time that the motion of the planets is actually compounded of Projection and Gravitation, unleſs he can demonſtrate that it is impoſſible by the nature of things, that the circular or elliptical Motion can be ſimple, or that, if it were ſimple, the *phænomena* could not be accounted for †? And whether it would not be more for the honour of Sir Iſaac to ſuppoſe that the Planetary Motion is a ſimple and uncompound-

* Ant. Metaphyſ. vol. 2. p. 378. & 401. Other examples might be given, as of the ſtrings of muſical inſtruments, which, being tuned in a certain ratio to one another, exhibit wonderful ſympathetic motions.

† Vol. 3. of Ant. Metaphyſ. p. 304.

ed Motion, as it certainly is, but that he has moſt ingeniouſly analyſed it into two Motions, in order to demonſtrate the laws by which it is governed * ?

18. Whether there be not a difference in the nature of things betwixt that ſcience, by which the motions of the Celeſtial or other Bodies are meaſured and computed, and that ſcience, by which the moving principle in thoſe Bodies is diſcovered ?— Whether the one ſcience does not belong to Aſtronomy, Geometry, or Mechanics ? And whether the other does not belong to philoſophy ? And whether a man may not be an excellent aſtronomer, geometer, or mechanic, and yet not a philoſopher, and, conſequently, not capable of determining what is the moving principle in Bodies ?

19. Whether a man can be ſaid to be truly a man of ſcience, who does not know what ſcience is ? And whether a man can

* Vol. 3. of Ant. Metaphyſ. p. 312.—where it is ſhown, that a motion in a ſtraight line, the ſimpleſt of all motions, is decompoſed and analyſed into two other motions, for the purpoſe of demonſtrating certain problems.

learn that from Locke's book upon human underſtanding, where he tells us, that Truth *is the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our Ideas*, without being informed that all reaſoning conſiſts of Syllogiſms, Propoſitions, and Simple Terms; and that, after analyſing it in this manner, we muſt begin the ſtudy of it with that into which it is ultimately reſolvable, I mean Simple Terms, in the ſame manner as a man, who ſtudies language, muſt begin with the elemental ſounds of it*.

20. Whether there can be any ſcience without definition? Whether every definition muſt not be by the *genus* and *ſpecific* difference? Whether to know a thing perfectly, we muſt know not only the *genus* to which it immediately belongs, but alſo the remoter *genus*, and ſo on, till we come up to the higheſt *genus* of all, under which the thing is to be ranked? And if ſo, whether the doctrine of thoſe higheſt *genera*, contained in Ariſtotle's book of Categories, be not the foundation not only

* Upon this ſubject, ſee vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphyſ. book 5. chap. 2. & 4.

of Logic, but of all ſcience; as, without the knowledge of the Categories, there can be no perfect definition *?

21. Whether the human intellect, in forming its ideas, does not apprehend every thing in ſyſtem, and nothing abſolutely and ſimply by itſelf, but every thing relatively to other things? And whether this does not lead to very important conſequences in philoſophy, as it tends to ſhow that we are by nature formed for the contemplation of Order, Regularity, and Beauty †?

22. Whether a ſenſe of the *pulchrum* and *honeſtum* does not diſtinguiſh a man from a brute, as much, or more, than any thing elſe? And whether an author, ſuch as Mr Paley, who denies or doubts that we

* See upon this ſubject vol. 1. of this work, p. 72. & 520. 2d edit.—See alſo Ant. Metaphyſ. vol. 1. p. 317. & 318.

† Ant. Metaphyſ. vol. 2. p. 107. & 108.—131. & 132. Ibid. vol. 3. p. 342.

have any ſuch ſenſe, does not in effect deny or doubt the exiſtence of Man?

23. Whether Man differs from a brute, not in kind, but in degree? Whether Locke, not diſtinguiſhing betwixt ſenſations and ideas, does not confound man and brute? And whether he muſt not be a moſt wretched philoſopher, who cannot diſtinguiſh himſelf accurately and ſcientifically from a brute *?

24. Whether it be true, as Mr Locke ſays, that we can have no perception of any kind without conſciouſneſs? And whether, on the contrary, conſciouſneſs be not one of the greateſt exertions of intellect, by which we are eſſentially diſtinguiſhed from the brutes †?

25. Whether Ideas, abſtract Ideas, and general Ideas, be all ſynonymous terms; ſo that there is no ſuch thing as a parti-

* See, upon this ſubject, Appendix to vol. 3. of Ant. Metaphyſ. chap. 3. p. 335.

† Ibid. vol. 2. p. 87. & 88.

cular Idea of any thing? Or whether, on the contrary, it be not impoſſible to conceive abſtracted or general ideas without particular ideas *?

26. What is the nature of that idea which muſt exiſt in particular things before it can be abſtracted or generalized? Can it be any thing elſe than an immaterial principle, which animates the ſubſtance, gives it its form and motions, and makes it what it is, diſtinct from every thing elſe †?

27. Whether there be any difference betwixt God and Nature? And, if there be, what that difference is ‡?

28. Whether there be not ſuch a philoſophy, as that which Ariſtotle calls the *firſt philoſophy*, becauſe it demonſtrates not

* Vol. 2. of Ant. Metaphyſ. p. 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 79, and 85; and vol. 3. p. 341.

† Ibid. vol. 2. p. 79.

‡ Ibid. p. 360.

only its own principles, but the principles of every other branch of philoſophy, and of all ſciences? And whether it be true, what both Plato and Ariſtotle tell us, that even geometry, which is accounted by us to be the moſt certain of all ſciences, is ſo far from being able to demonſtrate its own principles, that it cannot ſo much as inform us what its ſubject, viz. *magnitude*, is: And accordingly Euclid has not attempted to define magnitude, nor even the dimenſions of it, *length*, *breadth*, and *thickneſs* *?

29. Whether it be poſſible to conceive the myſtery of the Trinity, or to believe that there may be three diſtinct Perſons of one and the ſame ſubſtance, and that the Son was begotten from all eternity of the Father, without having ſtudied that philoſophy, which, as it is defined by the antients, is the knowledge of things divine as well as human†? Whether, without being taught by the antient philoſophy, and

* P. 381. of this volume.

† See what I have ſaid of the Platonic Theology, p. 373, 384, and 385. of this volume.

having there learned to diſtinguiſh accurately betwixt the intellectual part of our own compoſition and the animal, we can conceive the myſtery of the Incarnation, and underſtand, that, as in us the Intellectual Nature is added to the Animal, ſo in the Perſon of Jeſus Chriſt, there was no impoſſibility in the nature of things that the divine ſhould be added to both *? And, laſtly, whether it be poſſible to believe theſe eſſential doctrines of Chriſtianity, if we cannot conceive them, or believe the poſſibility of their exiſting?

30. Whether the philoſophy of the Fine Arts is not alſo to be learned in the ſchool of antiquity? And whether it be not only from Ariſtotle that we can learn in what ſenſe they are imitative arts, and how to diſtinguiſh a copy of verſes, or even the longeſt and moſt elaborate didactic work in verſe, adorned with the moſt ſplendid diction and fineſt verſification, ſuch as the Georgics

* See p. 364. of this volume.

of Virgil, from a poem, and in painting, a portrait from a picture, and in general the ideal beauty from the copy of any thing actually existing.

31. Whether there be not even in Grammar an art and a science, which cannot without philosophy be perfectly understood? And whether it be not philosophy, and antient philosophy only, that can explain distinctly and scientifically the three great arts of grammar, Derivation, Composition, and Flection, by which millions of words, (they say five millions in Latin), are so connected together as to be comprehended in the memory and readily used *; and how, with articulation Melody

* Of these three arts I have treated at considerable length in the second volume of this work, particularly in chapters 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. & 15. of book 1. Of these three I hold *flection* to be the greatest art, and which saves more than any other the multiplication of words: For, by the same word, with some variation, it contrives to express Numbers, Persons, Genders, Times, Dispositions of the speaker, and the Relations that things have to one another. But this is not to be understood without the knowledge of antient philosophy; and, accordingly, upon the princi-

and Rhythm are joined in the antient languages, ſo as to make altogether the moſt wonderful art that ever was invented by man?

To conclude this philoſophical catechiſm. —If all theſe queſtions can be anſwered from the philoſophy of Mr Locke, Mr David Hume, or Dr Prieſtley, or any others in modern times, ſuch as Des Cartes and Leibnitz, who have philoſophiſed without the aſſiſtance of the antients, or if it can be ſhown that they are trifling, and not worthy of anſwer, then I will allow that I have ſpent my time very ill, and before me Mr Harris, in endeavouring to revive the old obſolete philoſophy of the antients, which the great diſcoveries of the

ples of that philoſophy, I have explained it. And, particularly, I have given a philoſophical account of the Caſes of Nouns, (perhaps the moſt artificial thing in language), which nobody before me has ſo much as attempted to do. This, I know, makes my ſecond volume but little read, though it contain more of the philoſophy of language than any of the other volumes. But it is not to be underſtood by thoſe who know no more of language than what is taught in our ſchools, or even in our univerſities.

moderns have rendered quite uſeleſs. But, on the contrary, if the queſtions I have propoſed are of ſo much importance, as I think they are, and cannot be anſwered from any books of modern philoſophy, it follows of neceſſary conſequence, that, if we will not ſtudy the antient philoſophy, we cannot be philoſophers, not even complete ſcholars and critics, nor indeed learned in the principles of any one art or ſcience, and not ſo much as knowing what ſcience is.

CHAP. V.

The Halicarnaſſian's treatiſe of Compoſition is confined to the ſound of the Greek language.—In this a great variety.—Of the vowels in Greek.—All the vocal ſounds poſſible, in that language.—That not the caſe of every language.—How there came to be 7 vowels reckoned by the Greek grammarians.—Of the variety of conſonants in Greek;—the ſyllables conſequently very various.—Of the Greek accents upon ſyllables;—theſe believed by ſome not to exiſt;—proof from fact of their exiſtence.—Of long and ſhort ſyllables in Greek;—ſome long ſyllables, longer than others, and ſome ſhort ſyllables, ſhorter than others.—The Halicarnaſſian's account of long and ſhort ſyl-

lables, that is of the rhythm of language, more diſtinct than Cicero's account.—Of ſyllables words are made, and of words ſentences, with all the variety of periods and members of periods.—Of the wonderful variety and beauty of the compoſition in Greek.—That beauty was ſtill greater when Homer wrote, and when greater liberty was uſed with words.—The variety of arrangement, which the ſyntax of the Greek language permits, adds wonderfully to the beauty of ſound in the Greek compoſition, and alſo to the ſenſe.—Of what is called the natural order *of words;—that does not make the beauty of compoſition.—Of the wonderful beauty of the Orations of Demoſthenes pronounced by himſelf.—Two things required to make a perfect ſtile;—that it ſhould be both beautiful and pleaſant.—Of the difference betwixt the two.—Four things required to make a* ſtile *both beautiful and pleaſant, ſo far as concerns the ſound, viz.* melody, rhythm, variety, *and what is* decent *and* proper.*—Of each of theſe in order.—The Rhythm much inſiſted upon;—examples of good and bad rhythm.—*

Alſo much ſaid upon the το πρεπον, *and illuſtrated by examples from Homer.—Of the Melody of ſpeech,—how diſtinguiſhed from the melody of muſic,—not reducible to rules.—Of the three different characters, the* auſtere, *the* florid, *and the* middle.—*Examples of theſe from different authors.—Two curious problems:—*1mo, *How proſe is to be made like to verſe.—*2do, *How verſe is to be made like to proſe.—The firſt a myſtery in his time,—yet to be conceived even by us.—Examples from Demoſthenes.—This can only be done in a language which has the rhythm of long and ſhort ſyllables;—not therefore in Engliſh, except the diction be poetical.—Of making proſe of verſe.—This explained by the Halicarnaſſian in a paſſage tranſlated from him.—Milton's verſe the perfection of that ſtile in Engliſh.—Next to Milton's is that of Dr Armſtrong.—Mr Pope's verſes very different.—Objections to Milton's verſification anſwered.—This work of the Halicarnaſſian, the moſt elegant compoſition in the didactic ſtile.—Many errors in the text to be corrected.*

I WILL conclude my obſervations upon the didactic ſtile, by giving an account of a work of that kind, which I think admirable; and it is the more proper that I ſhould enlarge upon it, that the ſubject of it is the ſame with the ſubject of theſe volumes, namely, Language. The work I mean is that of *Dionyſius, the Halicarnaſſian, upon the compoſition of words*, an author of whom I have made more uſe in this work than of any other, as indeed I have been more inſtructed by him in every thing relating to ſtile and compoſition than by all the other authors I have read put together. This work, though it be entitled *Of Compoſition* only, yet treats likewiſe of the analyſis of language; and indeed it is impoſſible to underſtand perfectly any compound of any kind, without knowing the elements of which it is compoſed.

To compoſe and decompoſe all the words of the Greek language, not only with reſpect to the ſound, but alſo with reſpect to to the ſenſe, would be to write a whole Greek grammar; but this was not the intention of the Halicarnaſſian: He meant

only to conſider the ſound of it in different kinds of writing, whether verſe or proſe. And even this is a great work, if we conſider what a variety there is in the ſound of the Greek language.

And, firſt, as to the letters, or elemental ſounds, (for he carries his analyſis that far), there is all the variety that, I believe, is poſſible. And, in the firſt place, the Greeks have all the five vowels; and theſe, I believe, are all the ſounds purely vocal, which the human mouth can utter. Now, this is not the caſe of every language, as I have taken occaſion elſewhere to obſerve *; and even the Engliſh wants the ſound of one vowel, ſubſtituting in place of it a diphthong. The Greek grammarians commonly reckon ſeven vowels in their language; but two of them, viz. the η and the ω are no more than the ε and the ο marked by different characters when they are long: And I wiſh, for my own part, as I never made a profeſſed ſtudy of ſhort and long ſyllables, that they had diſtinguiſhed all the other vowels in the ſame way; or, what I ſhould have liked bet-

* Vol. 4. of this work, p. 177. and following.

ter, though it would have occaſioned more writing, that they had diſtinguiſhed the long vowels as the Latins did of old, by writing them double*. But, as it is, I obſerve, that, in pronouncing the Greek, I mark the quantity of the vowels much better than in pronouncing the Latin. As the Latin is a very antient dialect of the Greek, I think, it is very likely that the Greeks of old marked the long vowels in the ſame way that the Latins did, and their long ο or their ω is plainly two *omicrons* joined together. One thing is certain, that the alphabet of 16 letters, which the Greeks got from the Phaenicians, has no different characters for long and ſhort vowels.—As to conſonants, the Greeks have all the variety poſſible of them, *liquid* and *mute*, *labial*, *palatal*, and *guttural*, *aſpirated* and *ſoft*, and a *middle* kind betwixt theſe two †.

Of this variety of elemental ſounds ſyllables are compoſed, of which ſome muſt, conſequently, be of harſher, ſome of ſofter,

* Vol. 2. p. 320.

† Vol. 2. p. 232. and following.

ſound, according to the nature of the letters, which compoſe them. And there is one diſtinction of ſyllables in Greek, which is not to be found in any language of Europe, and that is the diſtinction which the different *tones*, called by the antient grammarians *accents*, put upon them, make. This is ſo remote, not only from our practice, but from our ideas of the pronunciation of language, that there are ſome among us, who do not believe that the Greeks, or any other people, ſpoke in that way. But, if they have not Greek learning enough to underſtand what the Halicarnaſſian has ſo diſtinctly told us in this work upon compoſition, which, I think, I have made by my tranſlation * intelligible even to a man who does not underſtand Greek, and if nothing but facts will ſatisfy them, they ſhould go over to America, and there they will hear the Iroquois ſpeak with all that variety of melody and rhythm with which the antient Greeks ſpoke †.

* Vol. 2. p. 284.

† This information I had from a very ingenious man, Dr Moyes, who was three years in America, and

Another property of ſyllables in Greek, is, that ſome of them are long and ſome of them are ſhort. A ſyllable is long in two ways, either by the vowel being long,

being a man of great curioſity, was very much among the Savages, as we call them, as well as among the Provincials. And I could truſt more to what he told me of the muſic of the Iroquois language, that he is blind, and I am perſuaded his ear for muſic is much the better for that reaſon; and, beſides that, he practiſes muſic very much, and is a performer upon ſeveral inſtruments. He told me that their acute accent was, like the Greek, commonly confined within a *fifth*. But, he ſaid, they ſometimes ſtarted to an *octave*. This, I ſuppoſe, happens when they are much agitated by paſſion, which naturally makes men muſical. They have alſo, he told me, the diſtinction of long and ſhort ſyllables, and in the ratio of the long to the ſhort as *two* to *one*, in the ſame manner as in the learned languages: So that they have rhythm in their languages as well as melody. Of the rhythm of their language, I was informed by another gentleman. And I alſo heard ſomething of their ſyllabic tones, but nothing diſtinctly, as my information came from perſons who had not a good ear for muſic, without which ſuch languages can neither be ſpoken nor underſtood. This is the caſe of the Chineſe language, as I was told by Mr Beving, an Engliſh gentleman, who had been two and thirty years in China, having been ſent thither very young by the Eaſt India Company, in order to learn their language, and ſo qualify himſelf to be their factor at Canton.

or by two conſonants following the vowel, which, neceſſarily retarding the voice in pronunciation, makes the vowel long, though, by its nature, it be ſhort. A ſhort ſyllable is that which has a ſhort vowel, and not lengthened in the way above mentioned. One ſhort ſyllable, as the Halicarnaſſian has obſerved, may be longer than another, though it ſtill continue to be reckoned a ſhort ſyllable; and this is cauſed by the number of conſonants preceding the vowel in the ſyllable, not following it; for, otherwiſe, they would make the ſyllable long. Of this he has given us ſome examples *. One long ſyllable may alſo be longer than another, if the vowel be of itſelf long, and be followed by two or more conſonants: And, if ſome of theſe conſonants be aſpirated, it will ſtill be longer. Syllables of this kind that are either ſhorter or longer, as the vowel happens to be joined with more or fewer conſonants, are ſaid by the Halicarnaſſian to be ἄλογοι, that is, *without any fixed ratio*, by which they are determined to be long-

* Cap. 15.

er than long ſyllables, or ſhorter than ſhort; for ſo nice were thoſe antient ears, that they perceived even this difference among ſyllables; and accordingly the Halicarnaſſian takes notice of it in the examples he has given us of numerous compoſition both in verſe and proſe *.

And here I cannot help obſerving, that, upon the ſubject of long and ſhort ſyllables, which form the rhythm of the antient languages, and was a thing of the greateſt conſequence in their compoſition both of verſe and proſe, the Halicarnaſſian is much more accurate and diſtinct than Cicero, who has alſo treated the ſame ſubject at conſiderable length in his *Orator*. He has puzzled, I think, and perplexed the matter by making a diſtinction betwixt rhythm and feet; whereas the Halicarnaſſian tells us, that there is no diſtinction, and that any foot makes by itſelf rhythm †: And, I think, it is certain, that, wherever the ear perceives a ratio betwixt two ſyllables, (for

* Cap. 17.

† Cap. 17. *in initio.*

a foot muſt conſiſt of at leaſt two ſyllables, and not of more than three, according to the Halicarnaſſian), whether it be a ratio of equality, or of *two* to *one*, there, of neceſſity, rhythm muſt be.

As ſyllables are compoſed of letters, ſo words are compoſed of ſyllables; and of words are made periods and members of periods; and thus the compoſition of writing or ſpeaking is compleated. And here the Halicarnaſſian lets us know, that it is not of the choice of words he ſpeaks, but only of the compoſition of them; for, as to the choice of words, he promiſes his pupil, *Rufus Melitus*, another birth-day preſent upon that ſubject *. But either he did not keep his word, or the work is loſt. And it is further to be obſerved, that, when he ſpeaks of compoſition, he does not mean the compoſition of the words in ſyntax, but only the compoſition of them ſo as to pleaſe the ear by giving to them the proper melody and rhythm. It is therefore, as I have obſerved, neither the ſenſe nor

* Cap. 1. *in fine.*

the grammatical conſtruction of the words that is the ſubject of this very learned and accurate treatiſe, but merely the ſound of them: This may appear to ſome a very inſignificant thing, and unworthy to be made the ſubject of any work. But we ought to conſider that language was made to be ſpoken. This was the firſt uſe of it in all nations; and in many nations it is no otherwiſe uſed at this day. Even where it is written, reading is the beſt teſt of the ſtile and compoſition, as I have elſewhere obſerved. And, if the ſound be a material part of every language, it is more ſo of the Greek than of any other, I believe, in the world that either is, or ever has been; for it has the greateſt beauty, and at the ſame time the greateſt variety in its pronunciation that can well be conceived: And, if the Halicarnaſſian had known any language ſo barbarous as the modern languages of Europe, he would have ſhown, by comparing the Greek with thoſe languages, how much ſuperior it was not only in the ſenſe, but in the ſound of the words. He would have ſhown, for example, that the Greek had not only all the

ſimple vocal ſounds, which it is poſſible for the human mouth to utter, and which many of the barbarous languages have not, and even ſome of the European languages, which to call barbarous, would be thought an indignity to the nations that ſpeak them, but theſe vocal ſounds the Greeks compound, making what they call Diphthongs, which ſwell and raiſe the ſound of the language very much; and, beſides what are properly called Diphthongs, they had other compounded vocal ſounds, which they called Improper Diphthongs; but which we cannot diſtinguiſh by our pronunciation from the ſimple vowels. Then, of conſonants, as I have obſerved, they had all the variety of Liquids and Mutes, of Aſpirated and Soft, all formed by different organs of pronunciation, which muſt have given all the variety, that it is poſſible to conceive, to the ſound of their language, and made it neither too ſoft and ſweet, which is a fault of ſome modern languages, particularly of the Italian, nor too rough and harſh, which is the caſe of the Engliſh, and of every language where there

are ſo many monoſyllables, and theſe crouded with conſonants, ſometimes ſeven conſonants for one vowel, as in the word *ſtrength*, and the laſt letter not only a mute, which never happens in Greek, but an aſpirated mute. In ſuch a language, it is impoſſible there can be an agreeable flow: Whereas in Greek, by a proper choice and arrangement of the words, there may be as agreeable a flow as articulate ſounds are capable of, and at the ſame time variety enough by the mixture of ſounds more auſtere or even harſh. This could be effected even at the time the Halicarnaſſian wrote, after the language was formed; and it is the buſineſs of this treatiſe to ſhow how it could be done. But in earlier times, before the language was brought to a fixed ſtandard, which was the caſe when Homer wrote, there was a wonderful liberty taken with words, not only in forming them ſo as to expreſs by the ſound the nature of the things they repreſented, of which the Halicarnaſſian has given us ſundry examples, but in adding to them, or taking from them, or otherwiſe changing them after they were formed, ſo as to

make them join and run together agreeably in compoſition. Some of this liberty was preſerved in the Attic Greek, even at the time the Halicarnaſſian wrote; for they frequently uſed apoſtrophes and elided vowels, and in that way run ſyllables together, or they ſometimes added a vowel to the end of the word, and by that means a ſyllable. Thus, in place of τουτον, they ſaid τουτονι; and in place of τουτου, they ſaid τουτουι. What an agreeable variety this muſt have made in the compoſition, is eaſy to imagine *.

But there is one thing that I am ſure the Halicarnaſſian would have inſiſted much upon, had he known the difference betwixt Greek and the modern languages of Europe, and that is the wonderful variety of arrangement, which the declenſions of nouns, and their caſes, genders, and numbers, allow to the writer and ſpeaker in Greek, and which, in my opinion, adds to the beauty and variety of

* See in Demoſthenes τουτοι in the beginning of the Oration *De Corona*, and τουτουι in the beginning of the Oration againſt Ariſtocrates.

the compoſition more than all the other things mentioned by the Halicarnaſſian put together. It is this wonderful art of the learned languages, which, beſides the variety of terminations and flections that it gives to the words, enables the compoſers in thoſe languages to arrange the words in ſentences, almoſt in any order they pleaſe, ſetting, ſometimes at a conſiderable diſtance from one another, words, which, by the ſyntax, are neceſſarily joined together. Of this I have given a fine example in an ode of Horace, which Milton by tranſlating into Engliſh, and endeavouring to imitate the variety of Horace's arrangement, has ſhown the great defect, in that reſpect, of the Engliſh language *. I have alſo ſhown in the ſame volume that what is called the Natural Order of words, has truly no foundation in Nature †; and the Halicarnaſſian has beſtowed a chapter to prove that the Natural Order, by which the noun is put before the verb, the verb before the adverb, and what is firſt in or-

* Vol. 4. p. 130.

† Ibid. p. 131.

der of time before what is laſt, is not at all more beautiful than any other order or arrangement of words, which the language will permit *.

But, beſides the pleaſure which this variety of arrangement muſt neceſſarily give to the ear, it has a conſiderable effect upon the ſenſe; for the words of the ſentence, placed in a certain order, will convey the meaning more forcibly than in any other order. This, I think, I have ſhown very clearly in the diſſertation annexed to the ſecond volume of this work. But this not only the Halicarnaſſian has taken no notice of, (nor indeed did it belong to his ſubject, which relates only to the ſound of the language), but no other author antient or modern, as far as I know, who has written upon the ſubject of language.

When we add to all the things I have mentioned, the melody, which the tones of the Greek language muſt have produced in ſpeaking, and of which a variety was

* Cap. 5,

required, as the Halicarnaſſian informs us, as well as of other things belonging to the language;—then the rhythm, which, joined with the melody of their accents, muſt have made their language as muſical as it was poſſible that a language could be, and which, as the Halicarnaſſian has obſerved, diſtinguiſhed the ſtiles of the different authors very remarkably *;—when, I ſay, we join all theſe things together, I think we may conclude, that there was a beauty in the orations of Demoſthenes, when pronounced by himſelf, of which we men of modern times can hardly form an idea.—But to return to the Halicarnaſſian.

The tendency of all his rules for compoſition, he tells us, is to form a ſtile that is both beautiful and pleaſant. The diſtinction betwixt theſe two he does not much inſiſt upon; and indeed to diſtinguiſh them accurately belongs more to philoſophy than

* Cap. 11. 13. & 19. See alſo what I have written upon the antient accents, and the uſe of them in compoſition, vol. 2. book 3. chap. 7.; and upon the rhythm of antient proſe, ib. chap. 10.

to criticiſm: And all, I think, that is neceſſary to be ſaid upon the ſubject by a critic, is, that the one is perceived by the ſenſe, I mean what is pleaſant, the other more by the judgment: And it may be added, that what is pleaſant to a man of good taſte, is alſo beautiful; and again, what is beautiful, is to a man of taſte alſo pleaſant. I think, therefore, the Halicarnaſſian has very properly joined them together, and given us rules by which a ſtile is to be made both beautiful and pleaſant.

There are four things, he ſays, that make compoſition both beautiful and pleaſant, as far as it can be made by the ſound only. The *firſt* is a noble melody; the *ſecond*, a dignified rhythm; the *third*, proper variations and changes; the *fourth* and *laſt*, what is decent, proper, and ſuitable to the ſubject, without which no compoſition, nor any work of art can be either beautiful or pleaſant; for, ſays he, it is of it that Beauty chiefly conſiſts *.

* Cap. 13.

The application of theſe rules for compoſition depends upon the nature of letters, ſyllables, and words. And it is here that he enters into a moſt minute and accurate diſſection of the elements of language, upon which I have taken occaſion to make obſervations in ſundry paſſages of this work, which I will not here repeat. He is very copious upon the ſubject of change and variety, without which it is evident there can be no beauty in any work of art; and he is ſtill more copious upon the ſubject of rhythm: And he ſhows very clearly that it was eſſential to the beauty of proſe compoſition, though, at the time he wrote, it was quite neglected. And not only ſo, but many were of opinion that it was ridiculous to meaſure and number ſyllables in proſe compoſition. But the Halicarnaſſian was of a different opinion; and he has ſcanned and reduced to feet ſome fine paſſages in Plato, Demoſthenes, and Thucydides, as carefully as he would have ſcanned any piece of poetry. And not only from them has he given us examples of fine numerous compoſition, but he has contraſted theſe with

examples of the worſt compoſition from an author, whom he calls Hegeſias *, and which is indeed ſo bad, that even my ears are offended with it.

Upon the other two of the four things above mentioned he inſiſts at conſiderable length, illuſtrating whatever he ſays by examples from the beſt authors; and particularly with reſpect to the laſt of the two, namely, the compoſition that is proper and ſuitable to the ſubject, he has given us ſome of the fineſt illuſtrations from Homer that can be imagined.

Before I have done with theſe four things, I muſt obſerve, that, with regard to the firſt of them, viz. the Melody, he has ſaid very little, giving us neither rules nor examples, but only telling us in general, that there muſt be a variety in the Tones, as well as in every other part of the compoſition; and therefore that there muſt not be many words together

* Cap. 18

accented in the ſame manner. The reaſon of this I take to be, that the melody of common ſpeech was not, nor indeed could well be reduced to exact rules, like the muſic of ſinging or of inſtruments. The acute accent, as the Halicarnaſſian tells us, roſe to about a fifth *, without pretending exactly to determine how much higher or lower it might have been, as that muſt have depended very much upon the voice and ear of the ſpeaker. The caſe of the Melody of Muſic was very different: For, in the *firſt* place, it was of very much greater compaſs, and roſe very much higher. 2*dly*, It did not proceed by Slides as the tones of ſpeech did, but by meaſured intervals, accurately diſtinguiſhed one from another. And this was an eſſential difference betwixt the muſic of ſinging and of inſtruments, which was all *Diaſtematic*, as they expreſſed it, that is, diſtinguiſhed by meaſured intervals, and the muſic of ſpeech, which was all συνεχης, or εν ρυσει, that is, *proceeding by ſlides*. It is therefore not to be wondered, that the

* Cap. 11. The expreſſion is ὡς ἐγγιστα.

muſic of the firſt kind was reduced to a regular ſyſtem, and a ſyſtem much more comprehenſive than our ſyſtem; for it was divided into three kinds, the *Diatonic*, which is our only ſyſtem, but what was no more than the vulgar muſic among them; *2dly*, the *Chromatic*; and, *3dly*, the *Enharmonic*.

Having finiſhed what he had to ſay upon the four things which make a ſtile beautiful and pleaſant, he proceeds to give an account of the different characters or diſtinguiſhing marks of ſtile, which he divides into three, the *auſtere*, the *florid*, and the *middle* betwixt theſe two, to which he gives the name of *common*, as partaking of each of the other two, but avoiding what is extreme in either*. In treating of theſe different ſtiles, he has made excellent obſervations upon the joining of words together, ſo as to make the compoſition rough and auſtere, pleaſant and florid, or a middle betwixt theſe two, and which will apply to all languages more or leſs, as well as to the Greek. He compares, I think not un-

* Cap. 21. & 22.

fitly, a man who compoſes with words, to a maſon or builder, who makes his work of materials very different, but theſe he puts together ſo as to make rough work, or ſmooth and poliſhed, or ſomething betwixt the two *. Here, likewiſe, he illuſtrates what he ſays by examples from great authors of theſe different ſtiles, Pindar as a poet, and Thucydides as an hiſtorian, for the auſtere ſtile. Of the ſmooth and flowery, he has given us an example in verſe from Sappho, and in proſe from Iſocrates. And to theſe examples he moſt accurately and minutely applies the rules he had laid down for each of the ſtiles; nor do I think that he could have taught his pupil, to whom he addreſſes the work, with greater exactneſs and preciſion. Of the middle ſtile, he tells us, that Homer, the fountain of all fine writing of every kind, is the moſt perfect model, as well as of the other two. He in the Epic, of the Lyrics Steſichorus and Alcaeus, Sophocles of Tragedians, Herodotus of Hiſtorians, Demoſthenes of Orators, and of Philoſophers Democritus,

* Cap. 6.

Plato, and Ariſtotle. But he gives us no examples from theſe authors, as he had given examples from the authors who have written in the two ſtiles, betwixt which this middle ſtile lies.

Our author concludes his treatiſe with two very curious problems: The firſt is, how proſe is to be made like to verſe, and yet continue proſe: The other is, how verſe is to be made like to proſe, and yet be ſtill verſe. When this can be properly done, our author thinks it is the perfection of writing, as it gives to each of the two compoſitions all the beauty of the other, as far as the nature of the thing will permit.

He begins with the firſt of theſe problems, which was ſo little known at the time he wrote, that he conſidered it as a myſtery not to be communicated to the profane vulgar; and therefore he bids them keep at a diſtance, uſing that form of words, which was uſed in the initiations into the myſteries of Ceres *. And here

* Cap. 25. The words are to be found in a famous verſe of Orpheus.

Φθεγξομαι οἰς θεμις ἐστι, θυρας δ' επιθεσθε, βεβηλοι.

he tells us, that it is not by uſing poetical words and figures of ſpeech, that we are to make our proſe poetical with reſpect to the numbers, of which only he here ſpeaks, but it is by compoſing common words in ſuch a manner as to give a certain rhythm even to proſe, and to make it numerous without being aſtricted to certain numbers as verſe is. Now, I think, this ſhould not appear ſo great a myſtery even to us of theſe later times, if we conſider that the ſame ſyllables are long or ſhort both in verſe and proſe; and, therefore, that even in proſe theſe ſyllables muſt form feet, and, conſequently, produce a rhythm of one kind or another. Now the ſecret is, ſays our author, to make that rhythm agreeable to the ear, and yet not ſo regular, and with ſuch returns at ſtated intervals as to make verſe. That this is poſſible, I think I can certainly conclude from theory, though my ear is not formed to perceive the rhythm of this kind, and not even the true rhythm of verſe, becauſe I have not the practice of reading the antient verſe in the antient manner, that is, by quantity. But our author affirms, that it is not only poſſible to compoſe proſe in that way, but that the

Orations of Demoſthenes are actually ſo compoſed. And he gives two examples, the one from his oration againſt Ariſtocrates, and the other from the famous oration for Cteſiphon. I think it is impoſſible to deny that his learned ear perceived thoſe numbers, which I do not perceive, though I can ſay that the compoſition pleaſes my ear very much, and appears to me perfectly different from the compoſition of Hegeſias above mentioned.

This way of making verſe of proſe anſwered very well in a language where every thing in common diſcourſe was ſpoken with a rhythm of one kind or another; but it will not anſwer in a language ſuch as ours, in which there is no rhythm of long or ſhort ſyllables. If, therefore, we will verſify our proſe, it muſt be by accented and unaccented ſyllables, in the ſame way as we make our verſe. This has been attempted by ſeveral; but this alone will not do with common words, as in Greek. The words, therefore, and figures muſt be poetical; and even in that way, it has not, in my opinion, ſucceeded with any writer,

except perhaps with my Lord Shaftsbury in his *Rhapsody*, where he puts it only into the mouth of one of his perſonages, whom he repreſents as carried by the enthuſiaſm of philoſophy altogether out of the common ſtile of ſpeech. He has been ſo judicious, that, in no other part of that fine work, he has attempted this poetical proſe. In ſome other of his works, where he has affected to give numbers to his proſe, he has by no means ſucceeded, at leaſt in my judgment *.

But, if we have not been fortunate in our attempts to make poetry of proſe, it is impoſſible to deny, that Milton has given to his poetry in Paradiſe Loſt all the beauty of proſe compoſition; for he has broken and cut his verſe into periods and members of periods, finer, I think, than any that are to be found in our proſe, unleſs, perhaps, in his own proſe writings: And there is a paſſage in the laſt chapter of the Halicarnaſſian upon this kind of ſtile, ſo applicable to Milton's verſe, that one can-

* See vol. 3. of this work, p. 284. in the note.

not find better words to deſcribe it. 'Whoever,' ſays he, 'would ſucceed in 'this ſtile, muſt fit and adjuſt the words 'ſo that the members of the periods ſhall 'be properly diſtinguiſhed from one ano-'ther, not concluding with the verſe, but 'cutting the meaſure, and not equal or 'like to one another. He muſt ſometimes, 'too, throw into the verſe very ſhort ſen-'tences, (in Greek κομματα), not ſo long 'as the members of periods; and his pe-'riods muſt not be of equal length, nor of 'the ſame figure and ſtructure, theſe at leaſt 'that are joined together in the compoſi-'tion; for,' ſays he, 'it is the apparent 'diſorder in the rhythm and meaſure that 'makes verſe reſemble proſe *.' To give

* I will give the author's words: Τον δε βουλομενον εν τουτῳ τῳ μερει κατορθουν, τα της λεξιος μορια δει πολυειδως στρεφειν τε και συναρμοττειν, και τα κωλα εν διαστημασι ποιειν ασυμμετρως, μη συναπαρτιζοντα τοις στιχοις, αλλα διαστηματα τον μετρον, αριστα δε ποιειν αυτα και ανομοια. Πολλακις δε και εις κομματα συναγειν βραχυτερα κωλων, της τε περιοδους μητε ισομεγεθεις μητε ὁμοιοσχημονας, της γουν παρακειμενας αλληλαις, εργαζεσθαι· εγγιστα γαρ φαινεται λογοις, το παρα τους ρυθμους και τα μετρα πεπλανημενον. Here it may be obſerved, that I have adopted Upton's correction of the text, and read ασυμμετρως in place of συμμετρως.

examples of this from Milton, as the Halicarnaſſian has done from Greek authors, would be to tranſcribe a great part of the *Paradiſe Loſt*: And it would be the more unneceſſary, as I have elſewhere * given examples from Milton, ſuch as may ſuffice to ſhow the beauty of Milton's verſe in this reſpect. I will only add here, that Milton has not only made periods in his verſe, but has thrown into theſe periods parentheſes, by which he has moſt agreeably diverſified the ſtile †. It is alſo to be obſerved, that his periods are beſt marked and

But I reject his tranſlation of the laſt part of the paſſage, where he would make Dionyſius ſay, that, in order to make verſe like to proſe, there muſt be errors committed in the rhythm and the meaſure; for then it would ceaſe to be verſe, and be proſe altogether. But our author's meaning certainly is, that there ſhould only be an apparent diſorder, or wandering, as it may be called, in the meaſure.

* Vol. 4. of this work, p. 269.;—vol. 2. p. 355. and following.

† See, upon the ſubject of *parentheſis*, and particularly of Milton's parentheſes, vol. 2. p. 561. where I have obſerved a pretty long one, that had not been before obſerved. See alſo vol. 3. p. 75.

diſtinguiſhed where they ſhould be, that is, in the ſpeeches: And I cannot help further obſerving, how extraordinary it appears to be, to deny that Milton excels in writing proſe, when to his poetry he gives the beauty of proſe writing.

The author who comes neareſt to Milton, in blank verſe, is Dr Armſtrong in his *Art of preſerving Health.* Of this admirable poem the diction is more ſplendid than even of Milton's Paradiſe Loſt; but the verſification has not ſo much the merit of giving the verſe the beauties of proſe compoſition. And particularly it has but few of thoſe periods with which Milton has adorned his poetry ſo much.

How unlike to the verſe of Milton is our rhyming verſe, and particularly Mr Pope's, ſo much praiſed and admired, where the ſenſe is commonly concluded with the verſe, or at leaſt with the diſtich! Now, I can hardly conceive a compoſition more tediouſly uniform than a compoſition in ſentences (for they cannot be called periods) of ten, or at moſt twenty ſyllables,

and every two lines tagged with a rhyme. But, beſides that, there is almoſt always a certain pauſe in the middle of Mr Pope's verſe, very like to the pauſe in the middle of the French long verſe; and this pauſe, together with the pauſe at the end of each line, and at the end of every two lines, makes ſuch a diſguſting uniformity and ſameneſs, as is not to be found in any antient compoſition of any kind, and is therefore intolerable, eſpecially in a work of any length, to an ear accuſtomed to the variety of antient compoſition.

It may be objected to Milton's verſification, that, by his periods and members of periods, he has made his compoſition ſo perfectly proſaical, that the verſe is loſt. But to this I anſwer, that he has always contrived to terminate his verſe with a word upon which the ſenſe requires that ſome emphaſis be laid, even if the compoſition were altogether proſe. Now, where an emphaſis is laid upon a word, there is always ſome ſtop of the voice more or leſs, and that ſtop will mark the verſe: But,

as I have elſewhere obſerved*, it is a matter of delicacy juſt to mark this ſtop, but not to make it too long; for that would deſtroy the beauty of the compoſition in periods, and even make the ſenſe obſcure. I have obſerved that in Shakeſpeare's blank verſe, when he runs the verſes into one another, which happens but ſeldom, (for he does not compoſe verſe in periods, as Milton does), and in other blank verſe of that age, the poet is not ſufficiently attentive to conclude the line with a word of emphaſis; ſo that there can be no ſtop at all properly made at the end of the verſe; and therefore either the verſe muſt not be marked, or the ſenſe muſt be injured.

And here I conclude my obſervations upon this piece of the Halicarnaſſian, upon which I have enlarged the more, as I think it the moſt elegant piece of didactic writing that I know; for there is in it an elegance and copiouſneſs of ſtile which I do not find in any other writing of the kind, not even in the works of Ariſtotle.

* Vol. 4. of this work, p. 241. and following.

There is a variety, too, in the compoſition, which I think admirable; and particularly he has avoided that tedious ſameneſs, which I have obſerved * in a great deal of the Latin compoſition, I mean the concluding the ſentence or member of the ſentence with a verb. This little work, I am perſuaded, coſt him more pains than any thing of the ſame ſize that he has written; and indeed it was very natural, that, as the ſubject of it was Compoſition, he ſhould make the compoſition of it as perfect as he could make it, ſo that it might give his pupil not only the precepts of the art, but an example of the practice of it. I hope my friends at Oxford, when they give us that new edition of the Halicarnaſſian's works, which I have recommended to them †, will beſtow particular attention upon this work, ſo neceſſary to be ſtudied by every man who deſires to form a taſte of the beauty of antient compoſition. Some paſſages in it have been very well corrected by Sylburgius, Upton, and others: And theſe corrections are ſo ob-

* Vol. 4. p. 227. and following.

† P. 148. of this vol.—and p. 288. of vol. 4.

vious and certain, that they ought to be taken into the text, and the common reading degraded to the bottom of the page. But there are other paſſages that have not been corrected, but which abſolutely require it; of which I obſerve one in the very laſt ſentence of the treatiſe, where he exhorts his pupil not only to learn the precepts of the art, but to practiſe them: 'For,' ſays he, 'it will depend 'upon your labour in that way, whether 'the precepts are to be of any uſe to you 'or not *.'

* His words are: Ου γαρ αυταρκη τα παραγγελματα των τεχνων εστι δειλους αυταγωνιστας ποιησαι τους βουλομενους διχα μελετης τε και γυμνασιας· αλλ' επι τοις πονειν και κακοπαθειν κειται, ἡ σπουδαια ειναι τα παραγγελματα και λογου αξια, ἡ φαυλα και αχρηστα. Here I agree with Upton, that the words τους βουλομενους have no ſenſe at all, and therefore ought to be left out; but, in the following member of the ſentence, I would make a very ſlight correction, by reading τῳ in place of τοις, and αλλ' επι τῳ πονειν και κακοπαθειν κειται, ἡ σπουδαια, &c. So that I underſtand κειται impersonally: and the meaning is: 'That it depends upon application and labour whe-'ther the precepts ſhall be of any uſe or not.' This ſenſe, I think, agrees much better with the words than if we were to retain the τοις, and read, as Upton would have us do, επι τοις βουλομενοις πονειν.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

Pag. 42. line 19. Seneca, *lege* Quintilian
— 22. σκοτιζε *lege* σκοτισον
100. 2. in the Note *Lugubinae lege Eugubinae*
— 10. in the Note *Lugubinae lege Eugubinae*
162. ult. 1700 *lege* 700
265. 19. to *lege* too
325. 3. De L'Argent, *lege* Dargens.
339. 1. in the Note lib. 2. *lege* lib. XI.
381. 12. *magnitude lege magnitude,*

TO THE BINDER.

Cancel pages 173, 174, 261, and 262.

DOES NOT
CIRCULATE

DOES NOT
CIRCULATE